FILED
SEPTEMBER 17, 2026
In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
BLUE MOUNTAIN ACTION ) No. 40893-1-III COUNCIL, )
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Respondent, )
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v. )
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PAUL RUEHLE, and all other occupants, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION )
Defendants, )
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CAROL RUEHLE, )
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Appellant. )
MURPHY, J. — Carol Ruehle appeals from a trial court order granting Blue Mountain Action Council (BMAC) a writ of restitution. Carol 1 contends BMAC’s pre-suit notices to comply, cure or vacate were deficient for failing to incorporate mandatory language prescribed by federal regulations and the parties’ lease agreement. Alternatively, Carol argues the trial court erred at the show cause hearing by declining to examine the parties or set the matter for trial, despite there being disputed issues of material fact. We disagree and affirm.
1 Because they share a last name, for clarity and readability we refer to Carol Ruehle and Paul Ruehle in their individual capacities by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle BACKGROUND
On July 1, 2023, Carol and her husband Paul 2 entered into an agreement to lease an apartment from BMAC at its Whitman Court facility in Walla Walla. The rent for this apartment was subsidized through the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The lease agreement required residents to obey a comprehensive set of “House Rules” which, among other things, prohibited profane language, abusive behavior, harassment, threats, disturbances, or nuisances in the common areas and grounds. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 23-37 (some capitalization omitted). Additionally, residents with “Service/Assistance Animals” 3 were required to follow policies regarding the upkeep, safety, behavior, sanitary standards, and damage caused by the animals on the property. CP at 33 (some capitalization omitted). BMAC could terminate the lease agreement for, among other reasons, material noncompliance by the tenant.
Because the apartment rented to the Ruehles was federally subsidized, the lease agreement incorporated “HUD’s handbooks, instructions and regulations related to administration of multifamily subsidy programs.” CP at 14. Any termination of the lease
2 Carol and Paul are co-tenants under the BMAC lease. Although they had separate counsel before the trial court, only Carol’s attorney appeared for argument at the show cause hearing. Similarly, only Carol has appealed from the trial court’s orders and submitted briefing on review.
3 “Service/Assistance Animals” are defined in the House Rules as “[s]ervice animals, companion animals, and therapy animals.” CP at 33.
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle agreement by BMAC was required to “be carried out in accordance with HUD regulations, State and local law, and the terms of [the lease agreement].” CP at 19. BMAC agreed to provide written notice of termination of the tenancy and the grounds for termination, and the notice must “advise the Tenant that [they have] 10 days within which to discuss the proposed termination of tenancy with [BMAC].” CP at 20. Alleged violations and notices On May 6, 2024, BMAC posted on the door to the apartment, and mailed to the Ruehles, a “Ten (10) Day Notice to Comply or Vacate.” CP at 49-52 (some capitalization omitted). The notice alleged that the Ruehles had violated their tenant duties based on an incident two days earlier where Carol’s dog attacked another resident’s dog. It was noted that the incident was captured by a security camera in the facility. The notice stated that the attack constituted a serious breach of tenant duties, and a “failure [by the Ruehles] to comply and find a viable solution to the issue [in the time provided in the notice would] lead BMAC to ask [that the] pet be removed off the property in accordance with [the] lease.” CP at 49. The notice also included the following:
PET RULE VIOLATONS—If management determines on the basis of objective facts, supported by personal observation or written statements of complaint by neighbors, that a pet owner has violated a rule governing the owning or keeping of a pet, the following steps will occur:
a. The manager will service a written notice of pet rule violation to the pet owner. The notice will provide the pet owner with a factual statement which describes how the pet rule violation was determined and how the
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle
pet rules are alleged to be violated. The pet owner will be entitled to make a written request for a meeting to discuss the violation and will be entitled to be accompanied by a person of his/her choice at the meeting.
b. The pet owner will have ten days to correct the violation.
c. The pet owner’s failure to correct the violation, or request a meeting or to appear at a requested meeting may result in initiation of procedures to remove the pet or end the pet owner’s tenancy.
d. The pet owner and manager shall discuss any alleged violation and attempt to correct it. The manager may give the pet owner additional time to correct the violation.
e. If the pet owner and manager are unable to resolve the violation, or if the manager determines that the pet owner has failed to correct the problem in consultation with the property manager, within any additional time provided for that purpose, the manager may serve a written notice to the pet owner to remove the offending pet. The manager will notify the property manager of such action.
f. The pet owner must remove that pet within ten (10) days of receiving notice to do so. Failure to remove the pet may result in initiation of procedures to terminate the pet owner’s tenancy.
CP at 49 (emphasis added) (boldface omitted). 4 On June 3, 2024, the Ruehles were personally delivered a “Ten-Day Notice to Cure or Vacate Tenancy.” CP at 38-48 (some capitalization omitted). This notice listed four instances of lease violations. First, BMAC reiterated the May 4 dog attack referenced in the May 6 notice. Second, on May 28, it was alleged that Carol “engaged in a physical altercation with another tenant” in the community room and Paul yelled
4 While it appears BMAC may be citing to, or quoting from, pet rules or a pet policy applicable to Whitman Court, documentation of the rules or policy is not otherwise included in the record on review.
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle profanities and threatened other residents until the police were called. CP at 38. It was noted this incident was also captured on video. Third, on May 30, it was alleged that Paul, unprovoked, harassed other residents in the community room until he was asked to leave. This incident was also captured on video. Fourth, it was alleged that Paul returned to the community room on May 30 and continued to harass the other residents until the property manager intervened. The notice cited from a portion of the Whitman Court pet policy or rules that was previously cited in the May 6 notice.
On June 20, 2024, BMAC posted on the door to the apartment, and mailed to the Ruehles, a “Thirty-Day Notice to Cure or Vacate Tenancy.” CP at 70-86 (some capitalization omitted). This notice solely referred to the alleged dog attack on May 4, stating that the Ruehles’ dog had not been removed and that BMAC had received another report of the dog behaving aggressively toward another dog. The notice also cited from a portion of the Whitman Court pet policy or rules previously cited in the May 6 notice.
In a declaration submitted to the trial court, BMAC’s housing director indicated that he had “conversations with [Paul] to discuss . . . the dog’s aggression (and Paul’s own aggression) to no avail.” CP at 92. The director went on to note that “[r]easoning with Paul does not work, despite my best efforts. Paul simply denies everything. He denies that [the Ruehles’ dog] attacked another resident’s dog (despite security footage showing [the dog] attacking the other dog). He denies that Carol . . . bit or kicked another
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle resident (despite multiple eyewitness statements to the contrary).” CP at 92. In a second declaration, the housing director indicated that, since the May 28 incident, Paul “has continued to be verbally aggressive with staff and tenants. I have engaged with Paul in an effort to resolve the issues (and to shield my staff and the residents from Paul), but have gotten nowhere.” CP at 159. Unlawful detainer proceedings On July 2, 2024, BMAC initiated an unlawful detainer action in Walla Walla County Superior Court, based on the May 6 10-day notice to comply or vacate tenancy and the June 3 10-day notice to cure or vacate tenancy. On July 22, BMAC amended its complaint to add the June 20 30-day notice to cure or vacate tenancy. Declarations were submitted by various BMAC personnel and a Whitman Court resident. Separate counsel was appointed for Carol and Paul in early August.
Through counsel, Carol filed a demand for a 12-person jury trial and a motion for dismissal of the action with prejudice, a limit on dissemination, and an award of attorney fees. Carol argued BMAC lacked legally effective notice for three reasons: (1) the 10-day notices solely state that the Ruehles must vacate, and were therefore misleading as to the opportunity to cure, (2) the 10-day notices failed to comply with the 30-day notice
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle requirement of the Coronavirus, Relief, and Economic Security Act 5 (CARES Act), and (3) the unlawful detainer action was filed prematurely because the 30-day notice waived the 10-day notice.
Show cause hearing A show cause hearing was held on August 26, 2024. Carol was represented by counsel at the hearing. Paul did not participate in person or through counsel at the hearing. BMAC requested relief based on the three notices contained in the amended complaint but primarily relied on the May 4 dog attack and the continued presence of the Ruehles’ dog on the property.
Counsel for Carol argued that she did not cause the altercation with another Whitman Court resident on May 28, challenged whether her dog attacked the other dog, noted the dog is Carol’s emotional support animal, and argued procedural defects in BMAC’s notices to the Ruehles.
In reply, BMAC’s counsel denied any procedural defects and argued there was no factual dispute that the Ruehles’ dog remained on the premises. While Carol disputed the nature of the May 4 incident between the dogs, BMAC produced a veterinarian bill and sworn declaration from the injured dog’s owner, as well as security camera footage of
5 Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. ch. 116).
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle the incident.
The trial court summarily denied Carol’s motion to dismiss and ordered the issuance of the writ of restitution.
Carol unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, arguing the eviction notices were defective because they did not adequately inform her of the right to meet with management within 10 days.
Carol timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
1. Adequacy of termination notices Carol contends that BMAC’s eviction notices were invalid because they did not adequately inform her of the right to request a pre-eviction meeting with management within 10 days of receiving the notices. Without valid notice from BMAC, Carol argues the trial court erred when it denied her motion to dismiss.
We review de novo challenges to the adequacy of a termination notice under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973 (RLTA), chapter 59.18 RCW, as a mixed question of law and fact. Garrand v. Cornett, 31 Wn. App. 2d 428, 439, 550 P.3d 64 (2024). We also review de novo challenges to the adequacy of a termination notice under a lease agreement. Tacoma Rescue Mission v. Stewart, 155 Wn. App. 250, 254, 228 P.3d 1289 (2010). We review an order denying a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle discretion. Phillips v. Greco, 7 Wn. App. 2d 1, 9, 433 P.3d 509 (2018).
Before initiating an unlawful detainer action, a residential landlord must first satisfy the statutory notice requirements. Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels, 26 Wn. App. 2d 199, 210-11, 528 P.3d 834 (2023) (citing former RCW 59.12.040 (2021); RCW 59.18.650(6)(a)-(b)).
Under RCW 59.12.030(4), a landlord may initiate an unlawful detainer action before the lease term ends only if the tenant has been given an opportunity to correct any lease violations. Kitsap County Consol. Hous. Auth. v. Henry-Levingston, 196 Wn. App. 688, 699, 385 P.3d 188 (2016). The statute requires that a tenant be given 10 days to “perform such condition or covenant” to avoid forfeiture of the lease. RCW 59.12.030(4). There is no requirement that the landlord’s notice to the tenant under this statute include an offer to meet with management. See id.
Under the RLTA, the reasons a landlord may evict a tenant for cause include:
The tenant continues in possession after substantial breach of a material program requirement of subsidized housing, material term subscribed to by the tenant within the lease or rental agreement, or a tenant obligation imposed by law, other than one for monetary damages, and after the landlord has served written notice specifying the acts or omissions constituting the breach and requiring, in the alternative, that the breach be remedied or the rental agreement will end, and the breach has not been adequately remedied by the date specified in the notice, which date must be at least 10 days after service of the notice.
RCW 59.18.650(2)(b).
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle A landlord who fails to comply with the statutory notice and service requirements to a tenant may not maintain an unlawful detainer action. See Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 372, 173 P.3d 228 (2007).
Some cases speak of the trial court lacking jurisdiction to hear unlawful detainer actions, chapter 59.12 RCW, without adequate notice to the tenant. See, e.g., Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 372, 173 P.3d 228 (2007); Hous. Auth. v. Terry, 114 Wn.2d 558, 566, 789 P.2d 745 (1990); IBF, LLC v. Heuft, 141 Wn. App. 624, 632, 174 P.3d 95 (2007);
Hous. Auth. v. Silva, 94 Wn. App. 731, 734, 972 P.2d 952 (1999). But under chapter 59.12 RCW, ‘[t]he superior court of the county in which the property or some part of it is situated shall have jurisdiction of proceedings under this chapter.’ RCW 59.12.050. Furthermore, superior courts have broad general jurisdiction over real estate disputes. See WASH. CONST.
art. IV, § 6; Young v. Clark, 149 Wn.2d 130, 133-34, 65 P.3d 1192 (2003).
Thus, a superior court has jurisdiction to determine whether an unlawful detainer action may go forward. See RCW 59.12.050. The proper terminology is that a party who files an action after improper notice may not maintain such action or avail itself of the superior court's jurisdiction.
See Nickum v. City of Bainbridge Island, 153 Wn. App. 366, 379 n.9, 223 P.3d 1172 (2009). . . .
Tacoma Rescue Mission, 155 Wn. App. at 254 n.9 (emphasis added) (alteration in original).
In addition to compliance with statutory notice requirements, a termination notice must adhere to the terms of the lease. Tacoma Rescue Mission, 155 Wn. App. at 255. If a termination notice fails to follow the terms of the lease, the notice is “ineffective to maintain an unlawful detainer action.” Id.; see also Comty. Invs., Ltd. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 36 Wn. App. 34, 37-38, 671 P.2d 289 (1983).
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle Landlords must “strictly comply with timing and manner requirements of notice.”
Kiemle, 26 Wn. App. 2d at 215. “But when it comes to form and content, substantial compliance is sufficient.” Id. (citing Marsh-McLennan Bldg., Inc. v. Clapp, 96 Wn. App. 636, 640 n.1, 980 P.2d 311 (1999)). This distinction exists because “[t]he material thing is the giving of the notice.” Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Thrower, 155 Wash. 613, 617, 285 P. 654 (1930). In contrast, “‘we have never adopted the strictest rule of construction as to the form or contents of such notices under our unlawful detainer statutes, chiefly for the reason, doubtless, that the statutes prescribe no form.’” Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wn.2d 22, 32, 515 P.2d 160 (1973) (quoting Erz v. Reese, 157 Wash. 32, 35, 288 P. 255 (1930)). However, even where substantial compliance is sufficient, eviction notices must also be “sufficiently particular and certain so as not to deceive or mislead.” IBF, LLC v. Heuft, 141 Wn. App. 624, 632, 174 P.3d 95 (2007).
Carol raises several challenges to the effectiveness of the eviction notices.
Specifically, Carol argues that (1) both federal law and the lease agreement require BMAC to inform her of the right to meet with management within 10 days of receiving the notice, (2) the 10-day meeting language constitutes a “time and manner” requirement that must be strictly complied with, (3) the notices did not strictly comply with federal law or the lease agreement, and (4) even assuming the 10-day meeting language constitutes a “form and content” requirement, the notices failed to substantially comply.
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle While we agree that BMAC was required to notify the Ruehles of their right to request a meeting with management within 10 days of receiving the notice, we disagree with Carol’s remaining criticisms. 6 The lease agreement incorporated federal housing law “[W]hen a landlord accepts the financial benefits of a federal program, the federal protections provided to tenants therein ‘are properly considered as limitations to our state’s unlawful detainer statute.’” Sherwood Auburn, LLC v. Pinzon, 24 Wn. App. 2d 664, 678, 521 P.3d 212 (2022) (quoting Indigo Real Est. Servs., Inc. v. Wadsworth, 169 Wn. App. 412, 423, 280 P.3d 506 (2012)).
Carol cites to federal regulations and the HUD Handbook 7 for her contention that BMAC was required to notify her of her right to meet with management within 10 days of a notice to comply, cure or vacate. Under 24 C.F.R. § 880.607(c)(1),
6 In a footnote within its response brief, BMAC argues that Carol did not challenge the notices for failure to inform her of her right to meet with management until her motion for reconsideration. We observe that Carol preserved the issue for appeal by raising procedural defects with the notices before the show cause hearing and then augmenting the issue in her motion for reconsideration by claiming that the notices failed to notify her of her right to meet with management. See Newcomer v. Masini, 45 Wn. App. 284, 287, 724 P.2d 1122 (1986).
7 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., HUD HANDBOOK 4350.3:
OCCUPANCY REQUIREMENTS OF SUBSIDIZED MULTIFAMILY HOUSING PROGRAMS (2013) (HUD Handbook), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/43503hsgh.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DLV-68H8].
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle “[t]he owner must give the family a written notice of any proposed termination of tenancy, . . . advising the family that it has an opportunity to respond to the owner.” HUD requires that a written termination notice must “[a]dvise the tenant that he/she has 10 days within which to discuss termination of tenancy with the owner.” HUD Handbook, 8-13(B)(2)(c)(4).
While BMAC questions the applicability and authoritative nature of the above-
cited federal law, it is uncontested that the lease agreement incorporated the relevant language. The lease agreement stated, “All termination notices must . . . advise the Tenant that he/she has 10 days within which to discuss the proposed termination of tenancy with the Landlord.” CP at 20. Because the terms of a lease agreement are considered prerequisites to maintaining an unlawful detainer action, as are statutory or regulatory requirements, we consider the 10-day right to meet with management an additional limitation to maintaining this unlawful detainer action.
The 10-day right to meet with management is a form and content requirement
Carol argues the right to meet with management within 10 days of receiving the notice to cure, comply or vacate is a “time and manner” requirement, thus necessitating strict compliance. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 8-9. Timing and manner requirements apply to how and when a landlord institutes an unlawful detainer. See Marsh-McLennan,
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle 96 Wn. App. at 640 n.1. This court has held such requirements are inclusive of the time allowed to cure or vacate, when notice must be given, and the method of service on the tenant. See, e.g., Pinzon, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 680-81 (landlord failed to comply with CARES Act when tenants were served with two conflicting and misleading notices—a 14-day pay or vacate notice and a 30-day notice); Heuft, 141 Wn. App. at 633 (landlord served a 3-day pay or vacate notice when lease provided for 10 days of notice); Cmty. Invs., 36 Wn. App. at 37-38 (landlord served two conflicting notices, one providing for 10 days to pay or vacate, and the other providing for 20 days as required by the lease). A landlord’s notice to a tenant must strictly comply with express statutory requirements. See Hous. Auth. v. Terry, 114 Wn.2d 558, 563-64, 789 P.2d 745 (1990).
Alternatively, “form and content” requirements relate to the information contained within a notice and its precise wording. See Foisy, 83 Wn.2d at 32. Our courts have held form and content requirements to include the amount of rent owed, the level of specificity regarding the grounds for eviction, defective description of the premises, or absence of the owner’s signature. See, e.g., id. at 33; Kiemle, 26 Wn. App. 2d at 216; Provident Mut., 155 Wash. at 616-17.
The lease agreement term that required BMAC to inform the Ruehles of their 10-day right to request a meeting with management is a form and content requirement, rather than a time and manner requirement. The language informing a tenant of the right
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle to meet with management relates to the content of the notice, rather than when or how the notice itself must be administered. While subject to a 10-day time limitation, the right to meet with management does not relate to the time or method of the notice itself.
Carol argues that, because the language regarding the right to meet with management imposes a pre-eviction duty on BMAC, the specific language from the lease agreement must be wholly included in the eviction notice. This type of distinction, however, does not appear in our case law. As the right to meet with management relates to form and content, the notice need not use verbatim language.
The notice substantially complied with the lease agreement As a form and content requirement, the notices to the Ruehles must have substantially complied with the lease agreement’s language granting the right to meet with management. Although Carol argues that the eviction notices did not substantially comply with the lease, the record before us contains evidence to the contrary.
All three notices to the Ruehles substantially complied with the lease agreement.
The May 6 notice to comply or vacate expressly stated that the “pet owner will be entitled to make a written request for a meeting to discuss the violation” and the “pet owner will have ten days to correct the violation.” CP at 49. Such language conveys the Ruehle’s right to meet with management within 10 days and is not deceptive or misleading.
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle The June 3 and June 20 notices to cure or vacate tenancy likewise conveyed to the Ruehles their right to meet with management within 10 days. Both notices stated that the “pet owner will have ten days to correct the violation” and “failure to correct the violation, or request a meeting . . . may result in initiation of procedures to remove the pet or end the pet owner’s tenancy.” CP at 41, 71 (emphasis added). While these notices did not specifically state that the Ruehles were entitled to request a meeting with management, such a right is inferred.
Significantly, Paul actually did meet with a BMAC representative, which indicates the Ruehles had actual notice of their right to meet with management and exercised this right.
As the notices substantially complied with the lease agreement, the trial court did not err by permitting BMAC to proceed with its unlawful detainer action. 2. Compliance with show cause procedures Carol further avers that the trial court contravened RCW 59.18.380 by not examining the parties or witnesses at the show cause hearing. and not setting the case over for trial. Carol contends her factual denials and emotional support animal defense created triable issues.
We apply “something close to de novo review” when the trial court declines to order a trial after a tenant denies the landlord’s grounds for eviction or asserts an
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle affirmative defense. Kiemle, 26 Wn. App. 2d at 218-19. As required by the RLTA, a trial court will not enter an order issuing a writ of restitution without first conducting a show cause hearing. Id. at 211 (citing RCW 59.18.370-.380). A show cause hearing is a summary proceeding to determine the issue of possession pending suit. Id. It is not a final determination of the parties’ rights. Id. At the hearing, the trial court determines the merits of the complaint and answer. Brewer v. Hill, 25 Wn. App. 2d 844, 853, 525 P.3d 987 (2023) (citing RCW 59.18.380). The landlord bears the burden of proving the right of possession by a preponderance of the evidence. Hous. Auth. v. Pleasant, 126 Wn. App. 382, 392, 109 P.3d 422 (2005).
A tenant is entitled to answer and may assert any legal or equitable defenses at the show cause hearing. Country Manor MHC, LLC v. John Doe Occupant, 176 Wn. App. 601, 612, 308 P.3d 818 (2013) (citing RCW 59.18.380; Leda v. Whisnand, 150 Wn. App. 69, 80, 207 P.3d 468 (2009)). A tenant who raises a viable legal defense is entitled to testify and present witnesses in support of that defense. Leda, 150 Wn. App. at 82. The trial court may allow the parties or counsel to conduct the examination or may do so itself. Id. at 82-83. “The trial court must consider sufficient admissible evidence from parties and witnesses to determine the merits of any viable asserted defenses.” Country Manor, 176 Wn. App. at 612.
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle RCW 59.18.380 directs the court at a show cause hearing to determine whether to issue a writ of restitution or proceed to trial. Randy Reynolds & Assocs. v. Harmon, 193 Wn.2d 143, 157, 437 P.3d 677 (2019); RCW 59.18.380. If there are no issues of material fact regarding possession, the court need not set the matter for trial. Brewer, 25 Wn. App. 2d at 853. The court has an affirmative duty to determine the merits of raised defenses at the show cause hearing. Leda, 150 Wn. App. at 79, 81.
Carol contends that the trial court erred when it did not set the matter over for a trial. She argues there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether her dog was an emotional support animal, whether her dog attacked another dog, and whether her own May 28 altercation was “mutual combat.” Tr. of Proc. (Aug. 26, 2024) at 5.
BMAC presented three separate grounds for eviction: (1) the dog attack on May 4 and subsequent failure by the Ruehles to remove the dog from the premises, (2) Carol’s altercation with another resident on May 28, and (3) Paul’s harassment and use of abusive language toward other residents on May 28 and May 30. 8 BMAC presented evidentiary submissions including declarations and corroborative documentation regarding all three incidents.
8 The trial court did not provide an explanation or any reasoning during the show cause hearing when it announced it was ordering issuance of the writ of restitution and denying Carol’s motion to dismiss. BMAC presented all three grounds for eviction at the show cause hearing.
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle Carol’s oral assertions made through counsel at the show cause hearing were insufficient to controvert the evidence of the dog attack, assaults, and harassment. Regarding the dog attack, a mere denial or conclusory statement of fact unsupported by evidence is not sufficient to raise an issue of material fact. See Winters v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp. of Wash., Inc., 11 Wn. App. 2d 628, 641, 454 P.3d 896 (2019). Similarly, although Carol argued that her dog was an emotional support animal and therefore entitled Carol to a reasonable accommodation for a disability, she failed to provide any citation to legal authority in support of her claim. Therefore, even assuming the dog was an emotional support animal, Carol provided no law to indicate the outcome of the show cause hearing would have changed. Carol did not dispute that the dog remained on the premises at the time of the hearing, well beyond the expiration of any cure period.
As this ground alone was sufficient to support issuance of the writ of restitution, we do not evaluate the remaining two grounds. Concomitantly, no bond was required under RCW 59.18.380 as trial was not ordered.
APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS Both parties request an award of attorney fees and expenses on appeal pursuant to RAP 18.1. Carol argues she is entitled to an award of fees under RCW 59.18.290 and RCW 59.18.650 for wrongful eviction. BMAC argues it is entitled to an award of fees under RCW 59.18.290.
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Blue Mountain Action Council v. Ruehle Under the RLTA, “[t]he prevailing party may recover the costs of suit or arbitration and reasonable attorney[] fees.” RCW 59.18.290(1), (2). Furthermore, “‘Where the court has entered a judgment in favor of the landlord restoring possession of the property to the landlord, the court may award reasonable attorney[] fees to the landlord.’” Tedford v. Guy, 13 Wn. App. 2d 1, 17, 462 P.3d 869 (2020) (quoting RCW 59.18.290(3)).
We award BMAC its reasonable attorney fees and expenses incurred on review.
Carol’s corresponding request for attorney fees and expenses is denied.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Murphy, J.
WE CONCUR:
Cooney, A.C.J. Hill, J.