JOHN F. McAULIFFE, Judge, Retired, Specially Assigned.
This case involves the question of whether a juror’s response to a poll of a verdict in a criminal case was ambiguous, and if so, whether the trial judge’s action properly resolved the ambiguity.
I.
Paul Renard Bishop was tried in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on charges of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. At the conclusion of deliberations following a two-day trial, the foreman of the jury announced a verdict of guilty on both counts. Defense counsel requested that the jury be polled. The first two jurors answered “yes, it is” to the clerk’s question of whether their verdict was the same as the foreman’s verdict. The third juror questioned in the poll responded differently—he said “uhh, reluctantly, yes.” 1 The defendant’s attorney immediately requested a bench conference, and the following colloquy took place:
LDEFENSE COUNSEL]: I thought I heard that juror when he initially came out and was questioned is there a verdict, I thought I heard the juror say no and then when the court asked and who shall say for you that juror didn’t [290]*290respond. Now that juror says in response “Reluctantly, yes.”
I would ask the court to send the jury back, keep that juror out here and inquire of him. I don’t think “Reluctantly, yes” is an appropriate response at this point in the case.
[PROSECUTOR]: He said yes. I mean, he could be reluctant on any number of grounds. I’m reluctant because of the evidence. I’m reluctant because I feel bad for the guy. I mean, they have been in for two and a half hours and he hasn’t, I mean I think they were very carefully instructed that it should be a unanimous verdict.
THE COURT: All right, here is what I’m going to do. I’m not going to send them back. I’m going to ask the clerk to simply start over and ask the jurors again. As you call each name just say is the foreman’s verdict your verdict. That is the way to ask it. Is the foreman’s verdict your verdict?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would ask you before doing that is to tell the jury—. At that point I think it becomes coercive. He has expressed reluctance. To then do it in front of the other jurors I think is coercive. I would ask the court then before saying that to tell them that if it is not a unanimous verdict that they can deliberate further, there can be other results.
But I think it is coercive now to start over again when you stopped at that point because that juror says “Reluctantly, yes.” I think the court should get some voir dire of that juror.
THE COURT: I don’t think it is coercive. I disagree.
In open court, the judge then instructed the clerk to “start polling the jury again and start with the first juror as you did.” This time all jurors answered in the affirmative, without adding qualifying words of any kind. The judge then instructed the'clerk to “hearken the jury” and the following occurred:
THE CLERK: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, hearken to your verdict as it stands recorded. Your foreman [291]*291sayeth that Paul Bishop is guilty of the matters whereof he stands indicted. And so you all say?
JURY: Yes.
Defense counsel again asked to approach the bench, and the following conference took place:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Again, ... juror number four did not respond to that, did not say yes. I would move for a mistrial at this time. He has, except for when the court went through a procedure which focused on him, he has not responded affirmatively that this is his verdict except for “Reluctantly, yes.” He has not responded to the questions asked of the court.
He clearly has reservations and I think it is inappropriate to enroll this verdict.
[PROSECUTOR]: Just for the record because I do not, I honestly don’t know whether he responded to the general group questions or not; I didn’t watch him. But as to the individual question he obviously did very specifically answer “Yes” on the second round after saying “Yes, reluctantly” on the first.
I don’t want the record to be barren of any expression as to whether that definitely took place or not because I didn’t watch his lips or listen for him individually as to the group type questions about the foreman’s verdict.
THE COURT: All right. All right, your exception is noted. I’m not going to grant your motion.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Will the court inquire as to that last question again?
THE COURT: No. No. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, thank you very much. You are excused.
Before the jury left, however, there was another bench conference at the request of defense counsel. On this occasion, he again moved for a mistrial, citing Lattisaw v. State, 329 Md. 339, 619 A.2d 548 (1993), and arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to either send the jury back for additional deliberation after appropriate instructions or questioning the reluctant juror in a non-coercive manner. He stated that the [292]*292situation was similar to that of Lattisaw, in that the reluctant juror “was visibly upset at the time and paused for a long time and answered very briefly when asked about his verdict.” The prosecutor responded that
in terms of him being visibly upset, although his statement would suggest that, I did not see anything in terms of tears or face discoloration or anything else that made it appear that he was particularly upset other than the words that he expressed.
The trial judge denied the motion, stating that “starting over ... was not coercive.”
The issue was again argued during the hearing of the defendant’s motion for a new trial. The trial judge denied the motion, stating it was his impression that the juror “was reluctantly saying ‘reluctant,’ ” and that under those circumstances the procedure he followed was appropriate.
The defendant appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. That Court agreed with the defendant that if the juror’s answer had been ambiguous the trial judge would have been required to take further steps to resolve the ambiguity. The Court concluded, however, that the trial judge did not find the response to be ambiguous, and affirmed on the ground that the finding of the trial judge was within the broad range of discretion properly afforded trial judges in such matters.
This Court granted the defendant’s petition for certiorari, and we reverse. We hold that the juror’s response was, under the circumstances, ambiguous, and that the action taken by the trial judge was not appropriate to resolve that ambiguity.
II.
In Lattisaw, a juror responded to the poll of the clerk by stating “yes, with reluctance.” This Court, in discussing the State’s contention that the trial judge found no ambiguity in the juror’s response, stated:
[T]he response, ‘yes, with reluctance,’ is demonstrably ambiguous in this case, where the record indicates that [the [293]
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JOHN F. McAULIFFE, Judge, Retired, Specially Assigned.
This case involves the question of whether a juror’s response to a poll of a verdict in a criminal case was ambiguous, and if so, whether the trial judge’s action properly resolved the ambiguity.
I.
Paul Renard Bishop was tried in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on charges of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. At the conclusion of deliberations following a two-day trial, the foreman of the jury announced a verdict of guilty on both counts. Defense counsel requested that the jury be polled. The first two jurors answered “yes, it is” to the clerk’s question of whether their verdict was the same as the foreman’s verdict. The third juror questioned in the poll responded differently—he said “uhh, reluctantly, yes.” 1 The defendant’s attorney immediately requested a bench conference, and the following colloquy took place:
LDEFENSE COUNSEL]: I thought I heard that juror when he initially came out and was questioned is there a verdict, I thought I heard the juror say no and then when the court asked and who shall say for you that juror didn’t [290]*290respond. Now that juror says in response “Reluctantly, yes.”
I would ask the court to send the jury back, keep that juror out here and inquire of him. I don’t think “Reluctantly, yes” is an appropriate response at this point in the case.
[PROSECUTOR]: He said yes. I mean, he could be reluctant on any number of grounds. I’m reluctant because of the evidence. I’m reluctant because I feel bad for the guy. I mean, they have been in for two and a half hours and he hasn’t, I mean I think they were very carefully instructed that it should be a unanimous verdict.
THE COURT: All right, here is what I’m going to do. I’m not going to send them back. I’m going to ask the clerk to simply start over and ask the jurors again. As you call each name just say is the foreman’s verdict your verdict. That is the way to ask it. Is the foreman’s verdict your verdict?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would ask you before doing that is to tell the jury—. At that point I think it becomes coercive. He has expressed reluctance. To then do it in front of the other jurors I think is coercive. I would ask the court then before saying that to tell them that if it is not a unanimous verdict that they can deliberate further, there can be other results.
But I think it is coercive now to start over again when you stopped at that point because that juror says “Reluctantly, yes.” I think the court should get some voir dire of that juror.
THE COURT: I don’t think it is coercive. I disagree.
In open court, the judge then instructed the clerk to “start polling the jury again and start with the first juror as you did.” This time all jurors answered in the affirmative, without adding qualifying words of any kind. The judge then instructed the'clerk to “hearken the jury” and the following occurred:
THE CLERK: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, hearken to your verdict as it stands recorded. Your foreman [291]*291sayeth that Paul Bishop is guilty of the matters whereof he stands indicted. And so you all say?
JURY: Yes.
Defense counsel again asked to approach the bench, and the following conference took place:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Again, ... juror number four did not respond to that, did not say yes. I would move for a mistrial at this time. He has, except for when the court went through a procedure which focused on him, he has not responded affirmatively that this is his verdict except for “Reluctantly, yes.” He has not responded to the questions asked of the court.
He clearly has reservations and I think it is inappropriate to enroll this verdict.
[PROSECUTOR]: Just for the record because I do not, I honestly don’t know whether he responded to the general group questions or not; I didn’t watch him. But as to the individual question he obviously did very specifically answer “Yes” on the second round after saying “Yes, reluctantly” on the first.
I don’t want the record to be barren of any expression as to whether that definitely took place or not because I didn’t watch his lips or listen for him individually as to the group type questions about the foreman’s verdict.
THE COURT: All right. All right, your exception is noted. I’m not going to grant your motion.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Will the court inquire as to that last question again?
THE COURT: No. No. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, thank you very much. You are excused.
Before the jury left, however, there was another bench conference at the request of defense counsel. On this occasion, he again moved for a mistrial, citing Lattisaw v. State, 329 Md. 339, 619 A.2d 548 (1993), and arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to either send the jury back for additional deliberation after appropriate instructions or questioning the reluctant juror in a non-coercive manner. He stated that the [292]*292situation was similar to that of Lattisaw, in that the reluctant juror “was visibly upset at the time and paused for a long time and answered very briefly when asked about his verdict.” The prosecutor responded that
in terms of him being visibly upset, although his statement would suggest that, I did not see anything in terms of tears or face discoloration or anything else that made it appear that he was particularly upset other than the words that he expressed.
The trial judge denied the motion, stating that “starting over ... was not coercive.”
The issue was again argued during the hearing of the defendant’s motion for a new trial. The trial judge denied the motion, stating it was his impression that the juror “was reluctantly saying ‘reluctant,’ ” and that under those circumstances the procedure he followed was appropriate.
The defendant appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. That Court agreed with the defendant that if the juror’s answer had been ambiguous the trial judge would have been required to take further steps to resolve the ambiguity. The Court concluded, however, that the trial judge did not find the response to be ambiguous, and affirmed on the ground that the finding of the trial judge was within the broad range of discretion properly afforded trial judges in such matters.
This Court granted the defendant’s petition for certiorari, and we reverse. We hold that the juror’s response was, under the circumstances, ambiguous, and that the action taken by the trial judge was not appropriate to resolve that ambiguity.
II.
In Lattisaw, a juror responded to the poll of the clerk by stating “yes, with reluctance.” This Court, in discussing the State’s contention that the trial judge found no ambiguity in the juror’s response, stated:
[T]he response, ‘yes, with reluctance,’ is demonstrably ambiguous in this case, where the record indicates that [the [293]*293juror] was upset and shaking her head and that the trial court recognized that there was ‘some reluctance on her part.’ While there is no telling exactly why [the juror] was reluctant, one distinct possibility, among many, is that she was genuinely uncertain as to the fact of Lattisaw’s guilt and may have assented to the verdict despite serious misgivings as to its correctness. If [the juror’s] reluctance went to the accuracy of the verdict itself, then her assent to the finding of guilt was not, in Hochheimer’s words, ‘free and unqualified.’
Id. 329 Md. at 346, 619 A.2d 548. Although the determination of whether a particular response by a juror is ambiguous will ordinarily be within the trial court’s discretion, we think it clear that the response in this case was ambiguous. It was simply impossible to tell from the response whether the juror’s reluctance went to the accuracy of the verdict, or to some other reason. As we pointed out in Lattisaw, the very purpose of polling the jurors is to be certain that the verdict is being given with “free and unqualified” assent of each of the jurors, and the response given in this case did not fulfill that purpose.
Nor are we persuaded that the trial judge in this case did not consider the response ambiguous. He obviously felt the need for some clarification, because he did not simply direct the clerk to resume polling, but rather directed that the clerk begin anew. The prosecutor also recognized the ambiguity, stating that the juror might be saying he is “reluctant because of the evidence,” or that he is “reluctant because I feel bad for the guy.”
The principal question in this case is not whether the juror’s response was ambiguous. It was. The question is whether the trial judge erred in attempting to clear the ambiguity by having the clerk begin the poll anew. In Lattisaw, we addressed the options that are available to a trial judge in this situation:
To clear the ambiguity in [the juror’s] verdict, the trial court may have employed either of two options. The safest [294]*294course would be for the court to send the jury out for further deliberations in accordance with Maryland Rule 4-327(e) ... with the simple instruction that their verdict must be unanimous. Alternatively, the trial court may attempt to clarify the juror’s ambiguous response by questioning the juror directly. In doing so, however, the court must be careful not to influence or coerce the juror’s decision during the course of the questioning.
Lattisaw, 329 Md. at 347, 619 A.2d 548 (footnote omitted).
The trial judge did not elect either of those options. Instead, having halted the poll after the third responding juror’s reluctant response, he instructed the clerk, in the hearing of the jury, to “start polling the jury again and start with the first juror as you did.” In so doing, he erred. We emphasized in Lattisaw that
a court does not clarify an ambiguous response by compelling an end to the ambiguity. For a trial court to demand a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer ordinarily is improper compulsion.
Id. at 348, 619 A.2d 548.
The course followed by the trial judge generated a significant possibility that the reluctant juror felt some compulsion to give the response that had proven acceptable as opposed to the one that was obviously unacceptable. The juror had heard two jurors before him say “yes” or “yes, it is,” and observed that the poll went on. He knew that when he gave his answer it was unacceptable, because there was an immediate bench conference and the judge directed the clerk to begin again. The juror may well have understood from that scenario that the judge would accept only a “yes” or “no” answer. The procedure employed did not resolve the ambiguity, because it is impossible to determine whether the subsequent “yes” was a product of compulsion or represented the requisite unanimity. The conviction must be reversed, and a new trial granted.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT
[295]*295
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THAT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL; COSTS TO BE PAID BY MONTGOMERY COUNTY.