Blits v. Blits

507 So. 2d 721, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1283, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8323
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Blits v. Blits. Read the opinion of the Court — 468 So. 2d 320
District Court of Appeal of Florida·Decided May 19, 1987·No. No. 86-1781·Published

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Because disputed issues of material fact remain unresolved, we reverse the probate [722]*722court’s judgment, which is in effect a final summary judgment. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.510(c). Even if the probate court correctly assumed that Harold Blits, in his personal capacity, was able to admit the assertion in the request for admission, cfi Krasa v. Derrico, 193 S.W.2d 891 (Tex.Ct.App.1946) (admitted request for admission directed at party in her personal capacity is not also admission in her representative capacity), when considered in conjunction with Harold’s prior affidavit, the admission does not establish that Harold has or ever had possession of the share certificate. The probate court, therefore, incorrectly granted final judgment. Cf. Dade Roofing & Insulation Corp. v. Torres, 369 So.2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (summary judgment improperly granted where disputed issue remained concerning whether corporate president converted corporate assets). Since H & J Blits, Inc. is not a party in this action, Hannah Blits must show that Harold is himself wrongfully withholding the share certificate. It is not sufficient for Hannah to merely show that either Harold or the corporation wrongfully acquired or possesses it. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a trial on the issues raised by the pleadings.

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Blits v. Blits, 507 So. 2d 721, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1283, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8323 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987).

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Related

Dade Roofing and Insulation Corp. v. Torres
369 So. 2d 98 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1979)
Krasa v. Derrico
193 S.W.2d 891 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1946)