Blach v. Diaz-Verson

303 Ga. 63

Opinion

303 Ga. 63 FINAL COPY

S17Q1508. BLACH v. DIAZ-VERSON.

BOGGS, Justice.

In this case involving the interpretation of the 2016 amendment to Chapter

4 of Title 18 relating to garnishment proceedings, the United States District

Court for the Middle District of Georgia has certified the following question for

this Court’s consideration:

Whether an insurance company is a “financial institution” under the Georgia garnishment statute when the insurance company is garnished based on earnings that it owes the defendant as the defendant’s employer.

For the reasons explained below, we answer this question of first impression in

the negative.

The relevant facts are as follows. Harold Blach filed a garnishment action

against AFLAC to collect a $158,343.40 judgment that he obtained against Sal

Diaz-Verson. He sought to garnish funds that AFLAC periodically pays to Diaz- Verson based on Diaz-Verson’s former employment with the company.1 Since

December 2015, Blach has regularly filed summonses of garnishment against

AFLAC, and AFLAC has deposited more than $140,000 into the court’s

registry.

Effective May 12, 2016, however, the legislature enacted a new chapter

governing garnishments in Georgia. Under OCGA § 18-4-1 et seq. (the “new

garnishment statute,” Ga. L. 2016, p. 8, § 1/SB 255), different forms are

required for summonses of garnishment for general garnishments,2 which

provide for a 29-day garnishment period, and for garnishments on a financial

institution, which provide for a five-day garnishment period. See OCGA § 18-4-

4 (c) (2) and (4); see also OCGA §§ 18-4-71, 18-4-74 through 18-4-77. After

the effective date of the new statute, Blach used the general garnishment forms

found in OCGA §§ 18-4-71 and 18-4-74, and AFLAC garnished payments to

1 AFLAC made bi-monthly payments to Diaz-Verson pursuant to the settlement of a contested pension claim arising from an ERISA pension plan. See AFLAC, Inc. v. Diaz-Verson, 2012 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 73140 (M.D. Ga., May 25, 2012). 2 Although the parties use the term “traditional garnishments,” we will refer to “all other garnishments” under OCGA § 18-4-4 (c) (4) as “general garnishments.” 2 Diaz-Verson for 29 days after receiving each summons of garnishment.

Diaz-Verson filed motions to dismiss all garnishments filed after May 12,

2016, arguing that because Blach used the general form instead of the form for

financial institutions, a portion of the funds in the court’s registry must be

released back to Diaz-Verson.3 See OCGA § 18-4-7 (d) (“When a plaintiff uses

the incorrect form for a summons of garnishment of any type, the garnishment

shall not be valid and the garnishee shall be relieved of all liability.”). The

district court was inclined to agree with Diaz-Verson that the garnishment

period is five days, because AFLAC is a financial institution for purposes of the

Georgia garnishment statute, and that Blach therefore used the wrong form. But

the court found it prudent and consistent with comity principles to give this

Court an opportunity to determine what the garnishment statute means, saying

that an argument can be made that a “plain meaning interpretation cannot be

what the General Assembly intended.”

OCGA § 18-4-1 (4) defines “financial institution” as

3 The district court ruled that payments made by AFLAC into the court registry were properly paid “according to traditional garnishment proceedings.” See AFLAC, supra, 2012 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 73140 at *23-24. 3 every federal or state chartered commercial or savings bank, including savings and loan associations and cooperative banks, federal or state chartered credit unions, benefit associations, insurance companies, safe-deposit companies, trust companies, any money market mutual fund, or other organization held out to the public as a place of deposit of funds or medium of savings or collective investment.

Blach argues that a plain reading of this subsection makes clear that a “financial

institution” is a broad term for “bank,” and an insurance company is only a

“financial institution” when it is answering a garnishment that seeks to garnish

a fund or account. He asserts that because AFLAC makes payments to Diaz-

Verson that are akin to wages, it is not a “financial institution” for purposes of

the garnishment statute. On the other hand, Diaz-Verson argues that the plain

language of OCGA § 18-4-1 (4) dictates that an insurance company is a

financial institution and that there is no language that limits the institutions

listed to “a commercial or savings bank” as Blach suggests. The parties do not

dispute that AFLAC is an insurance company. And as explained by AFLAC,

Diaz-Verson “is a former employee of AFLAC, and AFLAC is indebted to

[him] pursuant to certain contractual agreements . . . under which semi-monthly

payments are made . . . . The contractual agreement . . . also calls for a quarterly

4 payment of certain perquisites to . . . Diaz-Verson.”

“When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the

General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” (Citations and

punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d

337) (2013).

[A]nd so, we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would. The common and customary usages of the words are important, but so is their context. For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law — constitutional, statutory, and common law alike — that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 591 (1)

(774 SE2d 688) (2015); see also FDIC v. Loudermilk, 295 Ga. 579, 588 (2)

(761 SE2d 332) (2014) (“[W]e look not only to the words of [a] provision, but

we consider its legal context as well. After all, context is a primary determinant

of meaning. (Citation and punctuation omitted.)”).

Prior to the 2016 amendment to the statutes governing garnishment

proceedings, the Code provided only for a general garnishment, see former

OCGA §§ 18-4-1 through 18-4-97, a continuing garnishment, see former OCGA

5 §§ 18-4-110 through 18-4-118, and a continuing garnishment for support, see

former OCGA §§ 18-4-130 through 18-4-135. The 2016 amendment created a

new category of garnishments, those “served on a financial institution,” with a

garnishment period of five days. OCGA § 18-4-4 (c) (2). Although OCGA § 18-

4-1 (4) lists “insurance companies” in its definition of a “financial institution,”

the last phrase of this subsection provides: “or other organization held out to the

public as a place of deposit of funds or medium of savings or collective

investment.” Diaz-Verson argues that the use of the disjunctive “or”

immediately before this last phrase indicates that it is meant to stand alone and

in addition to the preceding list of institutions. But “or” is also used as a

reiterative term, Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167, 169 (2) (465 SE2d 440) (1996),

and here, in the context of the chapter as a whole, the natural and reasonable use

of this phrase at the end of subsection (4) of OCGA § 18-4-1 is to describe

generally all the entities listed earlier in the subsection. That is, that a “financial

institution,” for purposes of a garnishment on a financial institution pursuant to

OCGA § 18-4-4 (c) (2), is an entity that is a place of deposit for a defendant’s

funds or medium for a defendant’s savings or investments, for example, those

listed in the subsection.

6 We arrive at this conclusion by viewing OCGA § 18-4-1 (4) in the context

of other provisions of the chapter. OCGA § 18-4-7 (b) (2) provides that a

summons of garnishment on a financial institution shall “state with particularity

the defendant’s account, identification, or tracking numbers known to the

plaintiff used by the garnishee in the identification or administration of the

defendant’s funds or property[.]” (Emphasis supplied.) And subsection (c) of

OCGA § 18-4-10 provides that “[i]f the defendant does not have an active

account with and is not the owner of any money or other property in the

possession of such financial institution, then the garnishee may immediately file

the garnishee’s answer[.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Similarly, OCGA § 18-4-13 (c)

(2) provides: “No service upon the defendant shall be required by a financial

institution garnishee if the defendant does not have an active account with and

is not the owner of any money or other property in the possession of such

financial institution.” These provisions indicate that, pursuant to OCGA § 18-4-

4 (c) (2), garnishments served on a “financial institution,” that are not

continuing garnishments or continuing garnishments for support (or general

garnishments under OCGA § 18-4-4 (c) (4) as later explained), are those served

on an entity that holds an account where a defendant’s funds are deposited,

7 saved, or invested.

Further, OCGA § 18-4-7 (c) provides: “The form for a summons of

garnishment on a financial institution shall not be used for a continuing

garnishment or continuing garnishment for support.” And the forms provided

in the garnishment chapter further support our conclusion here regarding the

meaning of “financial institution.” The form for “Attachment for summons of

garnishment on a financial institution” contains blank spaces for listing

“Account or identification numbers of accounts of the Defendant used by the

Garnishee.” OCGA § 18-4-77. And the “Financial institution garnishee answer

form” contains a box labeled in bold type “Check this box if the Defendant is

not presently an account holder of the Garnishee.” OCGA § 18-4-85 (3). This

language is not contained in the forms for the garnishee answer to other types

of garnishments. See OCGA §§ 18-4-84 (garnishee answer form) and 18-4-86

(garnishee answer to continuing garnishment form). These forms further

demonstrate that “financial institution,” for purposes of garnishments on a

financial institution under OCGA § 18-4-4 (c) (2), is intended to include only

those entities that hold funds of the defendant in some type of account.

To follow Diaz-Verson’s interpretation of OCGA § 18-4-1 (4) that an

8 insurance company such as AFLAC is a “financial institution” regardless of the

capacity in which it is acting in relation to the defendant would also mean that

an insurance company, bank, and all other organizations enumerated in OCGA

§ 18-4-1 (4) could never be the garnishee of a general garnishment, continuing

garnishment, or continuing garnishment for support as the employer or former

employer of the defendant. See OCGA §§ 18-4-4 (c) (4), 18-4-40, 18-4-51, 18-

4-86. But the legislature has indicated in OCGA § 18-4-10 (c) that a financial

institution could also be the garnishee for a continuing garnishment or

continuing garnishment for support: “When the garnishee is a financial

institution and the garnishment is not a continuing garnishment or continuing

garnishment for support, such garnishee’s answer shall be filed with the court

issuing the summons . . . .”4 The legislature has also indicated that a financial

institution could be the garnishee for a general garnishment under OCGA § 18-

4-4 (c) (4). The general affidavit garnishment form contains a box labeled in

bold type “Check this box if the Garnishee is a financial institution.” OCGA

4 See also OCGA § 18-4-76, the form for “Summons of garnishment on financial institution,” which provides: “DO NOT USE THIS FORM IF THIS IS A CONTINUING GARNISHMENT . . . OR CONTINUING GARNISHMENT FOR CHILD SUPPORT OR ALIMONY.” 9 § 18-4-71.

For the above-stated reasons, we hold that viewing the garnishment

statutory scheme as a whole, it is clear that “financial institution” in OCGA §

18-4-1 (4), for purposes of garnishments served on a financial institution subject

to the five-day garnishment period, is limited to entities that are “held out to the

public as a place of deposit of funds or medium of savings or collective

investment” and are garnished in that capacity. We therefore conclude, in

answering the district court’s question, that an insurance company is not a

“financial institution” for purposes of OCGA § 18-4-4 (c) (2) when the

insurance company is garnished based on earnings that it owes the defendant as

the defendant’s employer.

Certified question answered. All the Justices concur.

10 Decided February 5, 2018.

Certified question from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Georgia.

Wagner, Johnston & Rosenthal, A. Binford Minter, for appellant.

Hunton & Williams, Kurtis A. Powell, for appellee.