SANDSTROM, Justice.
BKU Enterprises, Inc., appeals from a district court judgment affirming Job Service of North Dakota’s decision that BKU’s “independent dealers” were employees subject to job insurance taxes. We affirm.
BKU is a distributor of Kirby vacuum cleaners in the Fargo area. BKU enters into written contracts with “dealers,” who sell the vacuums to customers through in-home demonstrations. The contract designates the dealer as an independent contractor. Dealers set their own schedules and need not regularly report work hours to BKU. Although BKU provides regularly scheduled training sessions for its dealers, attendance is not required. Dealers generally take vacuums from BKU on consignment. BKU provides a suggested retail price list, but dealers can sell the vacuums for more or less. When a sale is made, payment is given to BKU, which then pays the dealer a profit: the difference between the wholesale price and the price paid by the customer. If a customer pays by check, the check must be payable to BKU. The dealers do not have sales tax permits, and BKU remits the sales tax to the taxing authorities.
The dealers are not provided with cars, telephones, or office space. Most work out of their homes, with sales and demonstrations taking place in the customers’ homes. The dealers have little or no investment in their business. BKU supplies financing forms, sales brochures, and business cards to the dealers, and also provides warranty service on vacuums sold by the dealers.
Under the written agreement, the dealer may only use the Kirby name and trademark “in the name of’ BKU, and upon termination may not claim to be “affiliated with anyone who is authorized to sell or service Kirby Products.” The dealer must perform services under the agreement personally, and must compile and forward customer records for warranty purposes. The dealer is also required to “comply with all directives ... with regard to said warranty.” Under the agreement, BKU may reject installment contract sales, and agrees to purchase trade-ins accepted by the dealers according to a written schedule. Although the agreement is for a one-year period, with automatic renewals, it permits either party to terminate the agreement without cause upon two-days’ written notice.
In 1991, following a claim for unemployment benefits by a former “dealer,” Job Service began investigating BKU’s failure to pay job insurance taxes on its dealers. BKU requested a hearing, which was held on March 11, 1992. The Director of the Job Insurance Division issued a “Determination” concluding BKU’s dealers were employees, not independent contractors. BKU appealed to Job Service, which affirmed the “Determination.” BKU appealed to the district court, which affirmed the decision of Job Service. BKU appealed to this Court.
When an administrative agency decision is appealed from the district court, we review the decision of the agency, not the district court.
Midwest Property Recovery, Inc. v. Job Service,
475 N.W.2d 918, 920 (N.D.1991). We limit our review to the record before the agency.
Midwest Property.
This Court recently outlined the standard of review in administrative appeals:
“Ordinarily, a determination of an administrative agency is presumed to be correct.... Our review is governed by NDCC 28-32-19. Courts must affirm an administrative agency decision unless one of the six factors listed in NDCC 28-32-19 is present_ In reviewing an administrative order, ‘there are three critical questions: (1) are the findings of fact supported by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) are the conclusions of law sustained by the findings of fact; and (3) is the agency decision supported by the conclusions of law?’
Matter of Prettyman,
410 N.W.2d 533, 536 (N.D.1987). Where the subject of an agency decision is a technical one, the expertise of the agency is entitled to respect. ... We determine only whether the agency reasonably made its factual determinations from the greater weight of all the evidence in the entire record.”
Turnbow v. Job Service North Dakota,
479 N.W.2d 827, 828 (N.D.1992) (citations and footnote omitted). The unemployment compensation law is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed in favor of the employee. Tu
rnbow
at 829;
Schaefer v. Job Service North Dakota,
463 N.W.2d 665, 666 (N.D.1990).
The sole issue presented upon appeal is whether BKU’s dealers are employees or independent contractors. If they are employees, BKU must pay unemployment taxes for them.
The relevant statute is N.D.C.C. § 52-01-01(17)(e):
“Services performed by an individual for wages or under any contract of hire must be deemed to be employment subject to the North Dakota Unemployment Compensation Law unless it is shown that the individual is an independent contractor as determined by the ‘common law
test.”
Under the statute, Job Service bears the initial burden of showing the work is performed for wages or under a contract of hire; the employer, however, bears the burden of showing the worker is an independent contractor.
E.g., Turnbow
at 829;
Midwest Property Recovery
at 923. Applying the liberal interpretations of
“wages”
and “any contract of hire” under unemployment compensation law, BKU’s dealers clearly performed services for wages or under a contract of hire.
See
N.D.C.C. § 52-01-01(31);
Turnbow
at 829;
Speedway, Inc. v. Job Service North Dakota,
454 N.W.2d 526, 528-529 (N.D.1990). Accordingly, the question in this case is whether BKU carried its burden of proving its dealers are independent contractors under the common law test.
Under N.D.A.C. § 27-02-14-01(5)(a), the common law test focuses upon the employer’s right to direct and control the means and manner of performing the work
:
“Generally, an employment relationship exists when the person for whom services are performed has the right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that result is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control of the employer not only as to what must be done but how it must be done. In this connection, it is not necessary that the employer actually direct or control the manner in which the services are performed; it is sufficient if the employer has the right to do so. The right to discharge is also an important factor indicating that the person possessing that right is an employer.
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SANDSTROM, Justice.
BKU Enterprises, Inc., appeals from a district court judgment affirming Job Service of North Dakota’s decision that BKU’s “independent dealers” were employees subject to job insurance taxes. We affirm.
BKU is a distributor of Kirby vacuum cleaners in the Fargo area. BKU enters into written contracts with “dealers,” who sell the vacuums to customers through in-home demonstrations. The contract designates the dealer as an independent contractor. Dealers set their own schedules and need not regularly report work hours to BKU. Although BKU provides regularly scheduled training sessions for its dealers, attendance is not required. Dealers generally take vacuums from BKU on consignment. BKU provides a suggested retail price list, but dealers can sell the vacuums for more or less. When a sale is made, payment is given to BKU, which then pays the dealer a profit: the difference between the wholesale price and the price paid by the customer. If a customer pays by check, the check must be payable to BKU. The dealers do not have sales tax permits, and BKU remits the sales tax to the taxing authorities.
The dealers are not provided with cars, telephones, or office space. Most work out of their homes, with sales and demonstrations taking place in the customers’ homes. The dealers have little or no investment in their business. BKU supplies financing forms, sales brochures, and business cards to the dealers, and also provides warranty service on vacuums sold by the dealers.
Under the written agreement, the dealer may only use the Kirby name and trademark “in the name of’ BKU, and upon termination may not claim to be “affiliated with anyone who is authorized to sell or service Kirby Products.” The dealer must perform services under the agreement personally, and must compile and forward customer records for warranty purposes. The dealer is also required to “comply with all directives ... with regard to said warranty.” Under the agreement, BKU may reject installment contract sales, and agrees to purchase trade-ins accepted by the dealers according to a written schedule. Although the agreement is for a one-year period, with automatic renewals, it permits either party to terminate the agreement without cause upon two-days’ written notice.
In 1991, following a claim for unemployment benefits by a former “dealer,” Job Service began investigating BKU’s failure to pay job insurance taxes on its dealers. BKU requested a hearing, which was held on March 11, 1992. The Director of the Job Insurance Division issued a “Determination” concluding BKU’s dealers were employees, not independent contractors. BKU appealed to Job Service, which affirmed the “Determination.” BKU appealed to the district court, which affirmed the decision of Job Service. BKU appealed to this Court.
When an administrative agency decision is appealed from the district court, we review the decision of the agency, not the district court.
Midwest Property Recovery, Inc. v. Job Service,
475 N.W.2d 918, 920 (N.D.1991). We limit our review to the record before the agency.
Midwest Property.
This Court recently outlined the standard of review in administrative appeals:
“Ordinarily, a determination of an administrative agency is presumed to be correct.... Our review is governed by NDCC 28-32-19. Courts must affirm an administrative agency decision unless one of the six factors listed in NDCC 28-32-19 is present_ In reviewing an administrative order, ‘there are three critical questions: (1) are the findings of fact supported by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) are the conclusions of law sustained by the findings of fact; and (3) is the agency decision supported by the conclusions of law?’
Matter of Prettyman,
410 N.W.2d 533, 536 (N.D.1987). Where the subject of an agency decision is a technical one, the expertise of the agency is entitled to respect. ... We determine only whether the agency reasonably made its factual determinations from the greater weight of all the evidence in the entire record.”
Turnbow v. Job Service North Dakota,
479 N.W.2d 827, 828 (N.D.1992) (citations and footnote omitted). The unemployment compensation law is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed in favor of the employee. Tu
rnbow
at 829;
Schaefer v. Job Service North Dakota,
463 N.W.2d 665, 666 (N.D.1990).
The sole issue presented upon appeal is whether BKU’s dealers are employees or independent contractors. If they are employees, BKU must pay unemployment taxes for them.
The relevant statute is N.D.C.C. § 52-01-01(17)(e):
“Services performed by an individual for wages or under any contract of hire must be deemed to be employment subject to the North Dakota Unemployment Compensation Law unless it is shown that the individual is an independent contractor as determined by the ‘common law
test.”
Under the statute, Job Service bears the initial burden of showing the work is performed for wages or under a contract of hire; the employer, however, bears the burden of showing the worker is an independent contractor.
E.g., Turnbow
at 829;
Midwest Property Recovery
at 923. Applying the liberal interpretations of
“wages”
and “any contract of hire” under unemployment compensation law, BKU’s dealers clearly performed services for wages or under a contract of hire.
See
N.D.C.C. § 52-01-01(31);
Turnbow
at 829;
Speedway, Inc. v. Job Service North Dakota,
454 N.W.2d 526, 528-529 (N.D.1990). Accordingly, the question in this case is whether BKU carried its burden of proving its dealers are independent contractors under the common law test.
Under N.D.A.C. § 27-02-14-01(5)(a), the common law test focuses upon the employer’s right to direct and control the means and manner of performing the work
:
“Generally, an employment relationship exists when the person for whom services are performed has the right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that result is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control of the employer not only as to what must be done but how it must be done. In this connection, it is not necessary that the employer actually direct or control the manner in which the services are performed; it is sufficient if the employer has the right to do so. The right to discharge is also an important factor indicating that the person possessing that right is an employer. However, the right to terminate a contract before completion to prevent and minimize damages for a potential breach or actual breach of contract does not, by itself, suggest an employment relationship. Other factors characteristic of an employer, but not necessarily present in every case, are the furnishing of tools and the furnishing of a place to work, to the individual who performs the services. The fact that the contract must be performed at a specific location, such as a building site, does not, by itself, constitute furnishing a place to work if the nature of the work to be done precludes a separate site or is the customary practice in the industry. In general, if an individual is subject to the control or direction of another merely as to the result to be accomplished by the work and not as to the means and methods for accomplishing the result, the individual is an independent contractor. An individual performing services as an independent contractor is not as to such services an employee. Individuals such as physicians, lawyers, dentists, veterinarians, construction contractors, public stenographers, and auctioneers, engaged in the pursuit of an independent trade, business, or profession, in which they offer their services to the public, are independent contractors and not employees.”
Subsection (b) of N.D.A.C. § 27-02-14-01(5) lists twenty factors to be used as guidelines to determine if sufficient control is present to establish an employer-employee relationship.
BKU does not challenge the adminis
trative rule, and relies on the twenty factors in arguing it has proven lack of control.
Whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee is a mixed question of fact and law.
Turnbow
at 830;
Midwest Property Recovery
at 923. When reviewing a mixed question of fact and law, the underlying predicate facts are treated as findings of fact, and the conclusion whether those facts meet the legal standard is a question of law.
See Salter v. North Dakota Department of Transportation,
505 N.W.2d 111, 112 (N.D.1993). Whether an employer has retained the right to direct and control the services performed by workers is a finding of fact.
Turnbow
at 831;
Midwest Property Recovery
at 924.
BKU initially argues its contract with its independent dealers explicitly provides the dealers are independent contractors. The label used by the parties does not decide the issue; the important consideration is how the relationship between the parties actually operates.
Turnbow
at 830;
Midwest Property Recovery
at 923.
BKU also argues a greater number of the twenty factors in N.D.A.C. § 27-02-14-01(5)(b) support a finding of independent contractor status, and therefore Job Service erred in finding the dealers were employees. Under the facts of this case, many of the twenty factors would support a finding of independent contractor status. Fact finding, however, is not the blind factoring of numerical quotients. Rather, fact finding is the
weighing
of evidence, which of necessity requires the fact finder to give greater importance to some factors than others. The administrative rule listing the twenty factors, which BKU concedes is controlling, specifi-
eally directs “[t]he degree of importance of each factor varies depending on the occupation and the factual context in which the services are performed.” N.D.A.C. § 27-02-14-01(5)(b).
We have reviewed Job Service’s findings of fact in conjunction with the twenty factors in N.D.A.C. § 27-02-14-01(5)(b), and find sufficient support for the findings and conclusions. The relevant findings, as they correspond to those factors, include: BKU directed that vacuum cleaners were to be sold through in-home demonstrations (factor 1); the dealers’ services were integrated into the business, as BKU’s continued success was dependent upon the efforts of its sales force (factor 3); dealers were to perform services under the contract personally (factor 4); many dealers had long-term continuing relationships with BKU (factor 6); BKU furnished business cards and sales brochures to dealers (factor 14); dealers did not have a significant investment (factor 15); dealers did not in general have a significant risk of loss (factor 16); dealers generally did not work as salespeople for other firms at the same time (factor 17); dealers did not make their services available to the general public (factor 18); and, the contract between BKU and each of its dealers allowed either party to terminate it without liability (factors 19 and 20).
BKU’s power to terminate the contracts with dealers without cause is an especially strong indication of employee status.
See
N.D.A.C. § 27-02-14-01(5)(a). The hallmark of an independent contractor relationship is the parties contract for a specific job to be done, or services to be performed for a specified period of time. When the contract gives the parties the right to terminate without cause, the relationship is more in the nature of employment at will. The power to terminate is highly suggestive of the power to control. As noted by another court holding that Kirby salespersons were employees:
“In this case Bevan had the right to terminate the services of his crew managers and salesmen at will. Having the power to discharge, he necessarily had the power to control practically all of the activities of those concerned. The fact that Bevan did not exercise the power makes no difference.”
Bevan v. California Employment Stabilization Commission,
139 Cal.App.2d 668, 294 P.2d 524, 533-534 (1956).
Although not specifically listed in the twenty factors, the dealers lack of sales tax permits, and reliance on BKU to remit sales taxes to the appropriate authorities, also indicates employee status. If the dealers were running independent businesses, they would not rely on a third party for such an essential business function. The same is true of BKU’s practice of requiring checks to be written to BKU, not the dealer.
We also note that the overwhelming majority of appellate courts addressing this issue have concluded Kirby’s “independent dealers” are employees, not independent contractors, for purposes of unemployment compensation.
See Bevan; Sudduth v. California Employment Stabilization Commission,
130 Cal.App.2d 304, 278 P.2d 946 (1955);
Weld County Kirby Co. v. Industrial Commission,
676 P.2d 1253 (Colo.Ct.App.1983);
Murphy v. Daumit,
387 Ill. 406, 56 N.E.2d 800 (1944);
Hart v. Johnson,
68 Ill.App.3d 968, 25 Ill.Dec. 352, 386 N.E.2d 623 (1979);
Wallis v. Secretary of Kansas Department of Human Resources,
236 Kan. 97, 689 P.2d 787 (1984);
Herron Enterprises, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission,
765 S.W.2d 614 (Mo.Ct.App.1988);
Kirby Co. of Bozeman, Inc. v. Employment Security Division,
189 Mont. 1, 614 P.2d 1040 (1980);
Kirkpatrick v. Peet,
247 Or. 204, 428 P.2d 405 (1967). Only one court has concluded Kirby dealers are independent contractors for unemployment compensation purposes.
See Speaks, Inc. v. Jensen,
309 Minn. 48, 243 N.W.2d 142 (1976).
Job Service found BKU retained the right to direct and control the services performed by the dealers. A reasoning mind reasonably could have found the greater weight of the evidence supported that finding.
See Midwest Property Recovery
at 924.
We conclude Job Service’s findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, its legal conclusions are sustained by the findings of fact, and its decision is supported by the conclusions of law. The judgment is affirmed.
VANDE WALLE, C.J., NEUMANN and MESCHKE, JJ., and BENNY A. GRAFF, District Judge, concur.
BENNY A. GRAFF; District Judge, sitting in place of LEVINE, J., disqualified.