Blaisdell v. Commissioner of Public Safety

Supreme Court of Minnesota

Blaisdell v. Commissioner of Public Safety

381 N.W.2d 849, 1986 Minn. LEXIS 757

CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota

DecidedFebruary 21, 1986

DocketC8-85-959

StatusPublished

Cited by11 cases

This text of 381 N.W.2d 849 (Blaisdell v. Commissioner of Public Safety) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Blaisdell v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 381 N.W.2d 849, 1986 Minn. LEXIS 757 (Mich. 1986).

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OPINION

AMDAHL, Chief Justice.

This is an implied consent proceeding. The Court of Appeals, 375 N.W.2d 880, affirmed the decision of the trial court rescinding the revocation of the driver’s license of Randy Jay Blaisdell. The Court of Appeals held that the stop of Blaisdell’s car, which led to the discovery that Blais-dell was intoxicated, violated Blaisdell’s fourth amendment rights because it was a stop to investigate a completed misdemean- or. Specifically, the court held that all stops to investigate completed, misdemeanors are impermissible under the fourth amendment. We granted the petition of the Commissioner of Public Safety but not for the purpose of deciding the issue decided by the Court of Appeals. Rather, we believe that there was an insufficient basis for the stop and that it was therefore unnecessary for the Court of Appeals to decide the broader issue of whether all stops to investigate completed misdemeanors are impermissible.

An officer of the Fridley Police Department was in the lot of a gas station. A clerk came up to him and said that a car leaving the station may have been involved in a no-pay gas theft 2 months earlier. A short time later the clerk said he was certain of it. The clerk did not give any specifics about the theft, did not give any license plate number, and did not identify the driver as the person involved in the [850]*850theft. The officer followed the vehicle and stopped it, telling Blaisdell, the driver, of the clerk’s allegations. When the officer seated Blaisdell in the squad car, the officer made observations of signs that Blais-dell was intoxicated. He then arrested Blaisdell for DWI and read him an implied consent advisory. Blaisdell took the implied consent test, which showed he had a blood alcohol level in violation of the implied consent law.

As we indicated, the Court of Appeals ruled that all stops to investigate completed misdemeanors are impermissible under the fourth amendment. The court did not try to define what it meant by “completed misdemeanors,” but said that this was one and that misdemeanors committed in the “very recent past” probably are not completed ones.

The United States Supreme Court in a number of cases has indicated that in determining whether or not to stop and temporarily seize a person police must ask themselves if there is “reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). However, the first case in which the Supreme Court actually held that the stop procedure could be used to investigate a completed offense was United States v. Hensley, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985), a case involving a completed felony. The Court of Appeals apparently attached great significance to the fact that in Hensley the Supreme Court stated, “We need not and do not decide today whether Terry stops to investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permitted.” 105 S.Ct. at 681.

We express no opinion as to the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ holding. We simply hold that the information provided to the officer by the clerk was not sufficient to justify the stop of Blaisdell. The officer’s right to stop Blaisdell depended on the sufficiency of the information that the clerk provided. See United States v. Hensley, 105 S.Ct. at 684; Olson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552 (Minn.1985). The clerk’s information was vague. At first he said that the ear may have been that of the thief; then he changed his mind and said that he was sure it was. He gave no license number and no indication that he had a license number or that he knew what the thief looked like. He gave no details as to the theft, other than that it occurred approximately 2 months earlier. In short, the information did not provide the officer with a reasonable basis to suspect the driver, Blaisdell, of having committed a crime. At best, the information suggested that the car possibly was connected with a theft that occurred approximately 2 months earlier. Under the circumstances, the officer was not free to interfere with Blaisdell’s freedom of action but, of course, could have simply followed the car and copied the car’s license number for possible future use in further investigating the vague allegations.

Affirmed on other grounds.

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OPINION

AMDAHL, Chief Justice.

This is an implied consent proceeding. The Court of Appeals, 375 N.W.2d 880, affirmed the decision of the trial court rescinding the revocation of the driver’s license of Randy Jay Blaisdell. The Court of Appeals held that the stop of Blaisdell’s car, which led to the discovery that Blais-dell was intoxicated, violated Blaisdell’s fourth amendment rights because it was a stop to investigate a completed misdemean- or. Specifically, the court held that all stops to investigate completed, misdemeanors are impermissible under the fourth amendment. We granted the petition of the Commissioner of Public Safety but not for the purpose of deciding the issue decided by the Court of Appeals. Rather, we believe that there was an insufficient basis for the stop and that it was therefore unnecessary for the Court of Appeals to decide the broader issue of whether all stops to investigate completed misdemeanors are impermissible.

An officer of the Fridley Police Department was in the lot of a gas station. A clerk came up to him and said that a car leaving the station may have been involved in a no-pay gas theft 2 months earlier. A short time later the clerk said he was certain of it. The clerk did not give any specifics about the theft, did not give any license plate number, and did not identify the driver as the person involved in the [850]*850theft. The officer followed the vehicle and stopped it, telling Blaisdell, the driver, of the clerk’s allegations. When the officer seated Blaisdell in the squad car, the officer made observations of signs that Blais-dell was intoxicated. He then arrested Blaisdell for DWI and read him an implied consent advisory. Blaisdell took the implied consent test, which showed he had a blood alcohol level in violation of the implied consent law.

As we indicated, the Court of Appeals ruled that all stops to investigate completed misdemeanors are impermissible under the fourth amendment. The court did not try to define what it meant by “completed misdemeanors,” but said that this was one and that misdemeanors committed in the “very recent past” probably are not completed ones.

The United States Supreme Court in a number of cases has indicated that in determining whether or not to stop and temporarily seize a person police must ask themselves if there is “reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). However, the first case in which the Supreme Court actually held that the stop procedure could be used to investigate a completed offense was United States v. Hensley, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985), a case involving a completed felony. The Court of Appeals apparently attached great significance to the fact that in Hensley the Supreme Court stated, “We need not and do not decide today whether Terry stops to investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permitted.” 105 S.Ct. at 681.

We express no opinion as to the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ holding. We simply hold that the information provided to the officer by the clerk was not sufficient to justify the stop of Blaisdell. The officer’s right to stop Blaisdell depended on the sufficiency of the information that the clerk provided. See United States v. Hensley, 105 S.Ct. at 684; Olson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552 (Minn.1985). The clerk’s information was vague. At first he said that the ear may have been that of the thief; then he changed his mind and said that he was sure it was. He gave no license number and no indication that he had a license number or that he knew what the thief looked like. He gave no details as to the theft, other than that it occurred approximately 2 months earlier. In short, the information did not provide the officer with a reasonable basis to suspect the driver, Blaisdell, of having committed a crime. At best, the information suggested that the car possibly was connected with a theft that occurred approximately 2 months earlier. Under the circumstances, the officer was not free to interfere with Blaisdell’s freedom of action but, of course, could have simply followed the car and copied the car’s license number for possible future use in further investigating the vague allegations.

Affirmed on other grounds.

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381 N.W.2d 849, 1986 Minn. LEXIS 757, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blaisdell-v-commissioner-of-public-safety-minn-1986.

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