STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT PISCATAQUIS, SS CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. DOVSC-Gff-20-02
JANICE BJORI(LAND, ) Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER v. ) ) ) AMANDA BJORKLAND, ) Defendant. )
Trial of this case was completed and closing argllments submitted by August 19, 2022.
Nolan Tanous, Esq. and his client the plaintiff were present for trial, as were Benjamin Cabot,
Esq. and his client, the defendant. This case concerns the plaintiffs multi-count complaint
addressing issues related to parties' interest concerning in a camp on Ambejejus Lake.
FACTS
The plaintiff and her then husband, Mark, bought the camp on August 29, 2000. Amanda
is their daughter. They bought the stiucture and outbuildings only (not the land) for $83,000 and
leased the land upon which the camp was situated. The transaction was owner financed and the
amount bo1rnwed was paid off within three years of the sale. Janice and Mark were divorced in
2004 but they continued to co-own the camp and share expenses amidst Janice's complaint that
Mark did not promptly pay his share of the expenses. Use of the camp in the ensuing years
brought great conflict. Mark had a girlfriend and many family members with whom he wanted to
enjoy the camp. Janice was resistant to splitting the time that each could be at the camp and
insisted on being present when Mark and guests were present. This caused a tremendous amount
conflict, stress, and unhappiness because Janice disliked Mark, his family, and, of course, the girlfriend. Eventually Mark gave up and wanted to release his interest in the camp, but he and
Janice were unable to reach an agreement until Janice devised a plan to convey the camp to
Amanda. Amanda, 22 years of age at the time, had no interest in having the camp conveyed to
her, but considered the proposal only after Janice and Mark agreed that they would pay all
expenses related to the camp. Amanda eventually acquiesced and on February 9, 2010, Janice
and Mark conveyed the camp to her. Based on the testimony at trial, the Court concludes the
camp was conveyed in an attempt to involve Amanda in improving the parents' relationship
issues and to preserve and protect the asset. Although Janice testified that Amanda agreed that
Janice would have a life estate in the camp, Amanda and Mark disagreed and tsetified that there
was no mention of a life estate at the time of the conveyance. The Court finds that although
Janice thought she would be able to use the camp as she pleased for the remainder of her life,
there was in fact no life estate created.
Following this transaction, the three were going to continue to use the camp, and the
parents were going to pay all related expenses. In fact, Amanda used the camp infrequently
because a period of continued disfunction followed. Amanda, now the owner, was in the
unenviable position of refereeing her parents' disputes and trying to get her mother to understand
there would be no peace if she were present when her former husband and his invitees were
present. Amanda even enacted rnles of behavior at camp that her parents violated constantly. The
biggest problem was trying to get Janice to moderate her behavior, which she intrnnsigently
refused to do. In 2015, Ma1'k announced he would no longer use the camp and pay expenses. At
the same time, the lessor wanted to sell the pmpe1ty upon which the camp was situated. Neither
parent could borrow the $102,000 sales price, but Janice persuaded Amanda to borrow the
money and buy the land, which she did, with her mother's nonfinancial assistance. Janice then
2 decided they would air B&B the camp and, pursuant to the established pattern, Amanda
acquiesced.
The agreement between the two involved renting the propetty and paying the mortgage
and related expenses out ofthe proceeds. One of the reasons Amanda agreed was that she still
did not want to use her separnte money to pay for the camp. They began renting the camp in
2016 and rental receipts increased each year, reaching almost $32,000 in 2019. Janice managed
the use of the rental property and deposited receipts into a bank account jointly owned with
Amanda and paid expenses out of the same acconnt. In the late summer of 2019, the tenuous
relationship between the two broke and Amanda no longer interacted with her mother. Amanda
withdrew $8,000 from the joint account to make mortgage payments in the future, and Janice
continued to occupy the property. Even when tenants were present, Janice had resided in a trailer
on the propetty and after this split she could reside in either the camp or trailer. Although in her
testimony she indicated she rented the property sparingly after 2019, she had to admit on cross
that she actually rented it fairly frequently, but there is little accounting information concerning
the post 2019 rentals. Amanda has continued to pay the mortgage to the present day. Amanda
filed a forcible and detainer action to regain occupation of the camp, but that proceeding has
been stayed pending a resolution of this case.
CLAIMS
Constructive Trust
"A constructive 1:mstmay be imposed to do equity and to prevent unjust enrichment when
title to property is acquired by fraud, duress, or undue influence, or is acquired or retained in
violation of a fiduciary duty." Estate ofCampbell, 1997 ME 212, 704 A.2d 329, 331. The
3 situation presented here is in many ways the opposite of the scenario commonly resulting in the
imposition of a constructive trust. Here, the plaintiff aggressively persuaded her daughter to take
title to the camp itself and later, to purchase the land upon which the camp is situated. Amanda
only consented when Janice guaranteed that she, Amanda, would in fact bear no related expense.
Later the on-line rental plan was devised to pay for the expenses related to the camp. That
eventually failed because of the "toxic relationship," in Amanda's words, between mother and
daughter. It is the Court's opinion that Janice's not to be denied personality trait in large part led
to the failure of the rental b11siness. Clearly, Amanda did not use fraud, duress, or undue
influence to acquire title to the property. Additionally, even though Janice thought she would be
able to use the property as her own on the foture, there was no agreement giving her a life estate
and the properly was conveyed to Amanda without such an agreement. Finally, there is no
fiduciary duty here. The existence of a fiduciary duty is dependent upon proof of the existence of
a confidential relationship and the elements of a confidential relationship include the actual
placing of trust and confidence by a pa1ty in another and a great disparity of position and
influence between the parties to the relation. Ruebsamen v. Maddocks, 340 A.2d 31, 35 (Me.
1975). Those features are not present here.
Partnership and Breach
Janice and Mark Bjorkland h·m1Sferred title to their camp to Amanda for reasons not
associated with forming a partnership. After Mark bowed out of involvement with the camp,
Amanda, at the urging of her mother, borrowed money to hut the land upon which the camp was
situated, and at that time arrived at a plan to rent the camp to others, in part, in order to raise
money for mortgage payments. From the beginning, Amanda had cooperated with her pm·ents'
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT PISCATAQUIS, SS CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. DOVSC-Gff-20-02
JANICE BJORI(LAND, ) Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER v. ) ) ) AMANDA BJORKLAND, ) Defendant. )
Trial of this case was completed and closing argllments submitted by August 19, 2022.
Nolan Tanous, Esq. and his client the plaintiff were present for trial, as were Benjamin Cabot,
Esq. and his client, the defendant. This case concerns the plaintiffs multi-count complaint
addressing issues related to parties' interest concerning in a camp on Ambejejus Lake.
FACTS
The plaintiff and her then husband, Mark, bought the camp on August 29, 2000. Amanda
is their daughter. They bought the stiucture and outbuildings only (not the land) for $83,000 and
leased the land upon which the camp was situated. The transaction was owner financed and the
amount bo1rnwed was paid off within three years of the sale. Janice and Mark were divorced in
2004 but they continued to co-own the camp and share expenses amidst Janice's complaint that
Mark did not promptly pay his share of the expenses. Use of the camp in the ensuing years
brought great conflict. Mark had a girlfriend and many family members with whom he wanted to
enjoy the camp. Janice was resistant to splitting the time that each could be at the camp and
insisted on being present when Mark and guests were present. This caused a tremendous amount
conflict, stress, and unhappiness because Janice disliked Mark, his family, and, of course, the girlfriend. Eventually Mark gave up and wanted to release his interest in the camp, but he and
Janice were unable to reach an agreement until Janice devised a plan to convey the camp to
Amanda. Amanda, 22 years of age at the time, had no interest in having the camp conveyed to
her, but considered the proposal only after Janice and Mark agreed that they would pay all
expenses related to the camp. Amanda eventually acquiesced and on February 9, 2010, Janice
and Mark conveyed the camp to her. Based on the testimony at trial, the Court concludes the
camp was conveyed in an attempt to involve Amanda in improving the parents' relationship
issues and to preserve and protect the asset. Although Janice testified that Amanda agreed that
Janice would have a life estate in the camp, Amanda and Mark disagreed and tsetified that there
was no mention of a life estate at the time of the conveyance. The Court finds that although
Janice thought she would be able to use the camp as she pleased for the remainder of her life,
there was in fact no life estate created.
Following this transaction, the three were going to continue to use the camp, and the
parents were going to pay all related expenses. In fact, Amanda used the camp infrequently
because a period of continued disfunction followed. Amanda, now the owner, was in the
unenviable position of refereeing her parents' disputes and trying to get her mother to understand
there would be no peace if she were present when her former husband and his invitees were
present. Amanda even enacted rnles of behavior at camp that her parents violated constantly. The
biggest problem was trying to get Janice to moderate her behavior, which she intrnnsigently
refused to do. In 2015, Ma1'k announced he would no longer use the camp and pay expenses. At
the same time, the lessor wanted to sell the pmpe1ty upon which the camp was situated. Neither
parent could borrow the $102,000 sales price, but Janice persuaded Amanda to borrow the
money and buy the land, which she did, with her mother's nonfinancial assistance. Janice then
2 decided they would air B&B the camp and, pursuant to the established pattern, Amanda
acquiesced.
The agreement between the two involved renting the propetty and paying the mortgage
and related expenses out ofthe proceeds. One of the reasons Amanda agreed was that she still
did not want to use her separnte money to pay for the camp. They began renting the camp in
2016 and rental receipts increased each year, reaching almost $32,000 in 2019. Janice managed
the use of the rental property and deposited receipts into a bank account jointly owned with
Amanda and paid expenses out of the same acconnt. In the late summer of 2019, the tenuous
relationship between the two broke and Amanda no longer interacted with her mother. Amanda
withdrew $8,000 from the joint account to make mortgage payments in the future, and Janice
continued to occupy the property. Even when tenants were present, Janice had resided in a trailer
on the propetty and after this split she could reside in either the camp or trailer. Although in her
testimony she indicated she rented the property sparingly after 2019, she had to admit on cross
that she actually rented it fairly frequently, but there is little accounting information concerning
the post 2019 rentals. Amanda has continued to pay the mortgage to the present day. Amanda
filed a forcible and detainer action to regain occupation of the camp, but that proceeding has
been stayed pending a resolution of this case.
CLAIMS
Constructive Trust
"A constructive 1:mstmay be imposed to do equity and to prevent unjust enrichment when
title to property is acquired by fraud, duress, or undue influence, or is acquired or retained in
violation of a fiduciary duty." Estate ofCampbell, 1997 ME 212, 704 A.2d 329, 331. The
3 situation presented here is in many ways the opposite of the scenario commonly resulting in the
imposition of a constructive trust. Here, the plaintiff aggressively persuaded her daughter to take
title to the camp itself and later, to purchase the land upon which the camp is situated. Amanda
only consented when Janice guaranteed that she, Amanda, would in fact bear no related expense.
Later the on-line rental plan was devised to pay for the expenses related to the camp. That
eventually failed because of the "toxic relationship," in Amanda's words, between mother and
daughter. It is the Court's opinion that Janice's not to be denied personality trait in large part led
to the failure of the rental b11siness. Clearly, Amanda did not use fraud, duress, or undue
influence to acquire title to the property. Additionally, even though Janice thought she would be
able to use the property as her own on the foture, there was no agreement giving her a life estate
and the properly was conveyed to Amanda without such an agreement. Finally, there is no
fiduciary duty here. The existence of a fiduciary duty is dependent upon proof of the existence of
a confidential relationship and the elements of a confidential relationship include the actual
placing of trust and confidence by a pa1ty in another and a great disparity of position and
influence between the parties to the relation. Ruebsamen v. Maddocks, 340 A.2d 31, 35 (Me.
1975). Those features are not present here.
Partnership and Breach
Janice and Mark Bjorkland h·m1Sferred title to their camp to Amanda for reasons not
associated with forming a partnership. After Mark bowed out of involvement with the camp,
Amanda, at the urging of her mother, borrowed money to hut the land upon which the camp was
situated, and at that time arrived at a plan to rent the camp to others, in part, in order to raise
money for mortgage payments. From the beginning, Amanda had cooperated with her pm·ents'
4 plan to dispose of the camp by conveying it to her, provided it did not cost her any money.
Whether a partnership agreement controlled by 31 M.R. S. § 1022 existed or not, there was no
express te1m of years during which the paitnership was to exist, and either party could dissociate
by notifying the pattnership of the pattner's express will to withdraw as a partner. 31 M.R.S.
§1061(1). What is left, then, is a wind up the partnership business which, in essence, is being
done here. First, it must be acknowledged that throughout the period of time from 2105 to
present, the camp has remained Amanda's property. In addition to having the m01tgage paid
down and the property improved (to be addressed below), the only financial benefit to Amanda
has been the $8,000 that she took form the joint account. From that point on, Jai1ice has had
access to the pmperty and has retained rental proceeds, while Amanda has been excluded. Fmm
2015 to the pattnership's end, all rental proceeds went into a joint account controlled by Janice,
and, with the exception of this $8,000, she has retained all of the money in the account, using it
to meet rental camp expenses and retaining some for her benefit, and since 2019, all done while
having exclusive use and control of the property. She is entitled to nothing in the wind up of this
partnership.
Unjust Enrichment
The elements of unjust enrichment are (l) a benefit conferred on defendant by plaintiff;
(2) an appreciation or Jmowledge of the benefit by the defendant; and (3) the acceptance or
retention of the benefit in circumstances that make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the
benefit without payment for the value of the benefit conferred. See Me. Eye Care Assocs., P.A. v.
Gorman, 2008 ME 36,, 17. The measure of damages is the value of the benefit received. The
cou1t finds that this doctrine applies to the reduction in mortgage principal and camp
5 improvement expenses related to the period of time in which the rental business was
operational.' The comt confines the award to these categories because Janice controlled the joint
account and had control over the surplus each year. Other than the two above categoties of
enrichment, money derived from renting the camp was shared equally or was kept by Janice or
used for proper expenses.
To arrive at a mo1tgage paydown, the cou1t notes that approximately Y, of each payment
went to principal. See Joint Ex. 11, 12. Using pl. ex. 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10, the total mortgage
payments were $42,585 prior to the breakup, plus the $8,000 Amanda took to make future
mortgage payments for a total of $50,585, with Y, or$ 25,293 attributable to plincipal. Janice's
Y, would be $12,647. The Court also finds that pl. ex.12 accurately demonstrates that $19,293
was spent on camp improvements and Y, of that amount is $9647. The total that defendant must
pay to the plaintiff is $22,294.
Conversion, Injunctive Relief and Tortious Interference
The Plaintiff does not prevail on conversion because any mortgage proceeds were spent
by agreement, with the exception of $8,000 retained by Amanda, to make mortgage payments
while Janice enjoyed exclusive use of the prope1ty. This amount has been factored into the
Cou1t's decision in the entirety of the claims. Plaintiff does not prevail on the injunctive relief
claim, having lost the constructive trust claim. Plaintiff does prevail on the claim for tortious
interference with advantage business relationship because of insufficient evidence that defendant
1 This is not inconsistent with the Court's constructive trust findings because a constructive trust was not imposed because of the absence of fraud, duress1 undue Influence, and confldential relationshlp - not because there was no unjust enrichment.
6 made such tortious statements, and her right to partnership income tenninated upon the
dissolution of the partnership.
IL COUNTERCLAIMS
The Court finds for the counterclaim defendant on all counterclaims. Counts I, II, and III,
which address Janice's allegedly unlawful occupation of the camp property are not successful
because Amanda eventually acquiesced in her occupation. On counterclaim IV, Amanda has
failed to prove that Janice made false statements as alleged. Counts V and VI fail because the
evidence of the severity ofthe emotional distressed caused is lacking. Count VII, conversion,
fails either because of insufficient evidence of personal prope1ty conve1ted, or if the count
applies to the camp itself, for the reasons expressed with regard to counts I, II, and III.
Counterclaim VIII fails, the Court having found already found that Amanda was unjustly
enriched, precluding Amanda's claim as counterclaim plaintiff.
The Entry is:
Verdict for the defendant on Counts I, II, III, IV, V, and VII on plaintiffs complaint and
for the plaintiff in the amount of $22,294 on Count VI.
Verdict for the counterclaim defendant on all counterclaims.
Daied I /14) ~ · //%~---,, 1! William Anderson, Justice Maine Superior Conrt