Blackard v. Jones
Opinion
The court finds:
1. The facts stipulated by the parties.
2. The estate tax upon the shares of stock held by Kate Chestnut on the day of her death, August 9, 1938, was fixed by the taxing authorities by dividing the gross assets of the Securities Company by the issued shares and multiplying the result by the number of shares of which Kate Chestnut died seized. 1
3. The value of one share of stock of Chestnut Securities Company on *236 August 9, 1938, the date of the death of Kate Chestnut was $91.89 and the value of the 4,584 shares subject to an estate tax was $421,218.76. 2
*237 Conclusions of Law
A. The burden was upon plaintiff taxpayers to prove that the determination of the tax by the Commissioner was invalid and further, to establish the basic facts from which a correct determination of the tax could be made. 3
B. The determination of the value of the stock by dividing the total value of the gross assets of the Chestnut Securities Company by the number of outstanding shares and multiplying the result by the number of shares held by Kate Chestnut on the date of her death was arbitrary and fixed an excessive value on such shares. The method followed was in conflict with the then prevailing regulations of the Bu *238 reau of Internal Revenue as promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasurer. 4
C. The value of the shares of stock in the Chestnut Securities Company of which Kate Chestnut died seized could not be determined by sales, or from bid and asked prices and must be determined upon the basis of the company’s net worth, earning power, dividend paying capacity, and all other relevant factors having a bearing upon the value of the stock. 5
The Policies of Insurance
4. Policy 9928,842 was issued by the Equitable Life Assurance Society of America on November 13, 1935, as a Single Premium Life policy for $40,000, consideration for which was $37,540, and annuity policy 9928,843, consideration for which was $4,860, was prepared in conjunction with it The two policies were one and the same transaction and are considered as such, and the Equitable Life Assurance Society would not have entered into the life insurance contract unless the annuity contract, entered into on the same day, was a part of the transaction.
Conclusion
D. The two policies created no insurance risk and the amount payable to the beneficiary named in the so-called life policy was not insurance within the scope of Sec. 302(g) of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9, 70, as amended, 47 Stat. 169, 279, 48 Stat. 680, 752, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 811(g), and the amount payable under the policy designated a life policy was taxable under Sec. 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926, as amended, it being a transfer to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after deat. 6
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62 F. Supp. 234 (Blackard v. Jones) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.