Bobbitt v. Martuscello III

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedDecember 4, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-04909
StatusUnknown

This text of Bobbitt v. Martuscello III (Bobbitt v. Martuscello III) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bobbitt v. Martuscello III, (E.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ----------------------------------------------------------------X Richard Bobbitt,

Petitioner, MEMORANDUM & ORDER 23-CV-04909 (DG) -against-

Daniel F. Martuscello III, Commissioner N.Y.S. D.O.C.C.S.,

Respondent. ----------------------------------------------------------------X DIANE GUJARATI, United States District Judge: By Petition filed June 29, 2023, pro se Petitioner Richard Bobbitt, incarcerated at Auburn Correctional Facility, commenced this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his murder conviction in New York State Supreme Court, Kings County (“Kings County Supreme Court”). See generally Petition (“Pet.”), ECF No. 1.1 Petitioner has also moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See ECF No. 4. The Court grants Petitioner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, the Court has conducted an initial review of the Petition and, for the reasons set forth below, has determined that the Petition appears to be time-barred. The Court therefore directs Petitioner to submit an affirmation by February 5, 2024, explaining why his Petition

1 Under the “prison mailbox rule,” the operative filing date is the date on which the Petition was delivered to prison officials for forwarding to the Court. See Noble v. Kelly, 246 F.3d 93, 97- 98 (2d Cir. 2001). Here, Petitioner does not indicate the date on which he delivered the Petition to prison officials. See generally Pet. The Petition was received by the Court on June 29, 2023.

When citing to the Petition, the Court refers to the page numbers generated by the Court’s electronic case filing system (“ECF”). should not be dismissed as time-barred. BACKGROUND Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree in Kings County Supreme Court upon his plea of guilty. See People v. Bobbitt, 213 A.D.2d 417-18 (2d Dep’t 1995) (noting that judgment was rendered on March 18, 1994 and specifying nature of offense).2 Petitioner

indicates that he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 15 years to life. See Pet. at 1. Petitioner appealed his conviction and, on March 6, 1995, the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the conviction. See Bobbitt, 213 A.D.2d at 417-18; see also Pet. at 2. On June 6, 1995, the New York State Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals”) denied Petitioner’s application for leave to appeal. See People v. Bobbitt, 86 N.Y.2d 732 (1995); see also Pet. at 2. Petitioner did not file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See Pet. at 3. Petitioner appears to indicate in the Petition that he filed post-conviction motions, but Petitioner does not indicate when those motions were filed or decided. See Pet. at 6, 10-11.

DISCUSSION I. Applicable Law A. Statute of Limitations and Grace Period The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), signed into law on April 24, 1996, provides in relevant part: A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of – (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

2 The Petition itself does not specify the “[d]ate of the judgment of conviction.” See Pet. at 1. review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (“Section 2244(d)(1)”). “A judgment becomes final ‘after the denial of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court or the expiration of time for seeking certiorari.’” Davis v. Lempke, 767 F. App’x 151, 152 (2d Cir. 2019) (alteration accepted) (quoting Williams v. Artuz, 237 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 2001)). When a petitioner does not file a petition for certiorari seeking review in the United States Supreme Court, a state court conviction becomes final 90 days after the Court of Appeals either denies the petitioner’s application for leave to appeal or affirms the conviction. See McKinney v. Artuz, 326 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 2003); Santos v. Keyser, No. 21-CV-02859, 2022 WL 1092678, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2022) (citing Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012)). A petitioner whose conviction became final prior to AEDPA’s effective date of April 24, 1996 was afforded a one-year grace period within which to file his habeas corpus petition – i.e., until April 24, 1997. See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1998)). B. Tolling As relevant here, the period within which a petition must be filed can be tolled – i.e., paused – in two ways. First, AEDPA provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under [Section 2244(d)].” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (“Section 2244(d)(2)”). This tolling provision “applies to both the statute of limitations and the one-year grace period.” See Smith, 208 F.3d at 15-16.3

Second, even where not statutorily tolled, the period within which a petition must be filed may be tolled for equitable reasons. See Smith, 208 F.3d at 17; see also Celaj v. Artuz, 49 F. App’x 331, 333 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit “has held that equitable tolling can apply to the one-year statute of limitations contained in § 2244(d) or to the one-year grace period announced in Ross v. Artuz”). However, “[e]quitable tolling applies only in the rare and exceptional circumstance.” Smith, 208 F.3d at 17 (alteration accepted) (quotation omitted). To qualify for equitable tolling, a habeas petitioner must establish “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Dillon v. Conway, 642 F.3d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). The

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Jenkins v. Greene
630 F.3d 298 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Dillon v. Conway
642 F.3d 358 (Second Circuit, 2011)
James Williams v. Christopher Artuz
237 F.3d 147 (Second Circuit, 2001)
Casim Noble v. Walter R. Kelly, Superintendent
246 F.3d 93 (Second Circuit, 2001)
Diaz v. Kelly
515 F.3d 149 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Bolarinwa v. Williams
593 F.3d 226 (Second Circuit, 2010)
People v. Bobbitt
213 A.D.2d 417 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1995)
Holland v. Florida
177 L. Ed. 2d 130 (Supreme Court, 2010)
Celaj v. Artuz
49 F. App'x 331 (Second Circuit, 2002)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Bobbitt v. Martuscello III, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bobbitt-v-martuscello-iii-nyed-2023.