Blechner v. Daimler-Benz AG

410 F. Supp. 2d 366, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2387, 2006 WL 167835
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedJanuary 24, 2006
DocketCIV.A. 04-331-JJF
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 410 F. Supp. 2d 366 (Blechner v. Daimler-Benz AG) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blechner v. Daimler-Benz AG, 410 F. Supp. 2d 366, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2387, 2006 WL 167835 (D. Del. 2006).

Opinion

OPINION

FARNAN, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is the Motion Of Defendants DaimlerChrysler AG And Daimler-Benz AG To Dismiss The Complaint (D.I.51). For the reasons discussed, the Motion will be granted.

I. Factual Background

The following facts are alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. In November 1998, Chrysler and Daimler-Benz merged to form DaimlerChrysler, a German corporation. (D.I. 1 at 2). Defendants, in order to secure shareholder approval, identified this merger as a “merger-of-equals,” rather than as an acquisition. Id. As a part of the merger-of-equals, shareholders were allegedly promised that control would be shared by managers from both companies and that the joining of the companies was merely to “further ensuring greater synergies, cost savings and spirited cooperative enthusiasm.” Id.

Plaintiffs contend that the “merger-of-equals” was in fact an acquisition and that Defendants never intended there to be a merger-of-equals. Plaintiffs contend that on November 17, 2000, shareholders discovered that all Chrysler senior managers had been removed from the Management Board and replaced with Daimler-Benz employees. (D.I. 1 at 3-4). Plaintiffs assert that on November 17, 2000, shares of DaimlerChrysler dropped $5.00 per share, representing a market capitalization loss of over $5 billion. (D.I. 1 at 4).

On May 24, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

who are not citizens or residents of the United States (“Foreign Investors”) who purchased or otherwise acquired the securities of DaimlerChrysler AG (“Daimler Chrysler” or the “Company”) between November 17, 1998 and November 17, 2000..., including those former shareholders of Chrysler Corporation (“Chrysler”) who surrendered their Chrysler shares in connection with the merger of Chrysler by and into the Company on or about November 17, 1998, on or through a securities exchange not based in the United States.

(D.I. 1 at l)(emphasis added). The Complaint alleges violations of § 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), § 11 of the Exchange Act, and § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) against all Defendants. (D.I.l). Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants Daimler-Benz, DaimlerChrysler, Schrempp, and Gentz violated § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, that Defendants Schrempp and Gentz violated § 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and that all individual Defendants violated § 15 of the Securities Act. Id.

Plaintiffs allege that because the “merger-of-equals” was in fact an acquisition, they were denied the payment of a control premium, and thus, received inadequate consideration in the merger. (D.I. 1 at 2). Plaintiffs also allege that investors were *368 misled as to the risks of investing in Daim-lerChrysler because the investors believed that the creation of DaimlerChrysler was a merger-of-equals. Id. at 4. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “artificially inflated [DaimlerChrysler’s] revenues and earnings and understated costs, in order to create the appearance that the Company was achieving the growth, synergies and cost savings promised by Defendants.” Id.

On March 1, 2005, Defendants Daimler-Chrysler and Daimler-Benz filed the instant Motion To Dismiss (D.I.51).

II. Parties’ Contentions

By their Motion, Defendants contend that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because federal securities laws do not grant extraterritorial jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims, or alternatively, that the Court should not hear the case due to considerations of international comity and foreign policy. Defendants further contend that the investors’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations and that even if the claims are not time-barred, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).

In response, Plaintiffs contend that the Court should hear the case, first, because the Complaint alleges sufficient conduct occurring in the United States to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction, and second, because international comity and foreign policy do not favor dismissal. Plaintiffs further contend that the asserted claims are not barred by the statute of limitations and that a claim has been stated for which relief may be granted under federal securities laws.

III. Discussion

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has only considered the extraterritorial reach of the federal securities laws twice and has not ruled on the question since its decision in Kasser in 1977. TriStar Farms Ltd. v. Marconi, 225 F.Supp.2d 567, 574 (W.D.Pa.2002). See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.1977); see also Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir.1976). Thus, the Court will examine several sources to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate in this case: a general canon of statutory interpretation, the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations, two relevant cases decided by the Third Circuit, the conduct and effects tests used by other circuits and recently applied by the Western District of Pennsylvania, case law concerning extraterritorial application in class actions, and Second Circuit case law cited by the parties.

A. General Canon Of Statutory Interpretation Against The Extraterritorial Application Of Laws

Unless Congress has expressed intent otherwise, courts should avoid the extraterritorial application of laws. W. Barton Patterson, Defining the Reach of the Securities Exchange Act: Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Fraud Provisions, 74 Fordham L.Rev. 213, 221 (2005)(citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 113 S.Ct. 2549, 125 L.Ed.2d 128 (1993); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 111 S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 274 (1991); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 69 S.Ct. 575, 93 L.Ed. 680 (1949)). “This canon of construction is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained. It serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord.” Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. NLRB, 365 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir.2004) (citations omitted).

The Court concludes that the general canon of statutory interpretation against *369

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Bluebook (online)
410 F. Supp. 2d 366, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2387, 2006 WL 167835, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blechner-v-daimler-benz-ag-ded-2006.