Shea, J.
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for the death of her decedent, [393]*393alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence, the court directed a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff has appealed from the judgment, assigning error in the denial of her motion to set aside the verdict and in a ruling on evidence.
In reviewing the action of the court in denying the motion to set aside the verdict, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bambus v. Bridgeport Gas Co., 148 Conn. 167, 168, 169 A.2d 265. The jury could reasonably find the following facts: On October 14, 1958, and for some time prior thereto, the defendant was the owner and in control of a two-family frame house in Bridgeport. At the rear of the house there was an outside stairway leading from the ground to the second floor. The plaintiff’s decedent lived with the defendant, his mother, as a paying boarder. He had a room on the third floor, which was reached by way of the second floor, where the defendant lived. The decedent was separated from his wife and children, who lived in Bridgeport about a mile and a half from the defendant’s house. During the afternoon and evening of October 13, the decedent had visited his wife. He left her house around 11 p.m., stating that he was going home to his mother’s house. He was sober at that time. At about 7 a.m. on October 14, the body of the decedent was found lying on a tar walk below the rear outside stairway at the defendant’s house. The decedent was lying on his back with his arms outstretched and his head resting on the walk just below the outer edge of the stairway. His legs extended away from, and at a right angle to, the stairs. He was in his stocking feet. Both shoes were lying on the ground a foot or two away from each other and close to his right hand. [394]*394His head and face were covered with blood, and on the walk under his head and shoulders there was a pool of blood which had flowed from Ms nose, mouth and ears. He had sustained a fracture at the base of the skull and a laceration at the same location. The only other visible mark of injury was an abrasion on the outer aspect of Ms left foot. His clotMng was undisturbed; there was no sign of any scuffle, nor was there any evidence of foul play. In the opinion of the medical examiner, the decedent had fallen a distance greater than his height and had struck Ms head on the walk at the place where his body was found; he was knocked unconscious by the impact and lived for some time; Ms death occurred between 2 and 4 a.m. on October 14.
There was evidence to show that the stairway was steep, at an angle approximating forty-five degrees; the risers of the stairs were uneven and of varying heights; the treads were of varying widths; the handrail was insufficient, of improper height and unsafe. A leader from the roof projected into the stairway for several inches, creating a hazardous condition. Thus, there was ample evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant had failed to exercise reasonable care in keeping the stairway in a reasonably safe condition. See Facey v. Merkle, 146 Conn. 129, 133, 148 A.2d 261.
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the decedent, wMle ascending the stairway to the second floor, fell to the ground below. The sole question is whether the jury reasonably and logically could reach the conclusion that the decedent’s death resulted from injuries sustained in a fall from the stairway wMch was caused by the defendant’s failure to exercise the care required by law. From the memorandum of decision, it is evident that the trial [395]*395court directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that there was no basis in the evidence for a finding by the jury that the negligence of the defendant in maintaining the stairway had any connection with the decedent’s injuries and death. In other words, in the court’s view, there was insufficient evidence to connect the decedent’s death with the negligence of the defendant and consequently the issue of causation was left to conjecture, surmise and speculation. See Chasse v. Albert, 147 Conn. 680, 683, 166 A.2d 148; Palmieri v. Macero, 146 Conn. 705, 708, 155 A.2d 750; Bruce v. McElhannon, 141 Conn. 44, 48, 103 A.2d 335.
It is true that there was no direct evidence to show that the decedent was ascending the stairway or that he fell from it. Nevertheless, triers of fact must often rely on circumstantial evidence and draw inferences from it. Cayer v. Salvatore, 150 Conn. 361, 363, 189 A.2d 505. There is no rule of law which forbids the resting of an inference on facts whose determination is the result of other inferences. Sliwowski v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 94 Conn. 303, 310, 108 A. 805; Ruerat v. Stevens, 113 Conn. 333, 338, 155 A. 219; State v. Foord, 142 Conn. 285, 294, 113 A.2d 591. Proof of a material fact by inference need not be so conclusive as to exclude every other hypothesis. It is sufficient if the evidence produces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the probability of the existence of the material fact. LeBlanc v. Grillo, 129 Conn. 378, 381, 28 A.2d 127. In White v. Herbst, 128 Conn. 659, 25 A.2d 68, the plaintiff’s decedent had left the second floor of the defendant’s house at about 9 p.m. An hour later, his body was found at the foot of the stairs to the first floor. The stairs were in a defective condition. There was no evidence as to the cause of the [396]*396decedent’s fall. We sustained a plaintiff’s verdict, stating (p. 661): “[W]e cannot hold that the jury could not, drawing proper inferences from the facts in evidence, reasonably believe that it was more probable than not that the decedent’s fall was due to the defective condition of the stairway.” See also Facey v. Merkle, supra; Dickson v. Yale University, 141 Conn. 250, 254, 105 A.2d 463; Hennessey v. Hennessey, 145 Conn. 211, 214, 140 A.2d 473; Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 256, 129 A.2d 606, appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15, 78 S. Ct. 36, 2 L. Ed. 2d 21; Esserman v. Madden, 123 Conn. 386, 388, 195 A. 739; Ruerat v. Stevens, 113 Conn. 333, 338, 155 A. 219.
When the decedent in the present case left the home of his wife around 11 o’clock on the night of October 13, he said that he was going home to his mother’s house.
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Shea, J.
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for the death of her decedent, [393]*393alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence, the court directed a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff has appealed from the judgment, assigning error in the denial of her motion to set aside the verdict and in a ruling on evidence.
In reviewing the action of the court in denying the motion to set aside the verdict, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bambus v. Bridgeport Gas Co., 148 Conn. 167, 168, 169 A.2d 265. The jury could reasonably find the following facts: On October 14, 1958, and for some time prior thereto, the defendant was the owner and in control of a two-family frame house in Bridgeport. At the rear of the house there was an outside stairway leading from the ground to the second floor. The plaintiff’s decedent lived with the defendant, his mother, as a paying boarder. He had a room on the third floor, which was reached by way of the second floor, where the defendant lived. The decedent was separated from his wife and children, who lived in Bridgeport about a mile and a half from the defendant’s house. During the afternoon and evening of October 13, the decedent had visited his wife. He left her house around 11 p.m., stating that he was going home to his mother’s house. He was sober at that time. At about 7 a.m. on October 14, the body of the decedent was found lying on a tar walk below the rear outside stairway at the defendant’s house. The decedent was lying on his back with his arms outstretched and his head resting on the walk just below the outer edge of the stairway. His legs extended away from, and at a right angle to, the stairs. He was in his stocking feet. Both shoes were lying on the ground a foot or two away from each other and close to his right hand. [394]*394His head and face were covered with blood, and on the walk under his head and shoulders there was a pool of blood which had flowed from Ms nose, mouth and ears. He had sustained a fracture at the base of the skull and a laceration at the same location. The only other visible mark of injury was an abrasion on the outer aspect of Ms left foot. His clotMng was undisturbed; there was no sign of any scuffle, nor was there any evidence of foul play. In the opinion of the medical examiner, the decedent had fallen a distance greater than his height and had struck Ms head on the walk at the place where his body was found; he was knocked unconscious by the impact and lived for some time; Ms death occurred between 2 and 4 a.m. on October 14.
There was evidence to show that the stairway was steep, at an angle approximating forty-five degrees; the risers of the stairs were uneven and of varying heights; the treads were of varying widths; the handrail was insufficient, of improper height and unsafe. A leader from the roof projected into the stairway for several inches, creating a hazardous condition. Thus, there was ample evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant had failed to exercise reasonable care in keeping the stairway in a reasonably safe condition. See Facey v. Merkle, 146 Conn. 129, 133, 148 A.2d 261.
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the decedent, wMle ascending the stairway to the second floor, fell to the ground below. The sole question is whether the jury reasonably and logically could reach the conclusion that the decedent’s death resulted from injuries sustained in a fall from the stairway wMch was caused by the defendant’s failure to exercise the care required by law. From the memorandum of decision, it is evident that the trial [395]*395court directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that there was no basis in the evidence for a finding by the jury that the negligence of the defendant in maintaining the stairway had any connection with the decedent’s injuries and death. In other words, in the court’s view, there was insufficient evidence to connect the decedent’s death with the negligence of the defendant and consequently the issue of causation was left to conjecture, surmise and speculation. See Chasse v. Albert, 147 Conn. 680, 683, 166 A.2d 148; Palmieri v. Macero, 146 Conn. 705, 708, 155 A.2d 750; Bruce v. McElhannon, 141 Conn. 44, 48, 103 A.2d 335.
It is true that there was no direct evidence to show that the decedent was ascending the stairway or that he fell from it. Nevertheless, triers of fact must often rely on circumstantial evidence and draw inferences from it. Cayer v. Salvatore, 150 Conn. 361, 363, 189 A.2d 505. There is no rule of law which forbids the resting of an inference on facts whose determination is the result of other inferences. Sliwowski v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 94 Conn. 303, 310, 108 A. 805; Ruerat v. Stevens, 113 Conn. 333, 338, 155 A. 219; State v. Foord, 142 Conn. 285, 294, 113 A.2d 591. Proof of a material fact by inference need not be so conclusive as to exclude every other hypothesis. It is sufficient if the evidence produces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the probability of the existence of the material fact. LeBlanc v. Grillo, 129 Conn. 378, 381, 28 A.2d 127. In White v. Herbst, 128 Conn. 659, 25 A.2d 68, the plaintiff’s decedent had left the second floor of the defendant’s house at about 9 p.m. An hour later, his body was found at the foot of the stairs to the first floor. The stairs were in a defective condition. There was no evidence as to the cause of the [396]*396decedent’s fall. We sustained a plaintiff’s verdict, stating (p. 661): “[W]e cannot hold that the jury could not, drawing proper inferences from the facts in evidence, reasonably believe that it was more probable than not that the decedent’s fall was due to the defective condition of the stairway.” See also Facey v. Merkle, supra; Dickson v. Yale University, 141 Conn. 250, 254, 105 A.2d 463; Hennessey v. Hennessey, 145 Conn. 211, 214, 140 A.2d 473; Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 256, 129 A.2d 606, appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15, 78 S. Ct. 36, 2 L. Ed. 2d 21; Esserman v. Madden, 123 Conn. 386, 388, 195 A. 739; Ruerat v. Stevens, 113 Conn. 333, 338, 155 A. 219.
When the decedent in the present case left the home of his wife around 11 o’clock on the night of October 13, he said that he was going home to his mother’s house. From this declaration by him and from the other circumstances in the case, we cannot say that the jury could not reasonably find that the decedent in fact went to his mother’s house, started to ascend the stairway and fell therefrom as a result of its dangerous condition. In a civil action, circumstantial evidence, in order to be sufficient to sustain a verdict, need not rise to the degree of certainty which excludes every reasonable conclusion other than that reached by the jury. LeBlanc v. Grillo, supra, 382. The important question is whether the evidence, fairly and impartially considered, would be likely to induce in the minds of twelve persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable belief that it is more probable than not that the fact in issue is true. LeBlanc v. Grillo, supra; Darrow v. Fleischner, 117 Conn. 518, 520, 169 A. 197; White v. Herbst, supra. Litigants have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by the [397]*397jury. Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 555, 102 A.2d 352. Here, the facts and the reasonable inferences which conld be drawn from them were sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff, and the court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant.
Since the case must be remanded for a new trial, we comment briefly on the ruling on evidence which the plaintiff assigned as error. The plaintiff offered in evidence a certified copy of the medical examiner’s certificate of the death of the decedent. In the certificate, the medical examiner stated that the decedent “apparently fell from the rear stairs striking his head” and that he had a fracture of the skull. Over the objection of the plaintiff, the quoted words were deleted from the certificate, which was thereafter admitted into evidence. The certificate was delivered to the coroner in compliance with the provisions of § 6-56 of the General Statutes. It was clearly the official duty of the medical examiner to incorporate in the certificate his opinion as to the cause and manner of the decedent’s death. The medical examiner, in using the quoted language, did no more than comply with the mandate of § 6-56. The certificate was admissible in evidence, and the court erred in deleting from it the language relating to the circumstances surrounding the death. Branford Trust Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 102 Conn. 481, 487, 129 A. 379. There is no merit to the claim of the defendant that the statement of the examiner was a “report” and not a certificate of death filed pursuant to the requirements of the statute. It was in fact a certificate delivered in conformity with § 6-56 of the General Statutes and was admissible in evidence. Hellman v. Karp, 93 Conn. 317, 321, 105 A. 678; Gett v. Isaacson, 98 Conn. 539, 543, 120 [398]*398A. 156; Branford Trust Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra; Bozicevich v. Kenilworth Mercantile Co., 58 Utah 458, 470, 199 P. 406; 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) § 1673.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and a new trial is ordered.
In this opinion King, C. J., and Alcorn, J., concurred.