1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Blake Lynch, No. CV-25-04669-PHX-DJH
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Michael J Naste, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 Pro se Plaintiff Blake Lynch (“Plaintiff”) has filed a Motion to Strike Answer to 16 Complaint (Doc. 17), Motion to Compel Compliance (Doc. 18), and a Motion in Support 17 of Plaintiff’s Request for Subpoena Duces Tecum (Doc. 21). No response was filed to 18 these Motions. Defendant Keith Johnson (“Johnson”) has filed an Answer in this case, 19 default was entered against Defendant Hydrogen Energy Systems LLC (“HES”) (Doc. 16), 20 and Defendant Michael J. Naste was dismissed from this matter. Before addressing 21 Plaintiff’s Motions, the Court will take up several matters sua sponte. 22 I. Background 23 Plaintiff alleges that, in December 2021, he invested $40,000.00 into HES. (Doc. 1 24 at 4). However, he claims that “Defendants Michael J. Naste, Keith R. Johnson and 25 Hydrogen Energy Systems LLC failed at all times to honor the investor contract, 26 Defendants refused to produce any meaningful documentation for potential investors over 27 the years, Defendants failed to produce any repayment to Plaintiff at all times to include 28 the $100,000 they promised Plaintiff and Defendants have implicated themselves as 1 accepting they might have to serve jail time if it ever comes to light what they did with 2 Plaintiff’s investment money. Plaintiff thus obtained a certified negotiable instrument 3 Defendants have ignored.” (Id.) Due to these claims, Plaintiff now seeks “compensatory 4 and punitive damages” against Defendants in the amount of $15,390,000.00. (Id.) 5 II. Vacating Default against HES 6 Assuming service upon HES was properly executed, Plaintiff sought and obtained 7 entry of default against non-answering HES on January 20, 2026. (Doc. 16). This 8 assumption was in error. “Where good cause exists, a district court has the authority to set 9 aside an entry of default sua sponte.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Pederson, 2025 WL 711185, 10 at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Investcorp Ret. Spec., Inc. v. Ohno, 2007 WL 2462122, at *2 (N.D. 11 Cal. 2007) (“The court may set aside entries of default sua sponte.”). Having reviewed the 12 various proofs of service filed in this case, the Court finds that service of process on 13 Defendant HES was not proper. 14 Rule 4(h) states that a domestic corporation, partnership, or association must be 15 served: 16 [B]y delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or 17 by law to receive service of process and--if the agent is one authorized by 18 statute and the statute so requires--by also mailing a copy of each to the defendant[.] 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h). Of course, Rule 4(e)(1) allows for service to be executed by 20 “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general 21 jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made[.]” Fed. 22 R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). The relevant Arizona Rule similarly provides: 23 If a corporation, partnership, or other unincorporated association is located 24 outside Arizona but within the United States, it may be served by delivering 25 a copy of the summons and the pleading being served to a partner, an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment 26 or by law to receive service of process and--if the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires--by also mailing a copy of each to the 27 defendant. 28 Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(h). 1 Initially, Plaintiff filed three Proofs of Service (Docs. 7, 9, 12) that each indicate 2 that Plaintiff mailed the Summons and Complaint to HES on either December 20 or 27, 3 2025. (See id.). None of these documents demonstrate proper service on HES because, 4 amongst other reasons, Plaintiff may not effect personal service himself. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 4(c). Moreover, the method of service clearly does not comply with either the Federal or 6 Arizona Rule described above. Therefore, the entry of default that occurred on January 20, 7 2026 was based on improper service and will be vacated. 8 The Court notes that Plaintiff filed an additional notice of service on February 4, 9 2026, titled “Affidavit of Posting” (Doc. 20). The Affidavit indicates that a process server, 10 after several unsuccessful attempts, effected service by “post[ing] all documents at [466 11 Bouchelle Drive, Apt. 101, New Smyrna Beach, FL 32169] per client instructions.” (Id.) 12 “Generally speaking, leaving documents at the door is insufficient to effect service of 13 process.” Miller v. Four Peaks Logistics LLC, 2023 WL 7301870, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2023). 14 While posting documents might be acceptable as an alternative means of service, leave of 15 court must first be sought. Here, no alternative service was authorized by the Court, and 16 thus service upon HES was still improper.1 Consequently, the Court will vacate the entry 17 of default against Defendant HES. 18 III. Partial Dismissal of Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 19 The Complaint does not clearly state what claims it is attempting to bring against 20 any Defendant. However, upon review of the Complaint, it is clear that the Court lacks 21 jurisdiction over any claim Plaintiff intends to bring based on the “Notary Certificate of 22 Dishonor” (Doc. 1 at 11), “Notice of Protest and Opportunity to Cure” (id. at 13), “Notice 23 of Dishonor” (id. at 15), or Presentment and Invoice (id. at 40–42) because such claims 24 would be legally frivolous. 25 “[F]ederal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their 26 1 The Court notes that service on Defendant Johnson was likewise improper for most of the 27 foregoing reasons. (See Docs. 7, 9, 12, 19). However, Johnson has appeared and did not contest service. The Ninth Circuit explains that “[a] general appearance or responsive 28 pleading by a defendant that fails to dispute personal jurisdiction will waive any defect in service or personal jurisdiction.” Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.1986) 1 jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of 2 merit[.]” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974) (internal quotations and citation 3 omitted). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in 4 fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “Dismissal for lack of subject-matter 5 jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the federal claim is proper only when the claim 6 is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise 7 completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens 8 for a Better Env., 523 U.S. 83, 86 (1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 9 “Regardless of whether a litigant is fee paying or not, a district court has the inherent 10 authority to dismiss frivolous actions at any time.” Downing v. Eckstrom, 2024 WL 11 289321, at *2 (E.D. Wash. 2024) (citing Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 12 U.S. 296, 307–08 (1989)). 13 Based on the attachments to the Complaint, on October 11, 2025, Plaintiff sent 14 Defendant Johnson a “Presentment and Invoice.” (Doc. 1 at 40–42).
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Blake Lynch, No. CV-25-04669-PHX-DJH
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Michael J Naste, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 Pro se Plaintiff Blake Lynch (“Plaintiff”) has filed a Motion to Strike Answer to 16 Complaint (Doc. 17), Motion to Compel Compliance (Doc. 18), and a Motion in Support 17 of Plaintiff’s Request for Subpoena Duces Tecum (Doc. 21). No response was filed to 18 these Motions. Defendant Keith Johnson (“Johnson”) has filed an Answer in this case, 19 default was entered against Defendant Hydrogen Energy Systems LLC (“HES”) (Doc. 16), 20 and Defendant Michael J. Naste was dismissed from this matter. Before addressing 21 Plaintiff’s Motions, the Court will take up several matters sua sponte. 22 I. Background 23 Plaintiff alleges that, in December 2021, he invested $40,000.00 into HES. (Doc. 1 24 at 4). However, he claims that “Defendants Michael J. Naste, Keith R. Johnson and 25 Hydrogen Energy Systems LLC failed at all times to honor the investor contract, 26 Defendants refused to produce any meaningful documentation for potential investors over 27 the years, Defendants failed to produce any repayment to Plaintiff at all times to include 28 the $100,000 they promised Plaintiff and Defendants have implicated themselves as 1 accepting they might have to serve jail time if it ever comes to light what they did with 2 Plaintiff’s investment money. Plaintiff thus obtained a certified negotiable instrument 3 Defendants have ignored.” (Id.) Due to these claims, Plaintiff now seeks “compensatory 4 and punitive damages” against Defendants in the amount of $15,390,000.00. (Id.) 5 II. Vacating Default against HES 6 Assuming service upon HES was properly executed, Plaintiff sought and obtained 7 entry of default against non-answering HES on January 20, 2026. (Doc. 16). This 8 assumption was in error. “Where good cause exists, a district court has the authority to set 9 aside an entry of default sua sponte.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Pederson, 2025 WL 711185, 10 at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Investcorp Ret. Spec., Inc. v. Ohno, 2007 WL 2462122, at *2 (N.D. 11 Cal. 2007) (“The court may set aside entries of default sua sponte.”). Having reviewed the 12 various proofs of service filed in this case, the Court finds that service of process on 13 Defendant HES was not proper. 14 Rule 4(h) states that a domestic corporation, partnership, or association must be 15 served: 16 [B]y delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or 17 by law to receive service of process and--if the agent is one authorized by 18 statute and the statute so requires--by also mailing a copy of each to the defendant[.] 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h). Of course, Rule 4(e)(1) allows for service to be executed by 20 “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general 21 jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made[.]” Fed. 22 R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). The relevant Arizona Rule similarly provides: 23 If a corporation, partnership, or other unincorporated association is located 24 outside Arizona but within the United States, it may be served by delivering 25 a copy of the summons and the pleading being served to a partner, an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment 26 or by law to receive service of process and--if the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires--by also mailing a copy of each to the 27 defendant. 28 Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(h). 1 Initially, Plaintiff filed three Proofs of Service (Docs. 7, 9, 12) that each indicate 2 that Plaintiff mailed the Summons and Complaint to HES on either December 20 or 27, 3 2025. (See id.). None of these documents demonstrate proper service on HES because, 4 amongst other reasons, Plaintiff may not effect personal service himself. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 4(c). Moreover, the method of service clearly does not comply with either the Federal or 6 Arizona Rule described above. Therefore, the entry of default that occurred on January 20, 7 2026 was based on improper service and will be vacated. 8 The Court notes that Plaintiff filed an additional notice of service on February 4, 9 2026, titled “Affidavit of Posting” (Doc. 20). The Affidavit indicates that a process server, 10 after several unsuccessful attempts, effected service by “post[ing] all documents at [466 11 Bouchelle Drive, Apt. 101, New Smyrna Beach, FL 32169] per client instructions.” (Id.) 12 “Generally speaking, leaving documents at the door is insufficient to effect service of 13 process.” Miller v. Four Peaks Logistics LLC, 2023 WL 7301870, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2023). 14 While posting documents might be acceptable as an alternative means of service, leave of 15 court must first be sought. Here, no alternative service was authorized by the Court, and 16 thus service upon HES was still improper.1 Consequently, the Court will vacate the entry 17 of default against Defendant HES. 18 III. Partial Dismissal of Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 19 The Complaint does not clearly state what claims it is attempting to bring against 20 any Defendant. However, upon review of the Complaint, it is clear that the Court lacks 21 jurisdiction over any claim Plaintiff intends to bring based on the “Notary Certificate of 22 Dishonor” (Doc. 1 at 11), “Notice of Protest and Opportunity to Cure” (id. at 13), “Notice 23 of Dishonor” (id. at 15), or Presentment and Invoice (id. at 40–42) because such claims 24 would be legally frivolous. 25 “[F]ederal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their 26 1 The Court notes that service on Defendant Johnson was likewise improper for most of the 27 foregoing reasons. (See Docs. 7, 9, 12, 19). However, Johnson has appeared and did not contest service. The Ninth Circuit explains that “[a] general appearance or responsive 28 pleading by a defendant that fails to dispute personal jurisdiction will waive any defect in service or personal jurisdiction.” Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.1986) 1 jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of 2 merit[.]” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974) (internal quotations and citation 3 omitted). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in 4 fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “Dismissal for lack of subject-matter 5 jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the federal claim is proper only when the claim 6 is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise 7 completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens 8 for a Better Env., 523 U.S. 83, 86 (1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 9 “Regardless of whether a litigant is fee paying or not, a district court has the inherent 10 authority to dismiss frivolous actions at any time.” Downing v. Eckstrom, 2024 WL 11 289321, at *2 (E.D. Wash. 2024) (citing Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 12 U.S. 296, 307–08 (1989)). 13 Based on the attachments to the Complaint, on October 11, 2025, Plaintiff sent 14 Defendant Johnson a “Presentment and Invoice.” (Doc. 1 at 40–42). In this document, 15 Plaintiff states that he made a $40,000.00 investment into HES, expecting a repayment of 16 $100,000.00 and a 10% equity stake in HES. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he received neither. 17 (Id.) He then asserts that “[Plaintiff is] now invoicing yourself personally, Keith R. 18 Johnson, your partner Michael J. Naste and HES in the amount of Five Million One 19 Hundred Thousand Thirty Dollars and 00/100 ($5,130,000.00USD).” (Id.) Plaintiff 20 further stated that this amount “shall come due for payment within (15) calendar days of 21 your receipt of this presentment and invoice. Failure to pay the invoice attached hereto 22 will be considered a refusal.” (Id. at 40–41). 23 Plaintiff then sent Defendants a “Notice of Dishonor” (Doc. 1 at 15) on November 24 15, 2025, and a “Notice of Protest and Opportunity to Cure” (id. at 13) on December 1, 25 2025, both citing Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) § 3-505(a). (Id. at 13, 15). He 26 finally sent Defendants a “Notary Certificate of Dishonor” (id. at 11) citing UCC § 3-505(a) 27 and A.R.S. § 47-3505(B), on December 11, 2025. (Id. at 11). All of these documents note 28 Defendants’ non-payment of the invoice, and the final Notary Certificate claims that 1 Defendants are now liable for three times the initial $5,130,000.00 request. (Id.) Plaintiff 2 then brought this case in attempt to enforce these “instruments.” 3 Plaintiff’s Invoice and various Notices are meritless and lack any legal basis from 4 which to collect on a “debt.” UCC § 3-505(a) and A.R.S. § 47-3505(B) apply to negotiable 5 instruments, and no negotiable instrument has been identified here. At most, Plaintiff 6 attached an unsigned contact labeled “Stock Purchase and Loan Agreement.” (Doc. 1 at 7 22–24). However, this document is not a negotiable instrument, nor are any of the 8 documents that Plaintiff sent to Defendants. See A.R.S. § 47-3104 (defining negotiable 9 instrument); A.R.S. § 47-3401(A) (stating that a person is not liable on an instrument unless 10 the person signed the instrument); UCC § 3-104 cmt. 2 (“Article 3 is not meant to apply to 11 contracts for the sale of goods or services or the sale or lease of real property or similar 12 writings that may contain a promise to pay money.”). Second, “[p]eople who identify as 13 sovereign citizens use maneuvers like the notary presentment to avoid paying debts or to 14 collect debts that are not actually owed.” Balash-Ioannidou v. Contour Mortgage Corp., 15 2022 WL 3358082, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2022); Friis v. City of San Jose, 2009 WL 1690439, 16 at *1 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“[Plaintiff] may have been inspired by various tax protester 17 websites. For example, the Sovereignty Education and Defense Ministry (www.sedm.org) 18 provides sample literature describing the ‘Notary Certificate of Dishonor Process’ for 19 resolving commercial disputes by unrebutted affidavit.”). Such “notary presentments” 20 entirely lack validity and claims for damages based upon them are legally frivolous. 21 McKay v. U.S. Bank, 2015 WL 5657110, at *2 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (denying plaintiffs’ 22 request for declaratory judgment that the defendant was not the real mortgage holder and 23 to quiet title based upon their mailing of a “notarial presentment” and a “notarial notice of 24 dishonor” to the defendant bank). 25 Notably, Plaintiff is employing this strategy in the present case as well as others 26 brought in this District. See, e.g., Lynch, v. American Express, 2026 WL 1303981, at *2 27 (D. Ariz. 2026) (“Lynch’s theories involving notarial protest and the UCC indicate he may 28 be asserting some sort of ‘sovereign citizen’ claim.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 1 omitted); see also 2:25-cv-04481-DJH; 2:25-cv-04883-JJT; 2:25-cv-04482-MTL; 2:26-cv- 2 02767-JJT. Plaintiff is now on notice that the various presentments and notices he has 3 based his cases upon are not legally enforceable documents. To the extent Plaintiff’s 4 Complaint is premised upon the attached Notary Certificate of Dishonor, Notice of Protest 5 and Opportunity to Cure, Notice of Dishonor, or Presentment and Invoice, it and any 6 related claims are dismissed with prejudice as legally frivolous. 7 IV. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim 8 The Ninth Circuit has affirmed that federal courts have the power to sua sponte 9 dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Omar 10 v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A trial court may dismiss a 11 claim sua sponte under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to 12 state a claim may be based on either the “lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence 13 of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 14 Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Complaints must make a short and plain 15 statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief for its claims. 16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 also requires that a complaint clearly establish the claims 17 and parties such that a defendant would have “no difficulty in responding to the claims 18 with an answer and/or with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Hearns v. San Bernardino 19 Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to 20 state any claim it intends to bring, much less the necessary elements of a claim. (See 21 generally Doc. 1). Consequently, Defendants in this case do not have adequate notice of 22 the claims brought against them. 23 Additionally, the Complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to allow the Court 24 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. 25 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It contains sparse allegations, relies heavily on the discredited 26 theories discussed above, and appends repetitive documents. (See generally Doc. 1). Even 27 accepting the allegations as true, the Complaint has not stated a cognizable legal claim. 28 That said, “the district court must give notice of its sua sponte intention to dismiss 1 and provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to at least submit a written memorandum in 2 opposition to such motion.” Seismic Reservoir 2020, Inc. v. Paulsson, 785 F.3d 330, 335 3 (9th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff is now on notice of the Court’s intention to dismiss. However, 4 instead of a responsive memorandum, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended 5 complaint. Given the Court’s above ruling, filing an amended complaint will allow 6 Plaintiff to omit the foreclosed theories above as well as comply with federal pleading 7 standards. Plaintiff is forewarned that, if an amended complaint is filed that does not 8 comport to the Court’s rulings, it will be subject to dismissal. 9 Finally, because the Court will require that Plaintiff file an amended complaint, 10 Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Answer to Complaint (Doc. 17), Motion to Compel 11 Compliance (Doc. 18), and a Motion in Support of Plaintiff’s Request for Subpoena Duces 12 Tecum (Doc. 21) are denied without prejudice as they are either moot or premature. 13 Accordingly, 14 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with leave 15 to amend. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he must do so on or before June 16 15, 2026. Defendant Johnson shall file an answer to any amended complaint within 17 twenty (20) days of the filing of the amended complaint. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to vacate the Entry of 19 Default as to Hydrogen Energy Systems (Doc. 16). If Plaintiff names Defendant HES in 20 an amended complaint, he must complete service of process on Defendant HES on or 21 before July 7, 2026. If a valid return of service is not filed by this date, Defendant HES 22 will be dismissed from this matter. 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff does not amend his complaint within 24 twenty (20) days, the Clerk of Court is directed to dismiss this matter without prejudice 25 without further Order from the Court. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Answer to || Complaint (Doc. 17), Motion to Compel Compliance (Doc. 18), and a Motion in Support 3|| of Plaintiff's Request for Subpoena Duces Tecum (Doc. 21) are DENIED without 4|| prejudice. 5 Dated this 26th day of May, 2026. . oe _ □□ 6 norable'Diang4. Hunfetewa 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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