Board of County Commissioners v. Strait

36 Colo. 137
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
DecidedJanuary 15, 1906
DocketNo. 4884
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 36 Colo. 137 (Board of County Commissioners v. Strait) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Board of County Commissioners v. Strait, 36 Colo. 137 (Colo. 1906).

Opinion

Mr. Justice SteeLe

delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellee' (plaintiff in the district court) brought his action to recover certain moneys paid by him as clerk of the district court of Pueblo county to the county treasurer. Prior to 1899, the salary of the clerk of the district court of Pueblo county was fixed by the la.w of 1891 at the sum of $2,500. By the 'act of 1899 (Laws of 1899, p. 331), the salary of the clerk of the district court of counties of the second class was fixed at the sum of $2,000. Pueblo, for the purpose of fixing the salaries of public officers, is a county of the second class. During the years 1901, 1902. and 1903, the said clerk paid to the county treasurer the amount of fees collected by him as such clerk in excess of the expenses of his office and the sum of $2,000. Claiming that the 'act of 1899 was unconstitutional, and that the law of 1891 fixing the salary at the sum of $2,500 had never been repealed, he made the payments of these amounts under protest. Judgment was rendered in his favor for the sum of $1,500, being the sum paid under protest during the years 1901,1902 and 1903. Prom this • judgment the board of county commissioners appealed.

The act of 1899, it is alleged, is unconstitutional and void because the legislature failed to observe the provisions of the constitution in its passage. The specific objections are:

1. Said act was never assented to by the senate and house of representatives by a vote of a majority of the members elected thereto, taken in the manner prescribed by the constitution.

2. Material parts of said act of 1899 were incorporated into it by the senate as amendments, and' were never concurred in by the house of representatives in the manner prescribed by the constitution.'

[140]*1403. By the-adoption of the conference committee report material amendments to said bill were adopted which were never printed before the final vote on said bill was taken, as prescribed by the constitution.

The bill, Ií. B. 143, originated in the house, where it was regularly passed, after being amended in the committee-of the whole house, on February 15th, 1899. The bill was amended in the senate. The house refusing to concur in the senate amendments, a conference committee was appointed. The conference committee reported that it had had said bill under consideration, “and beg leave to submit the following report, and recommend that it be adopted. The following amendments are made to said bill as amended in the senate.”. Then follow numerous amendments recommended by the committee. The report of the committee is entered in the house journal of the 85th day, being March 29th, 1899. At the afternoon session of the following day, March 30, the report of the' conference committee having been laid before the house, Mr. Dickerson’s motion that the report of the committee be not concurred in and that another committee be appointed was lost by a vote of 12 for, and 46 against, the motion. The report of the committee was then adopted by a vote of 50 yeas, 10 nays. The names of those voting on the motion to not concur and on the motion .to adopt the report were taken by ayes and noes, and the names of those voting entered upon the journal. On April 1st, the conference committee report was read in the senate, and immediately thereafter the motion to adopt the report was carried by an aye and nay vote; for the report 27, against the report, none. The names of those voting being entered in the journal. Following the roll-call on the motion to' adopt the report of the conference [141]*141committee, the house journal recites.: “A constitutional majority of all the members elected to the house of representatives having voted in the affirmative, the bill is passed.” Following the roll-call on the adoption of the report of the conference committee, the senate, journal recites: “A majority having voted in the affirmative, the report was declared adopted.” The iohly other recitals in the journals after these are those which state that the announcement was made that the hill was about to be signed, and was signed, in the presence of the members.

In the determination of the questions involved, it is necessary to consider sections 22 and 23 of the constitution. Section 22 provides that “* * * all substantial amendments made thereto, shall be printed for the use of members before the final vote is taken on the bill, and no bill shall become a law except by a vote of a majority of all the members elected to such house, nor unless on its final passage the vote be taken by ayes and noes, and the names of those voting be entered on the journal.” Section 23 provides: “No amendment to any bill by one house shall be concurred in by the other, nor shall the report of any conference committee be adopted in either house except by a vote of a majority of the members elected thereto-, taken by ayes and noes, and the names of those voting recorded upon the journal thereof.” The house had refused to concur in the senate amendments, and because of this disagreement a conference committee was appointed. The bill classified the counties and fixed the salaries of county and district officers; and the conference committee reported a bill that differed materially from the bill as passed by the senate or the one originally passed by the house. The journals contain no roll-call upon the final passage of the bill, unless the- vote on the adoption of the conference committee report [142]*142shall be regarded as the vote on final passage-. We are, then, confronted with a situation which requires us to either approve or disapprove a practice of the legislative assembly in the passag-e of bills. To disapprove of this practice may lead to great confusion in governmental affairs, and although that fact should not, and would not, have a controlling influence, it should have great weight, and we should resolve any doubt in our minds in favor of the validity of the legislative procedure-. Moreover, we should show great deference to- the legislative construction of the constitution, particularly with reference to its construction of the procedure provided by the constitution for the passage of hills.

Endlich, in speaking, of the weight that should be given to the practical construction of the constitution by officers acting under it, says: ‘ ‘ The greatest deference is shown by the courts to- the interpretation put upon the. constitution by the legislature, in the enactment of laws, and other practical application of constitutional provisions to the legislative business, when the interpretation has had the silent acquiescence of the people, including the legal pro- ■ fession and the judiciary, and' especially when injurious results would follow the disturbing of it.” —Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, §527.

“Greater weight is- also given to- the practical construction of forms of procedure than to that which concerns the substance of legislation. When there is a real doubt of the proper interpretation of a constitutional provision relating to- the course of procedure, it should be solved in favor of the practical construction given it by the legislature.” — Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 86.

The provision of the constitution: “Nor shall the report of any conference committee be adopted in either house except by a vote of a majority of the [143]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In re Interrogatories of the Governor
578 P.2d 200 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1978)
Carlton v. Grimes
23 N.W.2d 883 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1946)
Smith v. Thompson
258 N.W. 190 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1934)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
36 Colo. 137, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/board-of-county-commissioners-v-strait-colo-1906.