Blakely v. The Department of Human Rights Commission

2023 IL App (1st) 211262-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: August 24, 2023
• Docket: 1-21-1262
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2023 IL App (1st) 211262-U Nos. 1-21-1262, 1-21-1268, & 1-21-1269 (cons.) Order filed August 24, 2023

Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ JACQUELINE BLAKELY, ) Petition for Direct ) Administrative Review of a Petitioner, ) Decision of the Human Rights ) Commission. v. ) ) THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ) Charge Nos. 2019 CF 1405 COMMISSION and HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, ) 2019 CN 1406 ) 2019 CF 2137 Respondents. )

JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Lampkin and Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We dismiss petitioner’s consolidated appeals for failure to name the necessary parties on appeal.

¶2 Jacqueline Blakely appeals pro se from three final decisions entered by the Illinois Human

Rights Commission (Commission) sustaining the Illinois Department of Human Rights’

(Department) dismissal of three charges Blakely filed pursuant to the Illinois Human Rights Act

(Act) (775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2018)), against her former employer, Fresenius Medical Nos. 1-21-1262, 1-21-1268, & 1-21-1269 (cons.)

Center (Fresenius), and her former direct supervisor, Nataya Williams. 1 We consolidated

Blakely’s three appeals seeking direct administrative review of the Commission’s decisions.

¶3 Blakely filed separate charges against Fresenius (charge number 2019 CF 1405) and

Williams (charge number 2019 CN 1406) related to her job as a patient care technician. In the

charge against Fresenius, Blakely alleged that she (1) was sexually harassed when Williams

“rubbed” her leg after asking Blakely whether she was wearing uniform pants, (2) received a

“written reprimand” for an attendance policy violation based on her “disability, back disorder”,

(3) received a written reprimand in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity, (4) experienced

unequal terms and conditions of employment based on her “disability, back disorder” when she

was assigned more patients on a particular day and other employees were permitted to take longer

breaks, and (5) experienced unequal terms and conditions of employment in retaliation for

engaging in a protected activity. In the charge against Williams, Blakely reasserted her sexual

harassment allegation, but directed it against Williams, individually.

¶4 After being discharged a few months later, Blakely filed a second charge against Fresenius

(charge number 2019 CF 2137). In this charge, Blakely alleged that she was harassed based on her

race when a nurse made derogatory comments during an argument. She further alleged Fresenius

retaliated against her for filing charges with the Department by (1) placing her on paid suspension,

(2) harassing her with phone calls during the suspension, and (3) discharged her following the

suspension.

1 On appeal, Fresenius identifies its name as Bio-Medical Applications of Illinois d/b/a Fresenius Medical Care Greenwood Avenue. In her petitions for review, petitioner names as parties on appeal Nadine Abrahams and Jackson Lewis, P.C., the attorney and law firm, respectively, representing Fresenius and Williams. Neither Abrahams nor Jackson Lewis, P.C. was a party in the proceedings before the administrative agency. Because they are not proper parties on appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 335(a) (eff. July 1, 2017)), they are not listed as respondents in the caption of this order.

-2- Nos. 1-21-1262, 1-21-1268, & 1-21-1269 (cons.)

¶5 The Department’s investigator interviewed Blakely and several Fresenius employees,

including Williams, the director of employee relations, and a nurse. The investigator also reviewed

Fresenius’s policies regarding equal employment opportunity and employee conduct and

discipline.

¶6 Following its investigation, the Department dismissed Blakely’s three charges for lack of

substantial evidence. Blakely then filed a request for review with the Commission and the

Department, Fresenius, and Williams each filed a response.

¶7 The Commission sustained the Department’s dismissal of Blakely’s charges for lack of

substantial evidence. The Commission found that (1) Williams’s isolated act was not sufficiently

severe to support a sexual harassment claim, (2) Blakely failed to present evidence that she was

disabled within the meaning of the Act, (3) some actions Blakely complained of were “ ‘[p]etty

slights or minor annoyances’ ”, which did not qualify as adverse actions under the Act, and (4) the

alleged incident of racial harassment was isolated and not severe. The Commission found that

Blakley had made a prima facie case of retaliation. However, Fresenius showed it had suspended

and discharged Blakely for legitimate reasons—misconduct, insubordination, and dishonesty—

and Blakely failed to show that Fresenius’s actions were pretextual.

¶8 Blakely filed three separate pro se petitions for direct administrative review of the

Commission’s final orders with this court, which we consolidated.

¶9 As an initial matter, we observe that Blakely’s brief fails to comply with the requirements

of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which governs the form and content of

appellate briefs. For example, her brief fails to (1) demonstrate this court’s jurisdiction, (2)

reference the underlying facts without argument or comment, (3) include specific page citations to

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the record on appeal, or (4) set forth clear legal argument supported by citation to pertinent legal

authorities. Id.

¶ 10 Illinois Supreme Court rules have the force of law and must be followed. In re Denzel W.,

237 Ill. 2d 285, 294 (2010). This court will not apply a more lenient standard for pro se litigants.

People v. Fowler, 222 Ill. App. 3d 157, 163 (1991); see Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d

514, 528 (2001) (“Pro se litigants are presumed to have full knowledge of applicable court rules

and procedures.”). Where a party fails to comply with Rule 341, this court may, in our discretion,

strike the brief and dismiss the appeal. Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 77. We

could dispose of Blakely’s appeals for failure to comply with Rule 341 alone. Instead, we dispose

of the appeals on the ground that petitioner failed to name necessary parties on appeal in her

petitions for review in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335 (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 11 When undertaking a direct review of an administrative decision, this court exercises

“special statutory jurisdiction.” McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 165 Ill. 2d 1, 6-7

(1995). “Special statutory jurisdiction is limited to the language of the act conferring it and the

court has no powers from any other source.” Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10

v. Regional Board of School Trustees of St. Clair County, 218 Ill. 2d 175, 182 (2006). “A party

seeking to invoke a court’s special statutory jurisdiction must strictly comply with the procedures

prescribed by statute.” Id.

¶ 12 The statutory source of this court’s power to review petitioner’s consolidated appeals is

section 8-111(B)(1) of the Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2020)), which

provides, in relevant part:

“Any complainant or respondent may apply for and obtain judicial review of a final order

of the [Human Rights] Commission entered under this Act by filing a petition for review

-4- Nos. 1-21-1262, 1-21-1268, & 1-21-1269 (cons.)

in the Appellate Court within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to

be reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision.” 775 ILCS 5/8-111(B)(1)

(West 2020).

¶ 13 Rule 335(a) (eff. July 1, 2017) governs the procedures for this court’s review of decisions

of the Commission. As explained in the committee comments, Rule 335 “prescribes the procedure

for the review of orders of any agency which the legislature has assigned to the Appellate Court.”

Il. S. Ct. R. 335, Committee Comments (rev. Dec. 17, 1993) (“The General Assembly has provided

by law that *** a decision from the Illinois Human Rights Commission (775 ILCS 5/8-111 (West

1992)) *** may be appealed directly to the Appellate Court.”).

¶ 14 Thus, a petitioner seeking direct appellate review of a decision by the Commission must

follow the joinder provisions of Rule 335 as well as section 8-111(B)(1) of the Human Rights Act.

See Cook County Sheriff’s Enforcement Ass’n v. County of Cook, 323 Ill. App. 3d 853, 855 fn.1

(2001) (finding petitioner must comply with joinder provisions of both Rule 335 and section 3-

113(b) of the Administrative Review Law (ARL) (735 ILCS 5/3-113(b) (West 2020)) when

petitioning the appellate court to review decisions of the Illinois Local Labor Relations Board).

¶ 15 Rule 335(a) provides:

“Unless another time period is provided specifically by the law authorizing review, the

petition for review shall be filed in the Appellate Court within 35 days from the date that

the order or decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected by any order

or decision of the administrative agency, and shall specify the parties seeking review and

shall designate the respondent and the order or part thereof to be reviewed. The agency and

all other parties of record shall be named respondents.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R.

335(a) (eff. July 1, 2017).

-5- Nos. 1-21-1262, 1-21-1268, & 1-21-1269 (cons.)

¶ 16 We note that sections 3-107(a) and 3-113(b) of Article III of the Administrative Review

Law (ARL) (735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2020); 735 ILCS 5/3-113(b) (West 2020)) contain similar

language requiring the joinder of necessary parties to direct appeals brought to this court in

administrative matters. In appeals concerning the ARL, courts have noted that they exercise

“special statutory jurisdiction,” and so their power to review is limited by the language of the act

conferring the jurisdiction. See e.g., Vogue Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Office of State Fire Marshal of

State, 354 Ill. App. 3d 20, 23-24 (2004). Thus, a party seeking to invoke special statutory

jurisdiction must strictly adhere to procedures in the statute, and failure to do so requires dismissal

of the appeal. Id. at 24-25. As this court has noted, the ALR does not apply to direct appeals from

proceedings under the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) (See Cook County Sheriff’s Office v. Cook

County Comm’n on Human Rights, 2016 IL App (1st) 150718, ¶ 27), as the Act has not expressly

adopted the ALR, as required in section 3-102 of the ARL (735 ILCS 5/3-102 (West 2020)).

¶ 17 Nonetheless, in McGaughy, our supreme court held that the “consequences of

noncompliance with the joinder requirements of the [ARL] and Rule 335 are the same, requiring

dismissal of the review proceeding.” McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 12. The court noted that Rule 335(a)

and section 107(a) are “substantively similar,” and there was “nothing in the plain language of the

statute or the rule that would justify the development of two divergent procedural standards for the

review of administrative matters.” Id. at 12-13. The McGaughy court stated that, much like section

3-107, Rule 335(a) must be categorized as “mandatory and specific, and admit[ting] of no

modification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 18 McGaughy also noted a portion of section 3-102 of the ALR stating that “ ‘[u]nless review

is sought of an administrative decision within the time and in the manner herein provided, the

parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial

-6- Nos. 1-21-1262, 1-21-1268, & 1-21-1269 (cons.)

review of such administrative decision.’ ” Id. at 14 (quoting 735 ILCS 5/3-102 (West 1992)). The

court stated there was no significance in Rule 335’s failure to incorporate said provision, as the

language “merely expresses the general principle of special statutory jurisdiction,” and

“proceedings under Rule 335 are also instances of special statutory jurisdiction.” Id.

¶ 19 In this case, Fresenius was a party of record to the administrative proceedings in charge

numbers 2019 CF 1405 (appeal number 1-21-1262) and 2019 CF 2137 (appeal number 1-21-

1268). Williams was a party of record in charge number 2019 CN 1406 (appeal number 1-21-

1269). Both were named parties in the charges now on appeal and participated in the proceedings

before the agency. See Crawley v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2019 IL App (1st)

181367, ¶ 21 (the actual litigants are the proper parties to an appeal). Thus, under Rule 335(a),

Blakely was required to name Fresenius as a respondent to appeal nos. 1-21-1262 and 1-21-1268

and Williams as a respondent to appeal no. 1-21-1269. Indeed, the Commission explicitly

admonished Blakely to do so if she wished to appeal the Commission’s decisions.

¶ 20 However, Blakely failed to name Fresenius and Williams as respondents on appeal and

serve them directly with her petitions for review. Blakely’s failure to comply with Rule 335(a)’s

mandatory requirement to name Fresenius and Williams as respondents is a fatal defect to her

consolidated appeals. As our supreme court held in McGaughy, compliance with the joinder

requirements of Rule 335(a) must be strict, and the rule is “mandatory and specific, and admit[ting]

of no modification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 13-14. The court

rejected the proposition that “substantial compliance with Rule 335(a) is all that is necessary.” Id.

Accordingly, as strict compliance with Rule 335(a) is mandatory and petitioner failed to comply

with its joinder requirement that all parties of record be named, her appeals must be dismissed.

See id. at 14-15; ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control, 191 Ill. 2d 26, 36 (2000); Vogue Tyre &

-7- Nos. 1-21-1262, 1-21-1268, & 1-21-1269 (cons.)

Rubber Co., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 25; Dahman v. Illinois Department of Human Rights, 334 Ill. App.

3d 660, 662-63 (2002).

¶ 21 We note that despite Blakely’s failure to name Fresenius and Williams as respondents in

her petitions for review, both parties appeared and filed responsive briefs in the appeals. We also

observe that Blakely included Fresenius and Williams in the caption of her brief. However, since

the requirement to name necessary parties is strict, her failure to name these parties in her petitions

for review controls our jurisdictional analysis. Neither the respondents’ participation in the appeal

nor naming them in the caption of a brief cures the jurisdictional defect.

¶ 22 We further observe that Blakely names as respondents “Nadine Abrahams/Jackson Lewis

PC,”—the attorney and law firm that represented Fresenius and Williams before the administrative

agency—in each of her three petitions for administrative review. However, the record on appeal

does not reflect that either Abrahams or Jackson Lewis, P.C. was a party to the proceedings before

the agency. Because they were neither an administrative agency nor parties of record to the

proceedings before the agency, they are not properly named as respondents here. See Ill. S. Ct. R.

335 (eff. July 1, 2017) (“The agency and all other parties of record shall be named respondents.”);

Crawley, 2019 IL App (1st) 181367, ¶ 21. Accordingly, we dismiss Abrahams and Jackson Lewis,

P.C. as respondents to the petitions for administrative review. Id.

¶ 23 Further, petitioner’s naming of Fresenius and Williams’s attorney and law firm does not

demonstrate compliance with the Rule 335(a) requirement that she name all necessary parties. In

McGaughy, the petitioners argued that, although they had not named necessary parties in their

petitions for review, they had timely served the unnamed necessary parties as required in Rule

335(b) and, therefore, substantially complied with Rule 335, to the prejudice of no one. McGaughy,

165 Ill. 2d at 14-15. The court found service on a respondent was not an adequate substitute for

-8- Nos. 1-21-1262, 1-21-1268, & 1-21-1269 (cons.)

properly naming that party in the petition for review. Id. at 15. The court explained that “meeting

the service requirement under Rule 335(b) did not relieve [the petitioners] of the obligation to

name all necessary party respondents in their petitions for review.” Id. Necessarily, if service on

an unnamed party is insufficient to demonstrate compliance with Rule 335(a), service on the

unnamed parties’ attorney and law firm is similarly deficient.

¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Abrahams and Jackson Lewis, P.C., as respondents

on appeal. And we dismiss the consolidated appeals for failure to name necessary parties.

¶ 25 Appeals dismissed.

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