Blakeley v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedSeptember 21, 2022
Docket3:21-cv-00112
StatusUnknown

This text of Blakeley v. Commissioner of Social Security (Blakeley v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blakeley v. Commissioner of Social Security, (S.D. Ohio 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

DAVID B.,1 : Case No. 3:21-CV-112 : Plaintiff, : Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr. : (by full consent of the parties) vs. : : COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL : SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, : : Defendant. :

DECISION AND ENTRY

Plaintiff David B. brings this case challenging the Social Security Administration’s denial of his applications for period of disability, Disability Insurance Benefits, and Supplemental Security Income. The case is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. #14), the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. #16), Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. #17), and the administrative record (Doc. #10). I. Background The Social Security Administration provides Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income to individuals who are under a “disability,” among other eligibility requirements. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1), 1382(a). The term “disability” encompasses “any medically determinable physical or mental

1 The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States has recommended that, due to significant privacy concerns in social security cases, federal courts should refer to plaintiffs only by their first names and last initials. See S.D. Ohio General Rule 22-01. impairment” that precludes an applicant from performing “substantial gainful activity.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); see Bowen, 476 U.S. at 469-70. In the present case, Plaintiff protectively filed his application for period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits in May 2019 and for Supplemental Security Income benefits in October 2019, alleging disability due to degenerative disc disease. (Doc. #10-6, PageID #233).

After Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, he requested and received a hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) David Kurtz. Thereafter, the ALJ issued a written decision, addressing each of the five sequential steps set forth in the Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 419.920.2 He reached the following main conclusions: Step 1: Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 6, 2018, his alleged onset date.

Step 2: Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine; degenerative joint disease of the shoulders; and migraine headaches.

Step 3: Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

Step 4: His residual functional capacity (RFC), or the most he could do despite his impairments, see Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2002), consists of “light work … except no overhead reaching; frequent climbing of ramps and stairs; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional stooping; no more than moderate exposure to noise; avoid work outdoors in bright sunshine; avoid bright or flashing lights such as would be experienced in welding or cutting metals.”

Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work.

2 The remaining citations will identify the pertinent Disability Insurance Benefits Regulations with full knowledge o f the corresponding Supplemental Security Income Regulations. 2 Step 5: Considering his age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform.

(Doc. #10, PageID #s 56-61). Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been disabled from November 6, 2018, through the date of his decision. Id. at 61-62. The evidence of record is adequately summarized in the ALJ’s decision (Doc. #10, PageID #s 54-62), Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. #14), the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. #16), and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. #17). To the extent that additional facts are relevant, they will be summarized in the discussion section below. II. Standard of Review Judicial review of an ALJ’s decision is limited to whether the ALJ’s finding are supported by substantial evidence and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)); see Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is such “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Gentry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)). It is “less than a preponderance but more than a scintilla.” Id. The second judicial inquiry—reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal analysis—may result in reversal even if the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009). Under this review, “a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the [Social Security Administration] fails to follow 3 its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives [Plaintiff] of a substantial right.” Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746 (citing Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2004)). III. Discussion Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating his RFC and symptom severity by

unreasonably finding him capable of sustaining competitive, full-time light exertion work. (Doc. #14, PageID #s 896-97). The Commissioner maintains that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. #16, PageID #s 905-08). An individual’s RFC “is defined as the most [he] can still do despite the physical and mental limitations resulting from [his] impairments.” Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 155 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). The ALJ is responsible for assessing an individual’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(c) (“If your case is at the administrative law judge hearing level …, the administrative law judge … is responsible for assessing your residual functional capacity.”).

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Related

Bowen v. City of New York
476 U.S. 467 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Jimmie L. Howard v. Commissioner of Social Security
276 F.3d 235 (Sixth Circuit, 2002)
Robert M. Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security
378 F.3d 541 (Sixth Circuit, 2004)
David Bowen v. Commissioner of Social Security
478 F.3d 742 (Sixth Circuit, 2007)
Debra Rogers v. Commissioner of Social Security
486 F.3d 234 (Sixth Circuit, 2007)
Blakley v. Commissioner of Social Security
581 F.3d 399 (Sixth Circuit, 2009)
Gentry v. Commissioner of Social Security
741 F.3d 708 (Sixth Circuit, 2014)
Simons v. Comm Social Security
114 F. App'x 727 (Sixth Circuit, 2004)
Daniels v. Commissioner of Social Security
152 F. App'x 485 (Sixth Circuit, 2005)
Kornecky v. Commissioner of Social Security
167 F. App'x 496 (Sixth Circuit, 2006)
Doris Poe v. Commissioner of Social Security
342 F. App'x 149 (Sixth Circuit, 2009)

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