Boeing Company v. King County
This text of 457 P.2d 595 (Boeing Company v. King County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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We have before us appeals in certain consolidated actions which arise out of a lease by King County to the Boeing Company (hereafter Boeing). This was a 75-year lease of considerable portions of the property generally known as Boeing Field.1 The lease was executed September 14, 1955, and states that it is made pursuant to the authority of Laws of 1953, ch. 178 (RCW 14.08.120 (5)). It provides, inter alia, that for each 5-year period after June 30, 1962, the rentals could be readjusted provided that the party to the lease desiring adjustment gives the other party [495]*495a written request for such adjustment at least 30 days before the commencement of the next 5-year period. The readjustment clause provides further that if the parties fail to reach an agreement on the rentals, they shall submit to arbitration. The language used in the lease is almost verbatim the language of the statute to which we have just referred.
King County is insisting on an arbitration of the rentals for the period beginning July 1, 1967 and ending June 30, 1972; and Boeing is insisting that the arbitration should be stayed as there was no timely request for a readjustment of the rentals. From judgments of the Kang County Superior Court directing that the arbitration proceed, Boeing appeals; and King County also appeals for reasons hereinafter indicated.
The whole controversy could have been avoided by a little more formality in the operations of county government and little more meticulous attention to detail and verbiage. It becomes here largely a question of semantics.2 The question is: did King County make a “written request” for a readjustment of rentals for 1967-1972?
May 11, 1967, King County’s airport manager sent a letter3 to the county commissioners stating that the rentals [496]*496under the lease with Boeing were due for readjustment on June 30, 1967. He then wrote Boeing on May 22nd, enclosing a copy of the May 11 letter to the county commissioners. In the letter to Boeing4 he stated that the copy was self-explanatory and asked that if Boeing had any factual information or comment relevant to the readjustment to furnish it to him.
June 8, Boeing informed the county that it doubted whether the May 22 letter complied with the notice requirement of the lease and the applicable statute,5 and that it questioned whether there could be a rental adjustment for the 1967-1972 period.
In its brief, Boeing asks two questions: (1) Was the letter given by a party to the lease; and (2) Did it constitute a “written request” for rental adjustment? It answers both questions in the negative, and concludes therefrom that no [497]*497request having been made, there should be no readjustment in rentals.
Both questions were answered in the affirmative by the trial court. True, there was no formal resolution by the Board of County Commissioners, and the word “request” appears no place in the May 22nd letter from the airport manager. However, establishing that the letter of May 22 to Boeing was from “King County,” two county commissioners made affidavits which state that the airport manager had prior approval of the county commissioners for all steps to be taken by him in an effort to secure a readjustment of the rentals.
Boeing does not question that it had notice of the county’s desire for a readjustment of the rentals for the 5-year period (1967-1972) and, in fact, it negotiated6 with King County for several months. When the negotiations appeared fruitless, King County made a demand for arbitration. It seems to us that, under the wording of the statute and the lease, “request” meant no more than “notice,” for if the parties did not agree on a readjustment of the rentals, arbitration was required. “Request” implies a right of choice by the person to whom a request is made, i.e., a right in this case to adjust rentals or to refuse to do so. Boeing, however, had no such choice. It could only agree to the readjustment or submit to arbitration with no right of choice as to the final rental figure.
No amount of quibbling over forms and terms avoids the basic fact that Boeing was advised that King County was expecting a readjustment of the lease terms for 1967-1972 and that Boeing was required to negotiate a readjustment or submit to arbitration.
The trial court correctly decided that Boeing had received “a request” from King County within the purview of the lease and statute for the readjustment of the rentals for 1967-1972 and that no agreement or readjustment having been reached, Boeing was obligated to proceed with arbitration.
[498]*498This disposes of the primary issue in this litigation. There remains a consideration of King County’s appeal, on which it urges that the trial court erred in holding that the lease between King County and Boeing was “controlled solely by chapter 178, Laws of 1953.” As stated in footnote 5, King County contends that the applicable statute is Laws of 1951, ch. 41 (RCW 36.34.180); we there pointed out the distinction between the two statutes on which the county relies.
The parties have both asked for a declaratory judgment as to which statute governs this particular lease: Laws of 1953, ch. 178 (RCW 14.08.120(5)), or Laws of 1951, ch. 41 (RCW 36.34.180).
It was the trial court’s view that the lease could have been made under either statute, and that they present alternative and not conflicting procedures. We agree. It was also the trial court’s view that it having been specifically stated in the lease that it was prepared pursuant to Laws of 1953, ch. 178, and the lease having quoted the language of that statute in the readjustment clause, it was clearly intended to be the controlling statute. Again we agree.
King County does not have to use that statute in such leases, but having elected to use it, it cannot repudiate some of the terms of the statute merely because it thinks the terms of some other statute are more advantageous to it.
The judgment is affirmed in Boeing’s appeal, and also on King County’s appeal.
Hunter, C. J., Finley, Hamilton, and Hale, JJ., concur.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
457 P.2d 595, 76 Wash. 2d 493, 1969 Wash. LEXIS 676, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boeing-company-v-king-county-wash-1969.