Board of Supervisors v. Heenan

2 Minn. 330
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedDecember 15, 1858
StatusPublished
Cited by38 cases

This text of 2 Minn. 330 (Board of Supervisors v. Heenan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Board of Supervisors v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330 (Mich. 1858).

Opinion

By the Court

Elandrau, J.

The Defendant is the Register of Deeds of Ramsey County, and this is an application for a peremptory writ of Mandamus to compel Mm to deliver to the Board of Supervisors certain books and papers relating to the taxes of the County. The application is made under Section 9 of the Act of August 13,1858, page 206 Laws 1858. Against the issuing of the writ, it is urged that the Act of August 13, 1858, is unconstitutional, in not having been read on three different days in each house of the Legislature, and twice at length; in not having been voted for by a majority of all the members elected to each house, and in embracing more than one subject-matter not expressed in its title. (Sections 13, 20 and 27 of Art. IY. State Constitution.) The question is for the first time presented for judicial determination as to the force and effect of Section 13 and Section 20 of Article IY. of the Constitution. Section thirteen provides that “ No law shall be “passed unless voted for by a majority of all the members “ elected to each branch of the Legislature, and the vote en“tered upon the journal of each house.” Section twenty provides that “ Every bill shall be read on three different days in “ each separate house, unless, in case of urgency, two-thirds of “ the house wdiere each bill is depending shall deem it expe- “ dient to dispense with this rule; and no bill shall be passed “ by either house until it shall have been read twice at length.”

The subject is one of great importance in its effect upon the State, and I approach it with the sole aim of faithfully ascertaining the intention of the framers of the instrument: the consequences of their action is with them, and not with the [332]*332Courts. There are many provisions in constitutions and statutes which, though explicit in terms, are construed to be only directory: but this results from the nature of the particular provision being confined to the regulation of the time or manner in which an act is to be performed, and where it is apparent that it was not designed to be operative as a condition, limitation or restriction upon the performance of the act enjoined or permitted; and must be generally governed by the nature of the subject treated of, more than by the language of the law. Clauses which are directory merely, must, in the nature of things, be much more frequent in statutes than in constitutions ; because, to the former is committed the modus operands, in minute detail, of the whole working system of the government, while the latter is confined to the more general establishment of the fundamental principles upon which, and the conditions and limitations under which, the system is to operate. Statutes command acts to be done, impose duties and obligations, and point out the road to their performance: to insure certainty and regularity throughout the country, the time when, the place where, and the manner in which the command is to be obeyed are generally particularized; but as the execution of the mandate is the principal object and aim of the law, a departure from the mode provided is often, where the public good demands it, and private rights are not interfered with in consequence of it, held not to invalidate the act, or, in other words, the provisions are declared to be directory only

There is a very material difference between provisions of apparently similar import in statutes and constitutions, and their meaning must be determined by the application of different rules and x’easons. A constitution, axxd especially the legislative branch of our Constitution, is not a creative instrument. Beyond the establishment of the legislature, it is but a system of limitations and restrictions upon the power of that body. It commands the performance of no act by the legislature, but declares that if they do act that action shall be in a certain manner, and within prescribed boundaries.

The general power to legislate upoxi all subjects within the proper province of such a body is presumed by the Constitutiop and it is oxxly such matters as are desigxxed to be with[333]*333drawn from their jurisdiction that the constitution' tabs especial care of. It will be conceded at once, that should a law violate any of the restrictions in the Constitution pertaining to the subject matter, or by restraining the liberty of the press— denying the right of trial by jury, introducing slavery, or otherwise, it would be void: this result would however be solely because the legislature had exceeded its jurisdiction: if therefore there is no instance in which the legislature can transcend the constitutional boundaries in regard to the subject matter of a law, it can only be permitted to do so in relation to the prescribed mode of its enactment, on the supposition that the same reasqp. did not exist for limiting its action in this respect as obtained in the other.

I will examine whether the framers of the Constitution intended the provisions of Sections 13, 20 & 27, of Art. 4, or any of them above cited to be merely directory upon the legislature. This investigation will lead me to a review of the legislation as practised previously in this Territory. Such changes as are instituted by the Constitution, and departures from established practices, when we wére acting without any Constitution, but that of the United States and the Organic Act, must be considered as providing for some deficiency or intended to check some abuse which existed previously in the legislative department. The Courts may have recourse to legislative proceedings, rules, journals and statutes, also to contemporaneous debates and undisputed history^ to ¿¿Lighten themselves on these points. Previous to the Constitution a majority of either House of the Legislature was a quorum to transact business; and laws could be passed by a single member voting in the affirmative, if no one voted against him; however objectionable this may have been it was less liable to abuse in bodies composed of a small number of members than in more numerous assemblies. Each House made its own rules and could alter them at pleasure by such vote as they should by rule provide. The power of determining the rules of proceeding in the separate Houses is continued by Nee. 4, Art. 4, but with exceptions which are specially enumerated, among which is that “no law shall be passed unless voted for by a majority of all [334]*334the members elected to each branch of the legislature and the vote entered upon the journal of each House.” Sec. 13, Ait A. This is particularly directedat the practice under the former system which would have been more liable to abuse by the contemplated increase of the number of the legislators, and its observance is essential to the validity of a law. If an act fails to receive the requisite number of affirmative votes to be evidenced by the journal, it is as'fatally defective as if it had failed to receive the sanction of the executive. The effect of the provision is to count every member of the body that does not vote affirmatively as voting against the passage of the act.

The next exception to the general power to pass rules is by Sec. 20, of Art. 4. “Every Bill shall be read on three different days in each separate House, unless in case of urgency two thirds of the House where such Bill is depending shall deem it expedient to dispense with such rule. And no Bill shall be passed by either House until it shall have been previously read twice at length.”

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Bluebook (online)
2 Minn. 330, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/board-of-supervisors-v-heenan-minn-1858.