Bloomberg v. Commissioner

74 T.C. 1368, 1980 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 56
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedSeptember 23, 1980
DocketDocket No. 2977-78
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 74 T.C. 1368 (Bloomberg v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bloomberg v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1368, 1980 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 56 (tax 1980).

Opinion

Drennen, Judge:

Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioners’ income tax for the year 1974 in the amount of $6,849.33. Due to concessions of the parties, the only issues for decision are (1) whether petitioners are entitled to an investment credit under sections 38 and 46, I.R.C. 1954, for equipment owned by petitioners and leased to petitioners’ professional corporation, Leroy Bloomberg, M.D., Inc., and (2) whether petitioners are entitled to an investment credit in excess of $65.86 for two automobiles owned by them and purportedly used by them in their business as employees of Leroy Bloomberg, M.D., Inc.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The stipulated facts are incorporated herein by this reference.

Petitioners Leroy and Sally Bloomberg, husband and wife, resided in Newark, Ohio, when they filed their petition herein. They filed a joint Federal income tax return for the year 1974 with the District Director of Internal Revenue, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Leroy Bloomberg (herein petitioner) is an ophthalmologist and is employed as a physician by a professional corporation known as Leroy Bloomberg, M.D., Inc., in Newark, Ohio (hereinafter referred to as the corporation). Leroy was president of the corporation during 1974. On August 1, 1974, the corporation leased certain medical equipment and office furniture and fixtures from petitioner under a written lease agreement. The equipment and furnishings were purchased by petitioner in 1974 and were transferred to and first placed in service by the corporation in 1974.

The lease agreement between petitioner and the corporation was for a period of 5 years commencing on August 1, 1974, and provided that the lessee should pay lessor an aggregate rental of $40,954.20 over the term of the lease, payable in monthly installments. Title to the equipment was to remain in lessor’s name and, upon termination, the equipment was to be returned to the lessor in the same condition as when received by lessee, reasonable wear and tear excepted. Upon default by the lessee, the lease could be terminated by lessor by written notice, but there was no provision for termination by the lessee.

The furnishings and equipment leased were purchased by petitioner for an aggregate cost of $35,979.56, were reported on the depreciation schedule attached to petitioners’ 1974 return at that cost, and depreciation deductions on the furnishings and equipment were claimed on the return, based on estimated useful lives of 7 years for all items except one, which used a useful life of 5 years. Petitioners also reported the rent received from the corporation as income on their 1974 return.

Thomas E. Brock, Jr., is president of Medical Management, Inc., of Columbus, Ohio. The business of Medical Management, Inc., is to render accounting and tax service to physicians and dentists, which it did for the corporation and petitioners. Brock was secretary of the Bloomberg corporation in 1974.

On June 10,1977, Brock, as president of Medical Management, Inc., wrote a letter to petitioners, advising “Effective date of this letter, all equipment leases between you, shareholder, and the corporation will be terminated. You will receive a monthly office equipment and/or office furniture allowance in the amount of $232.42, to commence 7/1/77.” This letter also advised petitioner not to pay himself any further lease payments from the corporation.

Petitioner purchased a 1974 Chrysler Imperial automobile on September 25, 1974, at a cost of $5,638, and a 1974 Mercedes Benz automobile on August 26, 1974, at a cost of $16,939. Petitioner did not lease these automobiles to the corporation but was paid an automobile allowance by the corporation which he included in taxable income. On the depreciation schedule attached to petitioner’s 1974 return, an estimated life of 3 years was claimed for the Imperial, depreciation of $930.21 was claimed, and also an investment credit of $131.55. The Mercedes was also listed on the depreciation schedule with an estimated useful life of 7 years; depreciation in the amount of $1,580.92, and an investment credit of $1,185.73 was claimed.

In the notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed the entire investment credit claimed on the return, which included the credit claimed on the leased equipment and furnishings, and on the automobiles. On brief, respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to 5 percent of the investment credit, or $65.86, on the automobiles.

OPINION

Section 38, I.R.C. 1954, provides for a credit against tax for investments in certain depreciable property, in an amount determined under section 46. Section 46(a)(2) provides that the amount of the credit shall be certain specified percentages of the qualified investment in the property. Section 46(c) defines “qualified investment” to mean the aggregate of the applicable percentages of the basis of new and used section 38 property placed in service by the taxpayer during the taxable year. Section 46(e)(3) provides:

A credit shall be allowed by section 38 to a person which is not a corporation with respect to property of which such person is the lessor only if—
* * * * * *
(B) the term of the lease (taking into account options to renew) is less than 50 percent of the useful life of the property, and for the period consisting of the first 12 months after the date on which the property is transferred to the lessee the sum of the deductions with respect to such property which are allowable to the lessor solely by reason of section 162 * * * exceeds 15 percent of the rental income produced by such property.

Section 48(a) defines the term “section 38 property” as including tangible personal property (among other things). Section 48(b) defines “new section 38 property” as including section 38 property acquired after December 31, 1961, if the original use of such property commences with the taxpayer and commences after such date. Section 48(d) provides that a person who is a lessor of property may (in accordance with regulations) elect with respect to new section 38 property to treat the lessee as having acquired such property.

With regard to the equipment, furniture, and fixtures purchased by petitioner in 1974 and leased to the corporation on August 1, 1974, there is no question that petitioner qualifies for the applicable investment credit on that property, or the amount thereof, if he meets the requirements of section 46(e)(3) quoted above.1 The issue is whether the term of the lease is less than 50 percent of the useful life of the property, and whether the section 162 allowable deductions, with respect to the property, exceed 15 percent of the rental income produced by the property.

On its face, the term of the lease, 5 years, exceeded 50 percent of the estimated useful lives of the assets claimed on petitioner’s depreciation schedule, being 5 to 7 years. Petitioner claims, however, that the lease was effectively canceled by Brock’s letter of June 10, 1977, which was prior to the expiration of 50 percent of the useful lives of any of the leased assets, and that the cancellation made the lease null and void ab initio so the property should be considered as first placed in service by petitioner in 1974. We disagree.

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Bluebook (online)
74 T.C. 1368, 1980 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 56, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bloomberg-v-commissioner-tax-1980.