Blount v. Lemaire

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: February 18, 2014
• Docket: 13-946
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-946 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 18 February 2014

JUDSON H. BLOUNT, III, Plaintiff

vs. Pitt County No. 91-CVD-756 ROBIN W. LEMAIRE, Defendant

Appeal by Plaintiff from judgment and order entered 7 March

2014 by Judge David A. Brantley in Pitt County District Court.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 January 2014.

Edwin M. Hardy for Plaintiff.

Susan K. Ellis, PLLC, by Susan K. Ellis, for Defendant.

DILLON, Judge.

Judson H. Blount, III (Plaintiff), appeals from the trial

court’s judgment and order awarding a monetary judgment and

attorneys’ fees in favor of Robin W. Lemaire (Defendant), in

connection with Plaintiff’s purported breach of an agreement to

pay the college expenses of the parties’ two children. For the

following reasons, we affirm in part and vacate in part.

I. Factual & Procedural Background -2- Plaintiff and Defendant, formerly husband and wife, have

two children from their marriage, Avery and Kallie. On 11 May

1990, while their children were still minors, Plaintiff and

Defendant executed a Separation and Property Settlement

Agreement (the Separation Agreement), which includes the

following provision (the Education Provision) concerning payment

of their children’s educational expenses:

EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES. . . . If the children of the parties shall be enrolled in a college or university beyond his or her eighteenth (18th) birthday, which college or university shall be selected by the child and the parties to this Agreement, the costs of room, board, and tuition of that college or university for each child so enrolled shall be paid by [Plaintiff]. [Plaintiff] agrees to provide reasonable spending money for the child while attending school.

The parties agreed to incorporate the terms of the Separation

Agreement into a judgment for absolute divorce, which was

entered in Pitt County District Court on 23 March 1992.

In May 2000, a consent order was entered through which

Plaintiff agreed to pay Defendant $2,000.00 per month in child

support. This consent order referenced the Education Provision,

recognizing that Defendant had, inter alia, waived any right to

spousal support in exchange for Plaintiff’s promise to pay the

children’s college expenses. -3- On 19 August 2004, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking credit

towards his child support obligation for additional living

expenses that he had been paying on Avery’s behalf. The court

denied Plaintiff’s motion by order entered 15 April 2005,

reasoning that the May 2000 consent order “contains clear and

unequivocal language and terms indicating that each of the

parties intended it to be non-modifiable as an integrated

agreement and Order based on reciprocal consideration and

without regard to any change in circumstances.” The court also

ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant’s attorneys’ fees on grounds

that Plaintiff’s motion had presented “a complete absence of a

justiciable issue of law or fact . . . .”

In the fall of 2005, Avery entered Peace College in Raleigh

as a full-time student. Plaintiff states that Avery performed

“adequately” until the fall 2007 semester, when Avery failed all

five of her courses, and after which Plaintiff informed Avery

that he would not pay her tuition, board, or other college

expenses until she passed a semester “under her own steam.”

Avery acknowledged her understanding and obtained a loan in

order to pay her college expenses for the spring 2008 semester.

Although her grades improved, Avery left Peace College after the

spring 2008 semester. Plaintiff resumed his payment of Avery’s -4- college expenses when Avery subsequently enrolled at Pitt

Community College, where she completed a two-year degree in May

2010.

Kallie enrolled as a full-time student at the College of

Charleston in the fall of 2008. Plaintiff informed Kallie in

2010 that he would not pay her college expenses beyond her

fourth year of enrollment. Following her fourth year of

studies, however, Kallie still needed one additional semester to

complete her degree. Accordingly, Kallie obtained a loan to

finance her final semester and graduated in December 2012.

On 23 August 2012, Defendant filed a motion in the cause

and for attorneys’ fees, seeking (1) reimbursement for student

loan payments and other college expenses that she had paid on

behalf of Avery and Kallie; and (2) court costs, including

attorneys’ fees that she had incurred in bringing this action.

Following a hearing on these matters, the trial court entered a

judgment and order on 7 March 2013. Therein, the trial court

awarded Defendant a judgment in the principal amount of $26,236;

ordered Plaintiff to pay off an outstanding student loan on

Kallie’s behalf; and ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant’s court

costs, including attorneys’ fees. From this judgment and order,

Plaintiff appeals. -5- II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

“It is well settled in this jurisdiction that when the

trial court sits without a jury, the standard of review on

appeal is whether there was competent evidence to support the

trial court’s findings of fact and whether its conclusions of

law were proper in light of such facts.” Shear v. Stevens Bldg.

Co., 107 N.C. App. 154, 160, 418 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1992). “Where

there is competent evidence to support the trial court’s

findings of fact, those findings are binding on appeal.”

Burress v. Burress, 195 N.C. App. 447, 449-50, 672 S.E.2d 732,

734 (2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Contractual Obligations

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in awarding

damages to Defendant as reimbursement for Defendant’s payment of

some of the children’s college expenses. We disagree.

“[O]ur case law . . . clearly establishes that a parent can

assume contractual obligations to his child greater than the law

otherwise imposes. Thus, a parent may expressly agree to

support his child after emancipation and beyond majority, and

such agreements are binding and enforceable.” Williams v.

Williams, 97 N.C. App. 118, 122, 387 S.E.2d 217, 219 (1990) -6- (citations omitted). “Where issues surrounding the

interpretation of the terms of a contractual agreement are

concerned, the generally accepted rule is that the intention of

the parties controls, and the intention can usually be

determined by considering the subject matter of the contract,

language employed, the objective sought and the situation of the

parties at the time when the agreement was reached.” Robertson

v. Hartman, 90 N.C. App. 250, 252, 368 S.E.2d 199, 200 (1988)

(citing Pike v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 274 N.C. 1, 161

S.E.2d 453 (1968)). “When the language of a written contract is

plain and unambiguous, the contract must be interpreted as

written and the parties are bound by its terms[.]” Five Oaks

Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Efirds Pest Control Co., 75 N.C. App.

635, 637, 331 S.E.2d 296, 298 (1985).

Here, the parties agreed to incorporate the terms of the

Separation Agreement into their divorce judgment. As part of

the Separation Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay their

children’s college expenses in exchange for Defendant’s

agreement to, inter alia, waive any claim against Plaintiff for

spousal support. Plaintiff acknowledges the Education Provision

and his obligations thereunder, but contends that because it is

silent with respect to when such obligations terminate, the -7- trial court should have read a term of reasonable duration into

the provision. Although we agree in principle with Plaintiff’s

position to a certain extent – for instance, we do not believe

that the Education Provision’s failure to specify the duration

of Plaintiff’s obligation to pay his daughter’s college expenses

would obligate Plaintiff to pay such expenses indefinitely – we

do not believe that application of this principle helps

Plaintiff in the present case.

With respect to Kallie, Plaintiff asserts that his

obligation to pay her college expenses should have ended at the

close of Kallie’s fourth year at the College of Charleston,

since four years represented “sufficient time” for Kallie to

complete her four-year degree. In short, Plaintiff contends

that it was unreasonable to require him to pay Kallie’s college

expenses for the one additional semester that Kallie needed to

complete her degree. We are not persuaded. While it may be

true – and perhaps anticipated in many instances – that a

college student will complete a four-year degree in the

“traditional” four-year period, it is also reasonably

foreseeable that a student might require additional time to

complete his or her degree. Plaintiff, who was an attorney at

the time he entered into the Separation Agreement with -8- Defendant, could have accounted for this possibility and

negotiated for inclusion of a provision in the Separation

Agreement limiting the duration of his college-expense-related

obligations. Restricting our analysis and holding to the

circumstances presented, where there exists a valid contractual

agreement unambiguously obligating one party’s payment of

college-related expenses incurred by a third-party beneficiary

without specifying when the obligation terminates, and where the

beneficiary enrolls one additional semester in order to complete

a four-year degree, we conclude that the trial court did not err

in construing the parties’ Separation Agreement so as to

obligate Plaintiff with respect to Kallie’s college expenses in

question.

Plaintiff further contends that the trial court erred in

obligating him to pay Avery’s college expenses for her spring

2008 semester at Peace College in light of the fact that Avery

had failed all five of her courses the preceding semester.

Plaintiff insists that his obligation to pay Avery’s college

expenses should have terminated when Avery failed to perform

“adequately” and, further, that because the Separation Agreement

fails to specify what level of performance was “adequate,” “the

Court should step in to rule what is reasonable.” We disagree -9- with these contentions for reasons similar to those articulated

above relating to Kallie’s college expenses. While we do not

believe that the Education Provision can be properly construed

as requiring Plaintiff to pay for semester after semester of

poor academic performance indefinitely, it is certainly

foreseeable that a college student such as Avery might perform

poorly in a given semester, ultimately requiring that she extend

her coursework beyond the traditional four-year period. Thus,

given the circumstances presented, we conclude that the trial

court did not err in obligating Plaintiff with respect to

Avery’s college expenses at issue. See Barker v. Barker, __

N.C. App. __, 745 S.E.2d 910 (2013) (holding that the father,

who had agreed to pay his daughter’s education so long as she

“diligently applied” herself to her studies, was obligated to

continue paying the daughter’s educational expenses,

notwithstanding the daughter’s poor academic performance and

placement on academic probation).

C. Attorneys’ Fees

ordering him to pay Defendant’s attorneys’ fees. We agree.

We review the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees for

abuse of discretion. Runnels v. Robinson, 212 N.C. App. 198, -10- 203, 711 S.E.2d 486, 490-91 (2011). “Abuse of discretion

results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by

reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result

of a reasoned decision.” State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285,

372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988). “The general rule in North Carolina

is that attorney’s fees are not allowed as a part of the costs

in civil actions or special proceedings, unless there is express

statutory authority for fixing and awarding the attorney’s

fees.” Alston v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 200 N.C. App. 420, 424, 684

S.E.2d 705, 707 (2009) (citing Bowman v. Comfort Chair Co., 271

N.C. 702, 704, 157 S.E.2d 378, 379 (1967)).

Here, the trial court concludes in its order that

“Defendant is the prevailing party in this action and is

entitled to a judgment for her attorney fees and expenses. The

attorney fees and expenses incurred by Defendant in the amount

of $5020.00 are reasonable, entitling Defendant to a judgment

for that amount.” The order, however, does not articulate any

basis, statutory or otherwise, for the attorneys’ fees award.

Defendant has not advanced any statutory authority, before

the trial court or now on appeal, in support of her request for

attorneys’ fees. Rather, Defendant’s sole contention with

respect to the merits of the attorneys’ fees award is that -11- “[t]his current proceeding is no different substantively from

the previous proceeding between the parties heard by Judge

Brantley in April 2005 in which attorney fees were awarded to

Defendant.” Defendant insists that because the same judge has

previously awarded her attorneys’ fees in a separate proceeding

brought under the Separation Agreement and because “[b]oth

proceedings concerned Plaintiff’s failure to pay certain amounts

he contractually agreed to pay and/or was required by court

order to pay[,]” she must likewise be entitled to attorneys’

fees in the present action. We disagree that these two

proceedings are substantively the same; whereas the April 2005

order addressed Plaintiff’s “clear and unequivocal” child

support obligation under the Separation Agreement, the present

matter involves Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the children’s

college expenses under a provision of the Separation Agreement

that fails to define the scope of that obligation. Moreover, we

fail to see how the April 2005 attorneys’ fees award, which

evidently was never subjected to appellate review, has any

bearing on the propriety of the attorneys’ fees award presently

under review. We also note that the April 2005 attorneys’ fees

award was based upon the trial court’s determination that the

action was non-justiciable, and the trial court made no similar -12- determination in support of the attorneys’ fees awarded here.

Accordingly, because the record is devoid of any basis for an

award of attorneys’ fees, and because Defendant has advanced no

authority in support of such an award, we vacate that portion of

the trial court’s order.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s

award of attorneys’ fees, but affirm the trial court’s 7 March

2013 judgment and order in all other respects.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART.

Judges STROUD and HUNTER, JR. concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).