Board of Trustees v. Webb

618 So. 2d 1381, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 5666, 1993 WL 169163
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedMay 21, 1993
DocketNo. 92-00487
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 618 So. 2d 1381 (Board of Trustees v. Webb) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Board of Trustees v. Webb, 618 So. 2d 1381, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 5666, 1993 WL 169163 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

BOOTH, Judge.

This cause is before us on appeal from a judgment quieting title in certain lands in Alachua County to appellee Charles Webb. Appellant contends, inter alia, that the trial court erred in finding that the Arredondo Land Grant1 divested the sovereign of title [1382]*1382to the lands beneath Orange Lake, a navigable water body.

Briefly, the historical background is that from 1763 to 1783, the country then known as Florida, divided into East and West Florida, was under British rule. At the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, Florida reverted to Spain under the Treaty of Paris, executed in 1783. Spain’s dominion over East and West Florida continued from 1783 to 1821, when under the Treaty of Amity, ratified on February 19, 1821, Spain ceded East and West Florida to the United States. Article VIII of the Treaty of Amity provided that “[a]ll the grants of land made before the 24th of January 1818, by his Catholic Majesty, or by his lawful authorities ... shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands.” 42 Fla.Jur.2d Public Lands § 3 (1983).

The Arredondo Grant, occurring on December 22, 1817, was a cession2 of land executed on behalf of the King of Spain by Don Alexander Ramirez, the Intendant of Cuba, to Don Fernando de la Maza Arre-dondo. The Arredondo Grant preceded the applicable date of Treaty of Amity by one month, so that grant was ratified and confirmed to all grantees in possession on the date of the treaty. United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 31 U.S. 691, 8 L.Ed. 547 (U.S.1832).

However, as to sovereign lands under navigable waters owned by the King of Spain on the date of the treaty, title was transferred to the United States and held for the benefit of the people. When Florida was admitted to the Union in 1845, the ownership of lands under navigable waters was transferred to the State of Florida. 42 Fla.Jur.2d Public Lands § 4 (1983).

The Law of Spain at the time of the Arredondo Grant was that submerged lands under navigable waters were within the sovereign dominion of the King and could not be converted to private ownership, except by grants or conveyances either made by the King or else expressly authorized by him. 42 Fla.Jur.2d Public Lands § 12 (1983), and cases cited therein.

The Arredondo Grant was not made directly by the King but by another acting on his behalf. In addition, there is no evidence that the King expressly authorized the conveyance on his behalf of lands beneath navigable waters within the Arredon-do Grant.

On substantially similar facts, the Florida Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Richardson, 33 Fla. 1, 14 So. 692, 721-722 (1894), ruled that a land grant by the same Don Ramirez to one Don Pintado, purportedly conveying lands beneath Pensacola Bay, did not convey the submerged land, holding:

That the king of Spain, in the exercise of his great power, might have made a grant of this kind [i.e., lands under navigable waters], is not denied, nor need it be.... [Y]et there is not to be found anywhere anything that justifies the conclusion that it was the purpose of the king to confer upon intendants the power to make a grant like this.... We fail to find a line in any American adjudication that has been formulated with reference to, or can be regarded as an authority in favor of, the exercise of the power asserted here by Ramirez, or a provision of Spanish law, general or special, that supports his exercise of the power.... Conceding that the king had the power to regulate the use of such waters, yet there is nothing which has been brought to our attention that tends to prove that he had confided this power of regulation to the intendant. Had it been the purpose of the king that such important rights as are attempted here to be conferred upon Pin-tado should be at the disposal of the intendant or other subordinate, it seems reasonable, if not certain, that some ordinance or other law regulating the subject would have been made, and be extant with the many others made specially applicable to the prov-[1383]*1383inces_ In the absence of some ordinance changing the general law, that law, as it is set forth above, defined the rights of the public in the shore and such waters, and was binding on the inten-dant, as it was on the citizen, [emphasis added]

Thus, the Sullivan court specifically found that Don Ramirez did not have the power to grant title in the lands under navigable waters. The court held that submerged lands under navigable waters were held by the King for the common use by the public. Alienation of submerged lands under navigable waters to private ownership could only be accomplished by the king, or by specific authorization (i.e., ordinance or regulation) to someone acting for the king.

Following Sullivan, we hold that Don Ramirez did not have the power to grant title to land beneath navigable waters. We further hold that, even assuming Ramirez had the power to grant such land, the grant is deficient because it does not expressly state the intention to divest the public of access to the submerged lands beneath the navigable waters contained therein, as required by Sullivan, 14 So. at 710:

Construing the grant as vesting in the grantee the extensive rights indicated above [i.e., title to submerged lands beneath navigable waters], the result would have been that the population of Pensacola, and of the lands east and west to the bayous, would have been deprived of the right of using for any purpose, or even , entering upon, the water within the described limits of the grant_ Surely, a construction entailing such consequences will never be given to a public grant, in the absence of conclusive proof of an intention that they shall result. Such proof must be manifest by terms expressly stating or necessarily implying the intention. In the absence of such manifestation, the proof must be held not to exist, [emphasis added]

In Apalachicola Land & Development Co. v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393, 98 So. 505 (1923), the court held:

By the laws and usages of Spain the rights of a subject or of other private ownership in lands bounded on navigable waters derived from the crown extended only to high-water mark, unless otherwise specified by an express grant. And though the Spanish possessions in America were held by the crown to be disposed of at will, a grant or concession of lands under navigable waters and tide lands was not in accord with usual customs of the kingdom, such lands and waters being held as res communes for the public use; and a conveyance of them to private ownership could be consummated only by a clear showing of express sovereign intent_ [emphasis added]

In the instant case, Bruce Chappell, archivist at the Library of Florida History, testified that there are no distinctions in the Arredondo Grant between submerged lands and uplands. We have found no reference to submerged lands in the grant.3 [1385]*1385In the absence of express language granting the submerged lands, such lands are not conveyed. We hold that appellee’s contention that the submerged lands were implicitly granted is without merit.4

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
618 So. 2d 1381, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 5666, 1993 WL 169163, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/board-of-trustees-v-webb-fladistctapp-1993.