Board of Education v. . Forrest

130 S.E. 621, 190 N.C. 753, 1925 N.C. LEXIS 162

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: December 16, 1925
• Status: Published

Opinion

Adams, J.

From the wording of the judgment we infer his Honor was of opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief demanded because tbe county board o£ education did not purchase or condemn tbe lot in suit at tbe time title was acquired to tbe five acres. In tbis we think there is error. It was formerly provided (O. S., vol. II, sec. 5416), that tbe county board of education or tbe board of trustees of any incorporated or chartered school district might acquire sites for school buildings by donation or purchase, and not more than two acres by condemnation; and, further, that a proceeding might be instituted to condemn more land in a district where a house or a site had previously been obtained, the site and the additional lot not to- exceed three acres. In 1921 this section was amended by striking out “not more than two acres” and substituting “not more than ten acres” (Laws 1921, ch. 119, sec. 18), and in 1923 it was repealed (Laws 1923, ch. 136, sec. 373) and thereafter superseded by C. S., vol. Ill, sec. 5469, in which it is again provided that not more than ten acres may be condemned. The amendment of 1924 is not material. Laws, Ex. Sess., 1924, ch. 121. Section 5416 sanctioned the condemnation of such additional land, not exceeding the area limited by the statute, as was deemed necessary to provide suitable sites. It is contended by the defendant that this section has been substituted by C. S., vol. Ill, sec. 5469, and that the latter statute confers authority “only to acquire property by condemnation for school purposes or school buildings.” But the county board of education is expressly empowered to acquire title to “suitable sites.” Section 5469. The meaning of the word “site” as used in the statute is broad enough to embrace such land, not exceeding, the statutory limit, as may reasonably be required for the suitable and convenient use of the particular building; and land taken for a playground in conjunction with a school may be as essential as land taken for the schoolhouse itself. 24 R. C. L., 582, sec. 31.

It appears in the statement of facts that the plaintiff, after deciding to consolidate the schools, selected as a site for the building a lot of more than six acres including the lot in question; that upon the reasonable assumption that title to each lot could be acquired by purchase the plaintiff erected a modern school building on the five-acre lot; and that afterwards it became necessary to condemn the lot in controversy. In all these matters the plaintiff was acting in the exercise of a discretion with which the courts seldom interfere. McInnish v. Bd. Ed., 187 N. C., 494; School Committee, v. Board of Education, 186 N. C., 643; Davenport v. Board of Education, 183 N. C., 570; Pemberton v. Board of Education, 172 N. C., 552; Venable v. School Committee, 149 N. C., 120.

Under the judge’s findings of fact the process of acquiring title to the five-acre lot by purchase and to the one-acre lot by condemnation may be regarded as separate stages in the accomplishment of a common purpose to appropriate both lots for the benefit of the school. Otherwise the plaintiff’s original purpose would be defeated. If both lots were selected at tbe same time as a site for tbe school and only one could be purchased, we see no satisfactory reason for denying to tbe plaintiff tbe right to condemn tbe other. "We have given to tbe appellee’s brief our careful consideration but find no authority, as we understand tbe law, which antagonizes our conclusion. Tbe judgment is

Reversed.