BLACKWALL GROUP, LLC v. Sick Boy, LLC

771 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19808, 2011 WL 612334
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedFebruary 11, 2011
DocketCase 6:10-cv-1620-Orl-31DAB
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 771 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (BLACKWALL GROUP, LLC v. Sick Boy, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
BLACKWALL GROUP, LLC v. Sick Boy, LLC, 771 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19808, 2011 WL 612334 (M.D. Fla. 2011).

Opinion

ORDER

GREGORY A. PRESNELL, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 10) filed by the Plaintiff, Blackwall Group, LLC (“Blackwall”), the response in opposition (Doc. 17) filed by the Defendant, Sick Boy, LLC (“SBLLC”), and the reply (Doc. 22) filed by Blackwall.

I. Background

SBLLC sells T-shirts, baseball caps and other such items via the Internet and in retail outlets located throughout the United States. Many of the items sold by SBLLC are adorned with a “Sick Boy Motorcycles” logo or variations thereof. The company is based in Connecticut, maintains a website at “www.sickboy.com”, and has been in business since 1999. SBLLC holds a federal registration for the “Sick Boy” mark for use with “t-shirts, sweatshirts, jackets, [and] hats.”

The Plaintiff operates a Daytona Beach bar and restaurant named “Sickboy’s Bad Habit Lounge,” which opened in October 2010. So far as the record discloses, the bar does not sell articles of clothing. *1325 Blackwall maintains a website at “www. sickboys.com”. Blackwall filed the instant suit seeking a declaratory judgment that its trade name, domain name, and logo artwork do not infringe on SBLLC’s trademark. SBLLC disagrees and has counterclaimed, contending that Blackwall’s activities have caused confusion and infringe on its trademark. By way of the instant motion, SBLLC seeks to enjoin any further (alleged) infringement.

II. Legal Standards

An injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant has clearly established the burden of persuasion as to the prerequisites. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir.2000). A party seeking a preliminary injunction for trademark infringement must establish four elements: (1) that there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that the party would be irreparably harmed if injunctive relief were denied; (3) that the threatened injury to the trademark owner outweighs whatever damage the injunction may cause to the alleged infringer; and (4) that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest. Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1359 (11th Cir.2003).

Trademarks are “any word, name, symbol, device, or any combination thereof [used] to identify and distinguish [one’s] goods ... from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Trademarks are not merely descriptive; they answer the question “Who made it?” rather than “What is it?” See 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 3:6 (4th ed. 2000). To prevail on a claim of trademark infringement, a plaintiff must show (1) that it had a valid trademark and (2) that the defendant adopted an identical or similar mark such that consumers were likely to confuse the two. Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir.2000). The Plaintiffs use of the mark must also predate the defendant’s potentially confusing mark. Id.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has identified seven factors to be considered when analyzing the likelihood of confusion between two marks: (1) strength of the mark alleged to have been infringed; (2) similarity of the infringed and infringing marks; (3) similarity between the goods and services offered under the two marks; (4) similarity of the actual sales methods used by the holders of the marks, such as their sales outlets and customer base; (5) similarity of advertising methods; (6) intent of the alleged infringer to misappropriate the proprietor’s good will; and (7) the existence and extent of actual confusion in the consuming public. Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 775 (11th Cir.2010) (citing Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1360 (11th Cir.2007)). Evidence of actual confusion between trademarks is not necessary to a finding of likelihood of confusion, although it is the best such evidence. E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A. v. Shaw-Ross Intern. Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1985). Likelihood of confusion is a question of fact, but it may be determined as a matter of law. Welding Servs., 509 F.3d at 1361.

The Eleventh Circuit recognizes four categories of distinctiveness, listed in ascending order of strength: “(1) generic — marks that suggest the basic nature of the product or service; (2) descriptive— marks that identify the characteristic or quality of a product or service; (3) suggestive — marks that suggest characteristics of the product or service and require an effort of the imagination by the consumer in order to be understood as descriptive; and (4) arbitrary or fanciful — marks that bear *1326 no relationship to the product or service, and the strongest category of trademarks.” Gift of Learning Found., Inc. v. TGC, Inc., 329 F.3d 792, 797-98 (11th Cir.2003). Suggestive and arbitrary or fanciful marks are deemed “inherently distinctive” because “their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product” and are generally entitled to trademark protection. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768, 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2757, 120 L.Ed.2d 615 (1992). Generic marks, on the other hand, are generally incapable of receiving trademark protection and may never be registered as trademarks under the Lanham Act. Welding Servs. at 1358; Coach House Rest., Inc. v. Coach & Six Rests. Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir.1991).

III. Analysis

For purposes of the instant motion, Blackwall does not dispute the validity of SBLLC’s mark. Thus, SBLLC’s likelihood of success on the merits boils down to a question of the likelihood of customer confusion between the party’s marks. This requires an assessment of the following seven factors.

A. Strength of SBLLC’s mark

SBLLC argues that its “Sick Boy” mark falls into the fourth and strongest category of marks: arbitrary or fanciful.

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771 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19808, 2011 WL 612334, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blackwall-group-llc-v-sick-boy-llc-flmd-2011.