Blackwood v. Westchester County Jail

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 12, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-02656·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK PHILLIP BLACKWOOD, Plaintiff, 1:23-CV-2656 (LTS) -against- WESTCHESTER COUNTY JAIL; C.O. ORDER OF DISMISSAL BRONER; C.O. ANTIGA, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Phillip Blackwood, who appears pro se and who filed this action while he was held in the Westchester County Jail (“WCJ”), asserts that the defendants violated his federal constitutional rights.1 He seeks damages and injunctive relief, and he sues the following defendants: (1) the WCJ; (2) WCJ Correction Officer Broner; and (3) WCJ Correction Officer Antiga. The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims of federal constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, as well as claims under state law. By order dated May 22, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses this action, but grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to file replead his claims in an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or

1 Following the filing of his complaint, Plaintiff informed the court that he is no longer being held in the WCJ. (ECF 10.) employee of a governmental entity.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d

636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged

2 For the purpose of the PLRA, the term “prisoner” refers to “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or [a] diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(h), 1915A(c). A litigant is considered to a be a prisoner under the PLRA if he fits that definition at the moment that he files his complaint. See Gibson v. City Mun. of N.Y., 692 F.3d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 21-22 (2d Cir. 2010)). Thus, although Plaintiff is longer in custody, because he filed his complaint while held in the WCJ, he is considered a prisoner for the purpose of this action. misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-

pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges the following: On March 17, 2023, while Plaintiff was held in the WCJ, another prisoner named Luis Ramos attempted suicide by putting a bag over his head during the night. Even though correction officers were supposed to conduct rounds every 15 minutes, they did not find Ramos’s dead body on the floor of his cell until the next morning. His body was found to be “black and blue” and his head was found to have “a gash in it.” (ECF 1, at 12.) The correction officers “did not do the[ir] job[,] that means the[y] just flash[ed] the light and walked pas[t]” Ramos’s cell. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that his own life “is in constant danger from being locked in and these

people don’t respond to [prisoners] when [prisoners] push the button to the door.” (Id.) He asks for “the autopsy reports” and the “time of death.” (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff is “tra[u]matized from seeing [his] friend dead in his boxers with his head split and body black and blue.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that in the “old jail” part of the WCJ, mental health officials check on prisoners four times per week; in the “new jail” part of the WCJ, where he was held at the time of filing, they are supposed to check on prisoners once per week, yet have not done so for over two months. He alleges that WCJ officials should have recognized that Ramos needed “help from the way he isolated himself. . . . [yet,] they only worry about drugs. That’s it. Nothing else.” (Id. at 14-15.) DISCUSSION A. Standing The complaint does not show that Plaintiff has standing to bring any of his claims, regardless of whether he brings them under federal or state law. Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts “to the resolution of cases and controversies.” Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). “Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of the case-or- controversy requirement.” Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997).

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Blackwood v. Westchester County Jail, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

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