Blume Knitwear, Inc. v. Commissioner

9 T.C. 1179, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 6
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedDecember 23, 1947
DocketDocket No. 10629
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 9 T.C. 1179 (Blume Knitwear, Inc. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blume Knitwear, Inc. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 1179, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 6 (tax 1947).

Opinion

OPINION.

OppeR, Judge:

Petitioner’s position that the present issue is limited to whether petitioner’s “profit-sharing plan” complied with Internal Revenue Code, section 165 (a), seems to be supported by the opening statement of counsel and by the apparent agreement thus developed as to the scope of controversy. As originally presented, the two questions were whether there has been compliance with any requirements of permanence inherent in section 165 (a), and whether the benefits of the trust were so preponderantly weighted in favor of the corporate officers that it could not be said that it was for “the exclusive benefit” of its employees.2 Since the latter objection is not pressed in respondent’s brief, we regard the only issue requiring consideration as that of permanence.

Granting in this respect the applicability to the year before us of respondent’s regulations, as amended almost two years later, T. D. 5278, 1943 C. B. 478, on the theory that they were either properly made retroactive or were merely declaratory of the interpretation at all times required, the most that can be said is that the abandonment of the plan after one year “for any cause other than business necessity” was “evidence that the plan from its inception was not a bona fide program * * 3

Granting further in respondent’s favor that the circumstances causing the decision to abandon the plan were not a “business necessity,” and therefore that its abandonment constitutes the evidence to which the regulation refers, we are, nevertheless, called upon to examine the operative facts to ascertain whether this evidence, which certainly can not be conclusive, is sufficiently rebutted so that on the whole record the burden imposed upon the petitioner of proving a “bona fide plan” is sustained.

The testimony shows that the reason for the abandonment of the plan was an outgrowth of petitioner’s purpose in creating it. Viewing as improbable the approval by the Salary Stabilization Unit of percentage increases in salaries to all of petitioner’s employees if these were to be paid in cash, the profit-sharing plan in question was chosen in order on the one hand to assure ultimate additional payments to the employees and on the other to postpone the actual payments until a five-year period at the conclusion of the war. It was petitioner’s understanding that such a plan would be acceptable to the Salary Stabilization Unit and it was in fact agreed to by the employees.

Upon submission to the Salary Stabilization Unit, after payment to the trust of the profits computed for the first year of operation, the plan was disapproved as to any future payments, but petitioner was advised that if it were to discontinue the plan the payment already made would be permitted to remain undisturbed. An alternative requiring amendment of the plan to call for a longer waiting period “would not be acceptable to the employees.”4

The conclusion appears to us inescapable that these circumstances leading to the abandonment of the plan after the main purpose originally envisaged was found to be impossible of fulfillment demonstrate that on the whole record there was a bona fide program for the exclusive benefit of employees in general.

We think that under these circumstances the "bona fides of petitioner’s program for the exclusive benefit of its employees in general is not overcome by the mere fact of abandonment when the reasons therefore have been adequately shown and explained. Assuming, as we have done, the necessity that a profit-sharing plan must have a fair degree of permanence and continuity, we are nevertheless of the opinion that any such requirement has here been met.

Decision will be entered under Rule 50.

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Related

Blume Knitwear, Inc. v. Commissioner
9 T.C. 1179 (U.S. Tax Court, 1947)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
9 T.C. 1179, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 6, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blume-knitwear-inc-v-commissioner-tax-1947.