Blanchard v. Bisignano
This text of Blanchard v. Bisignano (Blanchard v. Bisignano) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 25 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JASON BLANCHARD, No. 24-4359
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-01100-SKV v.
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of MEMORANDUM* Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington S. Kate Vaughan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 18, 2025** Seattle, Washington
Before: GOULD and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and PITMAN, District Judge. ***
Appellant Jason Blanchard (“Blanchard”) seeks review of the district court’s
order and judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Robert Pitman, United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation. (“Commissioner”) denial of Blanchard’s application for disability benefits. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. As the parties are familiar with the facts,
we do not recount them here. We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order upholding the Commissioner’s
denial of benefits and reverse only if the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”)
decision is not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ applied the wrong
legal standard. Stiffler v. O’Malley, 102 F.4th 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation
omitted). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” and means only
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
1. The ALJ articulated “specific, clear and convincing reasons” to discount
Blanchard’s testimony about the impact his symptoms had on his ability to sustain
work activities. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted). This Court has “made clear that an ALJ is not ‘required to
believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be
available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to’ the Social Security Act.”
Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the
claimant’s subjective testimony.” Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533
2 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2), (c)(4). The
ALJ agreed with Blanchard that his physical and mental conditions limited him to
a range of sedentary work with little social interaction, but the ALJ declined to
adopt all of Blanchard’s subjective symptom testimony because it conflicted with
the medical record, his work history, and his activity level. For example, the ALJ
considered the fact that Blanchard continued to work for a year in a demanding
position after the car accident. The ALJ further noted that though Blanchard could
not return to his banking job, his ability to continue handling even some aspects of
this highly demanding work discounted his allegations that he was incapable of
less difficult work. And the ALJ also considered that Blanchard continued to
handle household responsibilities, including providing transportation for his
children, attending their extracurricular activities, and traveling.
More specifically, the ALJ reviewed evidence of Blanchard’s cognitive
impairment and found that the record showed he could perform simple work in a
setting which required limited public interactions. The ALJ found that contrary to
Blanchard’s claims, his physical symptoms, such as pain, were relatively stable
and had improved, such that he could perform sedentary work within prescribed
limits. The ALJ found that collectively these facts “contradict[ed] claims of a
totally debilitating impairment.” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499 (citation omitted).
Because the ALJ identified reasons “sufficiently specific to allow [this] court to
3 conclude [the ALJ] . . . did not ‘arbitrarily discredit [Blanchard’s] testimony,’” we
affirm the ALJ’s discrediting of Blanchard’s testimony. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947
F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citation omitted).
2. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s consideration of the medical
opinions. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022). Where
conflicting medical evidence is “susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” Burch v. Barnhart,
400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Several doctors opined on Blanchard’s
condition and came to varying conclusions. One doctor concluded Blanchard could
do work that involved frequent lifting and standing while others concluded he
could only do work involving lighter exertion and without public interaction. Still
others concluded he could not consistently work full time at all. By finding that
Blanchard could conduct sedentary work with limited social interaction, the ALJ
weighed these competing opinions, determining which opinions were most
consistent with the overall record. The ALJ discounted three medical sources
which found Blanchard could not work full time, because those opinions were less
thorough, lacked citations to evidence from the relevant time frame, and conflicted
with the rest of the record. We affirm the ALJ’s weighing of the opinions and the
finding that Blanchard could complete sedentary work with limited social
interaction because the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.
4 3. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that there were a
significant number of jobs in the national economy that Blanchard could perform
given his age, work experience, and residual functional capacity. He was
accordingly found not “disabled” under the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1560(c). The ALJ relied on testimony from Dr. Erin Martz, a vocational expert
with a doctorate in rehabilitation research. Dr. Martz relied on data from the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics to conclude that 48,000 jobs, spread across several
representative occupations, existed in the national economy that Blanchard could
perform even with his limitations. The ALJ did not discuss conclusions from Todd
Gendreau, a vocational consultant whose set of interrogatory answers Blanchard
offered after the hearing. But the ALJ need only discuss “significant probative”
evidence. Wischmann v.
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