Bock v. Becerra

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: October 2, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2002
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LATRYCIA R. BOCK,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-cv-2002 (CRC)

ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR.,1 et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This is the second of two lawsuits filed by Latrycia R. Bock against various officials and

employees of the United States Department of Health and Human Services. In the first case

(“Bock I”), Bock alleged that she was subjected to discrimination and retaliation during her

employment at the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). See Complaint, Bock v. Kennedy,

No. 24-cv-2385 (D.D.C. July 5, 2024), Dkt. No. 1. This Court transferred Bock I to the District

of Maryland, which was the proper venue for her Title VII claims. See Opinion & Order, Bock

v. Kennedy, No. 24-cv-2385 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2025), Dkt. No. 50. In this case—filed three days

after Bock I— Bock brings discrimination claims against many of the same defendants. In fact,

the substance of the complaints appears to match word for word.2 In light of this “convoluted

and unusual” procedural history, the government asks the Court to either dismiss Bock’s

complaint or transfer the case to the District of Maryland. The Court will take the latter

approach.

1 By substitution pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25. 2 Bock later filed an amended complaint Bock I. See Motion to Amend Lawsuit, Bock v. Kennedy, No. 24-cv-2385 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2024), Dkt. No. 26. That amended complaint brings additional claims based on purported breaches of two settlement agreements. As the Court previously articulated in Bock I, this district is not the proper venue for

Bock’s discrimination claims. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et

seq., “provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal

employment.” Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976). Title VII’s special

venue provision states that claims may be brought in the judicial district in the State where

(1) the alleged wrongdoing was committed; (2) the relevant employment records are maintained

and administered; or (3) the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged discrimination. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The complaint in this case—like the complaint in Bock I—confirms that

the alleged discrimination occurred in Maryland. See Compl. at 3 (listing Bock’s “place of

employment” as the FDA’s office in Silver Spring, Maryland). Because this case is filed in the

wrong venue, the Court must “dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer” it to a district

“in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). As the Court noted in its prior

order, transfers are favored to “preserv[e] a petitioner’s ability to obtain review,” Nat’l Wildlife

Fed’n v. Browner, 237 F.3d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2001), especially when the plaintiff proceeds

pro se, see James v. Verizon Servs. Corp., 639 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing cases).

Even if this Court were a proper venue for some of Bock’s claims, the Court may

nevertheless transfer the entire case to another district where venue is proper “in the interest of

justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see Liu v. Mayorkas, 737 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2024) (noting

that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) are “mutually exclusive”). Because the

complaints in Bock I and this case appear to be word-for-word copies of one another, the Court

finds that both cases should be heard in the same district. Indeed, Bock previously conceded that

“consolidation [of the two cases] is the appropriate course of action to ensure judicial efficiency

and a full adjudication of all claims.” Pl.’s Resp. to O.S.C. (ECF No. 3) at 1.

2 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that [30] Defendants’ Motion to Transfer is GRANTED. It is further

ORDERED that this case shall be transferred to the United States District Court for the

District of Maryland. It is further

ORDERED that [30] Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as moot. It is further

ORDERED that [32] Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as moot.

SO ORDERED.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge

Date: October 2, 2025