IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
BOBBIE F. WALLS, JR., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) 1:24CV1074 ) CITY OF GREENSBORO, DET. J.C. ) PAYNE, DET. M.P. O’HAL, DET. ) A.J. SMITH, DET. G.H. WILDE, ) DET. K.A. DENNY, DET. R.L. ) ARMSTRONG, OFC. WALKER, OFC.) TYLER, and OFC. HOOKER, ) ) Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Police officers with the City of The City of Greensboro (“the City”) Greensboro arrested, detained, and has moved to dismiss all claims charged Bobbie F. Walls, Jr. with against it, the official capacity claims crimes related to drug distribution, a against the individual defendants, drive-by shooting, and a separate and the punitive damages demand. discharge of a firearm. Walls See Def. City of Greensboro’s Mot. to contends officers lacked probable Dismiss, Docket Entry 15; Def. City of cause and knowingly made false Greensboro’s Mem. of Law in Support statements and material omissions to of Mot. to Dismiss (“Mem. in Supp.”), the Magistrates to obtain warrants Docket Entry 16. and charges. He has sued the defendants for these alleged acts and Because Walls has not sufficiently claims violations of his Fourth, pled Monell liability against the City, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments the federal claims against the City rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, should be dismissed. Likewise, Walls and false arrest, false imprisonment, has not alleged the City waived obstruction of justice, and defamation immunity from suit for state torts. per se in violation of North Carolina Further, because adequate state law. See generally Compl., Docket remedies can redress the alleged Entry 1. injuries, there is no direct state constitutional claim. Thus, the state law claims against the City should be security footage from Greensboro dismissed. Were any claim to survive Nissan, he saw “‘a black Cadillac against the City, Walls could not be Escalade’” swerve into the left lane to awarded punitive damages, and, avoid crashing into the victim’s car. therefore, his request for them should Id. ¶ 10. Walls does not drive a black be dismissed. And, finally, because Cadillac Escalade. Instead, he drives the official capacity claims against the a black Cadillac SRX, which is smaller individual defendants are duplicative than an Escalade. Id.¶ 14. of the claims against the City, they, too, should be dismissed. That same afternoon, the driver of a black Cadillac SUV discharged a In sum, the Court should grant the firearm out of the car while heading City’s motion. east on Landmark Center Boulevard. Id. at 33. Other detectives and officers I. FACTS at this scene told Hooker that “it appeared to them that the same ‘Black All well-pled facts are accepted as true Cadillac Escalade’ was involved in and considered in the light most [both shootings].” Id. ¶ 11. A witness favorable to the plaintiff. See Nemet to this shooting described the driver Chevrolet, Ltd. v. as “‘a black male in his late twenties Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d with long dreads possibly shoulder 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation length.’” Id. These features do not modified). describe Walls. Instead, Walls is a black male in his early forties who is On the afternoon of September 27, bald with a full beard with gray 2023, in Greensboro, a person fired patches. Id. ¶ 13. shots out of a black Cadillac SUV speeding east on West Wendover Two days later, on September 29, Avenue near Norwalk Street. A round Detectives Wilde and O’Hal stopped struck a nearby car and hit the driver Walls’ car for fictitious tags and no in the left leg. Compl. at 35.1 financial responsibility on the car. Id. According to the police report, a ¶¶ 15, 31. Officers also told Walls that witness told officers that he was “‘one his car was involved in a shooting, and hundred percent sure it was a black they accused him of living at 1012 Fir Cadillac SUV’” with tinted windows Place in Greensboro. Id. ¶¶ 16, 17. that made it difficult to see the driver. Walls did not live at 1012 Fir Place. Id. at 36. Walls alleges that same Instead, at all relevant times, his witness told Officer Hooker that he residence was 502 Woodlake Drive. “‘saw a black Cadillac Escalade.’” Id. Id. ¶¶ 23, 34.b. The officers searched ¶ 9. When Officer Hooker reviewed Walls and the car and found no
1 Walls attached copies of two police numbers that CM/ECF assigned to the reports to his Complaint. Citations to document. Elsewhere, Walls organized information in those reports are the page his Complaint with paragraphs. evidence of any illegal activity — no 502 Woodlake Drive. Id. ¶ 23; see also firearms, bullets, bullet holes, drugs, id. ¶¶ 24, 33, 34.b. or drug paraphernalia. Id. ¶¶ 31, 34.e. Law enforcement executed the Detectives Wilde and O’Hal residential search warrant at 1012 Fir transported Walls to the Swing Road Place and found firearms and station and locked him in an interview suspected drugs. They charged Walls room where they held him for with possessing them. Id. ¶ 22. approximately five hours. Id. ¶¶ 18, 20. Officers never cited him for traffic On October 13, K.A. Denny applied for violations. Instead, they questioned and received an arrest warrant for him about his location on September Walls based on the offenses of 27 and asked him about the location September 27. Id. ¶¶ 26, 27. Denny of a firearm. Id. ¶ 20. A detective told swore to the Magistrate the name of a Walls, “We know you sell drugs out witness to the offenses who your Brother’s house” because “a C.I. “‘identif[ied] Mr. Walls as the told us.” Id. ¶ 19. Walls denied selling offender.’” Id. ¶ 27. But Denny knew drugs and told the detectives that he that statement was false because the did not live at that house. Id. The witness “‘was never anywhere around detectives responded by telling him 6006 Landmark Center Blvd. to that “they saw [him] leaving 1012 Fir Witness ANYONE discharge a Place” and asked him, “Will any drugs Firearm” and never told law be found there?” Id. ¶ 21. enforcement he was there. Id. ¶¶ 28, 32, 34.e. The only witness to the That same day, Detective J.C. Payne shooting on Landmark Center applied for a search warrant for 1012 Boulevard provided a description of Fir Place and swore to the Magistrate the suspect that did not describe that the following information was Walls. Id. ¶ 32. verified: the suspect car was a 2018- 2019 model of a black Cadillac SRX, Walls also alleges that Armstrong, the driver discharged a firearm, a Walker, Hooker, and Tyler altered confidential informant named Walls their police reports to reflect a as selling and storing drugs at 1012 Fir dispatch time that aligned with the Place, and 1012 Fir Place was Walls’ time his “alleged vehicle is seen on residence. Id. ¶ 24. Flock,” the city’s license-plate reader system. Id. ¶ 34.a. But the detectives Payne did not inform the Magistrate did not use Flock “to establish [him] of the actual suspect’s description, as the driver” of the suspect SUV. Id. that the suspect car was a Cadillac ¶ 34.b. In addition, Smith stated in Escalade, or that Walls’ residence was his report that he researched Walls “and determined he had a [sic] address of 1012 Fir Place” even though Walls’ address “at all relevant times” was 502 Woodlake Drive. Id. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, ¶ 34.e. 570 (2007)). Legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” Law enforcement charged Walls with that amount to more than possession of a firearm by a felon, “unadorned, the-defendant- going armed to the terror of the unlawfully-harmed-me people, injury to personal property, accusation[s].” Id. (citing Twombly, discharging a weapon into occupied 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, “a property inflicting serious bodily plaintiff’s obligation to provide the injury, assault with a dangerous ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to weapon inflicting serious injury, and relief’ requires more than labels and discharging a firearm in the city. Id. conclusions, and a formulaic ¶ 26. recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 Denny and Payne also published false U.S. at 555-56. information to the News & Record
newspaper. Id. ¶ 35. Although a plaintiff is not required to prove his case in the complaint, see, The detectives’ and officers’ actions e.g., Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Est. “deprive[d] Mr. Walls of his liberty for Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 291 (4th Cir. a year, and continued detention.” Id. 2012); Scott v. City of Durham, No. ¶ 34.e. 1:20-CV-558, 2021 WL 3856168, at *2 In short, Walls alleges that members (M.D.N.C. Aug. 27, 2021), the of the Greensboro Police Department complaint’s allegations should “allow knowingly presented false ‘the court to draw a reasonable information and omitted material inference that the defendant is liable information under oath when for the misconduct alleged,’” Int’l applying for warrants. These false Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, statements and omissions led to 961 F.3d 635, 648 (4th Cir. 2020) Walls’ arrest and detention for crimes (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). related to the incidents on September On a motion to dismiss, courts view 27, 2029. And Walls seeks to hold the the allegations in the complaint as City vicariously liable for these true, drawing all inferences in the unlawful actions. plaintiff's favor. See Twombly, 550 at II. STANDARD OF 555–56 (2007); Langford v. Joyner, REVIEW 62 F.4th 122, 124 (4th Cir. 2023). But the court does not consider “legal “To survive a motion to dismiss, a conclusions, elements of a cause of complaint must contain sufficient action, and bare assertions devoid of factual matter, accepted as true, to factual enhancement[,] . . . ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible unwarranted inferences, on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 unreasonable conclusions, or U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd., 591 F.3d at 255. A pro se plaintiff’s violation of the Fourteenth complaint must be construed liberally Amendment, id. ¶ 40; publishing or in his favor. See Nichols v. disseminating stigmatizing or Bumgarner, 173 F.4th 511, 517–18, damaging information and causing 520 (4th Cir. 2026); Jehovah v. the deprivation of his liberty (stigma- Clarke, 798 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. plus) in violation of the Fourteenth 2015). Amendment, id. ¶ 42; failing to intervene to prevent the However, even under this liberal constitutional violations in violation standard, because Walls has not of the Eighth Amendment, id. ¶ 44; adequately pled any official policy by and approving or ratifying the the City, his complaint fails to state officers’ violations of Walls’ any claim against the City. constitutional rights showing deliberate indifference towards III. ANALYSIS citizens’ safety in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, id. ¶ 45. a. The § 1983 claims against the City fail as a matter of law. “For purposes of § 1983, a municipality is considered a ‘person’ Title 42, United States Code, Section and thus is subject to suit.” Hunter v. 1983 “is a federal statutory remedy Town of Mocksville, 897 F.3d 538, available to those deprived of rights 553 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Monell v. secured to them by the Constitution Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, and, in a more sharply limited way, 690 (1978)). However, a city cannot the statutory laws of the United be vicariously liable for the acts of its States” by persons acting under color employees. Id. at 553-54. “Rather, ‘it of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l is when execution of a government’s Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. policy or custom, whether made by its 2009). A Section 1983 claimant must lawmakers or by those whose edicts or show that a person acting under color acts may fairly be said to represent of state law violated a Constitutional official policy, inflicts the injury that or other federal legal right. West v. the government as an entity is Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). responsible under § 1983.’” Id. at 554 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Here, Walls alleges violations of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and In other words, “municipal liability Fourteenth Amendments. under Section 1983 attaches only to Specifically, he contends that the City ‘action [taken] pursuant to official is liable for his unlawful arrest and municipal policy of some nature.’” Id. detention in violation of the Fourth (quoting Pembaur v. City of and Fourteenth Amendments, Compl. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 477 (1986)). ¶ 38; false statements, material A single decision may create an omissions, and fabrication of official policy “so long as that evidence depriving him of liberty in governmental unit possessed ‘final authority to create official policy.’” Id. by Chief Scott or any other named (quoting Semple v. City of official – are alleged anywhere in the Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 712 (4th complaint.”) Cir. 1999)). Walls’ “Monell Claim” consists “‘The question of who possesses final entirely of the following allegations: policymaking authority is one of state law.’” Id. at 555 (quoting Riddick v. Defendant the City is liable Sch. Bd., 238 F.3d 518, 523 (4th Cir. because the Constitutional 2000)). Courts “‘must look to the injuries alleged in Counts A, B, relevant legal materials, including C and D, was [sic] committed state and local positive law, as well as by city police officer(s), were custom or usage having the force of approved or ratified by City law.’” Id. (quoting Riddick, 238 F.3d officials with final at 523). A “municipality may delegate policymaking authority for the its final policymaking authority to City, and were the results of other officials or governing bodies.” city . . . policies adopted by Id. those City officials.
Here, the City argues that Walls’ . . . Monell allegations are conclusory and lack factual support. Mem. in Supp. at [The City] approv[ed] or 5. Walls’ response does not address ratifi[ed] . . . the this challenge. See generally Resp. to Constitutional violation(s) of Def.’s Dismissal of Complaint its police officer(s) and (“Resp.”), Docket Entry 20. fail[ed] to create policies to prevent the ‘go-along-to-get- Indeed, the Complaint lacks factual along’ culture practiced by support for its conclusory Monell [the officers]. allegations. The Court need not determine who has final policymaking Compl. ¶¶ 37, 45. Elsewhere in the authority for arrests and detention Complaint, he alleges in a similar here because Walls alleges nothing conclusory fashion that the "City is more than the elements of the claim. vicariously liable for . . . false arrest, See Smith v. City of Greensboro, No. false imprisonment . . . by its officer(s) 1:19CV386, 2020 WL 1452114, at *10 in their official capacities” and the (M.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2020) “City is vicariously liable for the (“Ultimately, there is no need to parse constitutional violations of their Plaintiffs’ inconsistent statements; officer(s) acting in their official their ‘formulaic recitation’ of terms capacities” Compl. ¶¶ 32, 35. like ‘decisionmaker’ and ‘policy’ do not camouflage the fact that no These allegations lack any specific specific, affirmative policy decisions – policy decision affecting Walls’ constitutional rights or any person Nevertheless, “‘a city can waive its who had final policymaking authority immunity by purchasing liability with respect to that policy. insurance.’” Flomeh-Mawutor v. City of Winston-Salem, 906 S.E.2d 1, 8 Walls has not sufficiently pled Monell (N.C. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Reid v. liability against the City. Therefore, Town of Madison, 527 S.E.2d 87, 89 the Court should dismiss the § 1983 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)). claims against the City. Here, Walls alleges the City is b. The state tort claims against the vicariously liable for false arrest, false City fail as a matter of law. imprisonment, obstruction of justice, and defamation per se. See generally North Carolina “has recognized the Compl. But the City argues that he rule of governmental immunity for failed to allege that the City waived its over a century.” Estate of Williams ex immunity from suit for these torts. rel. Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Mem. in Supp. at 7-8. As before, Parks & Rec. Dep’t, 732 S.E.2d 137, Walls’ response does not address this 140 (N.C. 2012) (citing cases). The challenge. See generally Resp. in doctrine of governmental immunity Opp’n. The City is correct; Walls must provides that a municipality “‘is allege the City waived its immunity, immune from suit for the negligence and his failure to do so dooms the tort of its employees in the exercise of claims. governmental functions absent waiver of immunity.’” Id. (quoting “To overcome a defense of Evans ex rel. Horton v. Housing governmental immunity, ‘[t]he Auth., 602 S.E.2d 668, 670 (N.C. complaint must specifically allege a 2004)); see also id. at 141 (noting that waiver of governmental immunity.’” this immunity does not apply to the Polk v. Clark, No. 1:24CV744, 2026 performance of proprietary WL 699649, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 12, functions). A governmental function 2026) (quoting Phillips v. Gray, 592 “is an activity that is ‘discretionary, S.E.2d 229, 232 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) political, legislative, or public in and granting the defendants’ motion nature and performed for the public to dismiss the tort claims against good in behalf of the State rather than them in their official capacities for itself.’” Id. (quoting Britt v. City of because the plaintiff failed to allege Wilmington, 73 S.E.2d 289, 293 (N.C. waiver of governmental immunity); 1952)). “A police officer in the see also, e.g., Stevens v. Town of performance of his duties is engaged Snow Hill, No. 4:19-CV-156-D, 2021 in a governmental function.” Mullins WL 2345353, at *13 (E.D.N.C. June 8, by Mullins v. Friend, 449 S.E.2d 227, 2021) (stating the same and granting 230 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994). the town’s and county’s motions to dismiss because the plaintiff did not allege a waiver of governmental immunity); Molamphy v. Town of Southern Pines, No. 1:02CV720, 2004 c. The North Carolina WL 419789, at *11 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 3, constitutional violations fail as 2004) (“A plaintiff must allege that a matter of law. this waiver occurred in order to take advantage of the waiver and state a “‘[T]he North Carolina Supreme proper claim for relief.”); Phillips, 592 Court has held that ‘in the absence of S.E.2d at 232 (“The complaint must an adequate state remedy,’ one whose specifically allege a waiver of state constitutional rights have been governmental immunity to overcome abridged has a direct claim under the a defense of sovereign immunity. North Carolina Constitution; Absent such an allegation, the otherwise no direct constitutional complaint fails to state a cause of claim is recognized.” Edwards v. City action.”) (internal citation omitted). of Concord, 827 F. Supp. 2d 517, 520 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (quoting Craig v. Walls’ allegations against the New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 678 members of the Greensboro Police S.E.2d 351, 356-57 (N.C. 2009) Department involve actions they took (internal citation omitted). in the performance of their duties: they arrested and detained him Walls alleges that the City is without probable cause, they made vicariously liable for the officers’ false false statements and material statements and material omissions to omissions to the Magistrate to obtain the Magistrate that led to his arrest warrants and charges against him, and detention in violation of the and they made false statements about North Carolina Constitution. The City Walls’ September 27, 2023 criminal argues that Walls has adequate actions to the newspaper. The officers remedies to redress these injuries and detectives were, therefore, and, in fact, is seeking those remedies performing governmental functions here with claims of false arrest, false at all relevant times. The City is thus imprisonment, defamation, immune from suit for their tortious obstruction of justice, and malicious actions, and Walls failed to make the prosecution. Mem. in Supp. at 8-9. requisite allegations that the City Walls’ response does not address this waived that immunity. challenge. See generally Resp.
Because the City is immune from the North Carolina “courts have state torts of the members of the emphasized that ‘[a]n adequate state Greensboro Police Department, and remedy exists if, assuming the Walls failed to allege a waiver of that plaintiff’s claim is successful, the immunity, he has failed to state tort remedy would compensate the claims against the City. The Court plaintiff for the same injury alleged in should grant the City’s motion to the direct constitutional claim.’” dismiss the state tort claims. Edwards, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 523 (quoting Estate of Fennell ex rel. individual capacities, just as the Fennell v. Stephenson, 528 S.E.2d plaintiffs did in, for example: 911, 915-16 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), rev’d in part on other grounds, 554 • Edwards, 827 F. Supp. 2d at S.E.2d 629 (N.C. 2000)). Notably, a 521-22 (granting the City’s “‘remedy’ is not synonymous with an motion to dismiss the state actual recovery. Rather, it is the constitutional claims because ‘possibility of relief under the the plaintiff had an adequate circumstances.’” Id. at 524 (quoting remedy with his claims against Craig, 678 S.E.2d at 355). the officer in his individual capacity, even assuming that The Edwards court dismissed the immunity would bar the tort direct constitutional claim because claims against the City and the the tort claims of false arrest and officer in his official capacity); assault and battery protect the same constitutional rights to be free from • Hogan v. Cherokee Cnty., 519 improper restraint and excessive F. Supp. 3d 263, 290 (W.D.N.C. force that the plaintiff alleged the 2021) (finding that “the defendants violated. Id. at 524. The inability to pursue certain Fennell court affirmed dismissal of claims that are barred by the direct constitutional claim where immunity does not deprive the claims of false imprisonment, Plaintiffs of an adequate trespass to chattel, and wrongful remedy” where the plaintiffs death were adequate remedies for the alleged state law claims against same constitutional injuries of defendants in their individual unlawful search, unlawful seizure and capacities); detention, excessive force, and the killing of Fennell. 528 S.E.2d at 916. • J.W. v. Johnston Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., No. 5:11-CV-707-D, 2012 The wrinkle here is that the WL 4425439, at *17 (E.D.N.C. undersigned has recommended Sept. 24, 2012) (dismissing dismissing the state tort claims constitutional claim against the against the City. Were the District board because “even though Court to adopt that recommendation, governmental immunity bars Walls will have no “opportunity to Newsome’s state-law claims enter the courthouse doors and against the Board from being present his [tort] claim[s]” against the adequate remedies, Newsome’s City. See Craig, 678 S.E.2d at 355. state-law claims against Moore
and Croom in their individual However, Walls still has an adequate capacities are adequate remedy at law to address those same remedies”); and injuries — his claims against the
individual defendants in their • Glenn-Robinson v. Acker, 538 against the county for punitive S.E.2d 601, 619 (N.C. Ct. App. damages). 2000) (affirming the grant of summary judgment on state Similarly, North Carolina law constitutional claims where the prohibits the award of punitive plaintiff conceded that “only if damages against a municipality. See this Court should find plaintiff Doe v. Nash Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. ‘has no common law cause of 5:24-CV-259-D, 2025 WL 820671, at action against . . . Acker in his *12 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 13, 2025) (citing individual capacity’ should her cases finding the same). [constitutional claims] stand”). Therefore, were any claim against the Because Walls has an adequate City to survive, the Court should remedy under state law to redress the dismiss Walls’ punitive damages injuries supporting his constitutional request for relief. claim, the Court should dismiss Walls’ constitutional claim against the City. e. The official capacity claims against the individual d. Were there a viable claim defendants are duplicative of against the City, Walls could those against the City. not recover punitive damages. The City moves to dismiss the official As the City argues, had Walls capacity claims against the individual sufficiently stated a claim against the defendants.2 As courts have long City, he could not recover punitive recognized, official capacity claims damages from the City. See Mem. in against law enforcement officers Supp. at 7. “[A] municipality is “generally represent only another way immune from punitive damages of pleading an action against an entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” City of of which an officer is an agent.” See Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. U.S. 247, 271 (1981); see also Scott v. Therefore, the court should dismiss City of Durham, No. 1:20-CV-558, them. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 2021 WL 3856168, at * 3 (M.D.N.C. F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004) Aug. 27, 2021) (citing City of Newport (affirming the district court’s and dismissing the claims against the dismissal of the § 1983 claim against City for punitive damages); Sutton v. the individual defendant in his official Rockingham Cnty., No. 1:21CV95, capacity as duplicative of the claim 2022 WL 960460, at *7 (M.D.N.C. against the Board of Education) Mar. 30, 2022) (citing City of (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. Newport and dismissing the claim 159, 165-66 (1985)); see also
2 “[B]ecause an official capacity claim is a municipality.” Howard v. City of claim against the municipality, its Durham, No. 1:17cv477, 2018 WL dismissal should be sought by the 1621823, at *9 (Mar. 31, 2018). Armstrong v. City of Greensboro, 190 IV. CONCLUSION F. Supp. 3d 450, 463 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (dismissing the official capacity IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED § 1983 claim against the individual that the Court GRANT the City of defendant). Greensboro’s Motion to Dismiss and dismiss all claims against the City and the officer defendants in their official capacities with prejudice. Ae Gibson McFadden United States Magistrate Judge July 7, 2026