Bishop Leonard Regional Catholic School v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review

593 A.2d 28, 140 Pa. Commw. 428, 1991 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 335

• Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 12, 1991
• Docket: 1282 C.D. 1990
• Status: Published

Opinions

McGINLEY, Judge.

Bishop Leonard Regional Catholic School (Bishop Leonard) appeals from an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) granting unemployment compensation benefits to Maria Wesley (Claimant).¹

Claimant was last employed by Bishop Leonard as a fifth and sixth grade, math and science teacher at a final rate of $11,000 per year. Her last day of work was December 22, 1989. The relevant facts, as found by the Board, are as follows:

3. The school has a policy providing as follows:

1.2 The Parish shall retain the prerogative to dismiss a teacher for serious public immorality, public scandal or public rejection of official teachings, doctrine, or laws of the Catholic Church. In the event that the Parish exercises such prerogative, the grievance procedure in this Handbook shall not be applicable. Such a termination would, however, be subject to review under the Code for the Assurance of Due Process of the Diocess of Pittsburgh.

4. Claimant did not sign a contract of employment in which she recognized the employer’s right to dismiss a teacher who violated a law of the church.

5. Claimant, who is Catholic, entered into a relationship with a non-Catholic and they planned to be married on December 23, 1989.

6. Claimant did not cohabit with her fiance.

7. Claimant’s fiance was divorced from a Catholic woman who subsequently initiated annulment proceedings. The marriage has not been annulled by the Catholic Church.

8. Because claimant’s fiance’s first marriage was to a Catholic and has not been annulled, he and claimant were unable to be married in the Catholic Church, so they decided to be married in a Presbyterian Church.

9. On or about December 13,1989, claimant also told the principal, a Catholic nun, of her intentions to be married to a divorced man in the Presbyterian Church.

10. The principal told claimant she was unsure of what to do and that she needed to get in touch with the Diocesan Office.

11. About an hour later, the principal informed claimant she was terminated for violating a law of the Church.

12. The principal asked claimant to stay on until December 22, 1989, claimant’s last day of work.

13. Claimant subsequently married her fiance on December 23, 1989.

Board’s Decision, May 23, 1990, at 1-2. The Board affirmed the referee’s granting of benefits² and concluded that “Claimant’s actions do not rise to the level of willful misconduct ... [s]he did not violate a law of the church prior to the employer’s decision to terminate her.” Board's decision at 2-3.

On appeal Bishop Leonard argues: 1) that the Board erred in concluding Claimant’s conduct did not constitute willful misconduct; 2) that the Board’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence; and 3) that the Board’s decision violates Bishop Leonard’s first and fourteenth amendment rights by imposing a burdensome tax on religion. It is Claimant’s position that Bishop Leonard’s policy is ambiguous and that the denial of benefits on the basis of religious preference furthers the establishment of a particular religion.³ Additionally, the Board and Claimant contend that Claimant was discharged before the alleged willful misconduct occurred.

Our scope of review is limited to determining whether there has been a constitutional violation or an error of law and whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704; Kirkwood v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 106 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 92, 525 A.2d 841 (1987).

Initially, Bishop Leonard argues that Claimant’s actions constitute willful misconduct because she was informed that marriage to her fiance, prior to an annulment, would be a public rejection of the laws of the Church, thereby subjecting her to termination according to its policy. Bishop Leonard further argues that Claimant did not have good cause for her conduct. Claimant argues that Bishop Leonard’s policy is ambiguous and asserts that the term “public rejection” as it appears in the policy is subject to different interpretations. Claimant maintains that she did not know that her marriage would constitute a “public rejection” of the laws of the Catholic Church subjecting her to dismissal.

The question of whether conduct rises to the level of willful misconduct is a question of law to be determined by this Court. Fritz v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 66 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 492, 446 A.2d 330 (1982). Willful misconduct is defined as conduct that represents a wanton and willful disregard of an employer’s interest, deliberate violation of rules, disregard of standards of behavior which an employer can rightfully expect from his employee, or negligence which manifests culpability, wrongful intent, evil design, or intentional and substantial disregard for the employer’s interest or employee’s duties and obligations. Frick v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 31 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 198, 375 A.2d 879 (1977). “Where the willful misconduct is based upon a violation of an employer rule or policy, the employer must establish the existence of the rule or policy and that the employee was aware of it.” Sauer v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 110 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 103, 108, 531 A.2d 1174, 1176 (1987). A violation of a known and reasonable rule establishes willful misconduct. Williams v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 109 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 329, 531 A.2d 88 (1987).

In the present controversy, Bishop Leonard instituted a policy prohibiting its teachers from publicly rejecting “the official teachings, doctrine, or laws of the Catholic Church.” Teacher Handbook, Chapter I, Teacher Requirements, Certified Record (C.R.), Item No. 3. Father Lawrence Donardo (Fr. Donardo), Chancellor for the Diocese Of Pittsburgh, testified that “[mjarriage as a sacrament ... is a public action” and that “when people enter marriage, whether they enter marriage within the realm of the church by its rule or enter marriage somewhere else, they are making a public proclamation that they are accepting to be married to another person.” Notes of Testimony, February 21, 1990 (N.T.), at 7. Fr. Donardo stated Claimant’s marriage was invalid because it was a public rejection of the Church’s law which holds that marriage is indissoluble. Fr. Donardo stated that “a person who violates the church’s law, proclaims that they, in fact, violated the church’s law” and that “because it’s in the public forum, automatically is a public repudiation of that particular law.” N.T. at 7. This policy applied to Catholics and non-Catholics.⁴

A review of the record reveals Claimant taught in the Catholic school system beginning in August of 1987. Although Claimant did not sign a contract of employment with Bishop Leonard⁵, Claimant was informed by Bishop Leonard that her marriage was a violation of its policy and would result in her termination. Claimant testified that she notified Sister Dorothy on December 13, 1989, of her intention to marry. Sister Dorothy, after contacting the diocese office, informed Claimant that her marriage would result in her termination. N.T. at 14. Claimant acknowledged that she was informed “exactly what rule [she] was breaking ... in the handbook.” N.T. at 14. Claimant maintains that because she did not communicate her marriage plans to her students that her marriage did not reflect on her ability to teach math and science. We disagree.

Fr. Donardo testified that Catholic teachers are expected to be role models for their students in and out of the classroom and that their failure to follow the Catholic teachings compromises their effectiveness in the classroom.⁶ “The teacher is employed by a religious organization, subject to the direction and discipline of religious authorities, and works in a system dedicated to rearing children in a particular faith.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2114, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). We agree that Claimant’s conduct directly reflected on her ability to perform her assigned duties and adversely affected the interest of Bishop Leonard.

Bishop Leonard next argues that there is substantial evidence to support a finding that Claimant violated its policy. Specifically, Bishop Leonard argues that Claimant remained employed during the time that she was in compliance with the policy and that she was discharged after it became apparent that the marriage would take place on December 23, 1989. The Board and Claimant maintain that Claimant did not violate Bishop Leonard’s policy because Claimant was terminated as a result of her intention to marry and not because of her marriage.

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Pine Haven Residential Care Home v. Department of Public Welfare, 99 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 1, 512 A.2d 59 (1986). In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings, we must examine the testimony in the light most favorable to the prevailing, party, giving that party the benefit of any inference which can be drawn logically and reasonably from the evidence. Johnson v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 94 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 24, 502 A.2d 738 (1986).

The Board found that, on December 13, 1989, the principal of Bishop Leonard “informed Claimant she was terminated for violating a law of the church.” Board’s Findings of Fact Nos. 9 and 11 at 2. A review of the record fails to support the Board’s findings. In fact, Bishop Leonard and Claimant agree that Claimant was terminated because of her marriage. At the hearing before the referee, counsel for Bishop Leonard stated that “[i]n this case claimant, after discussing the fact that her planned marriage would be in violation of the rules of the school, went forward with her marriage and subsequently, her employment terminated on this basis.” N.T. at 3. Counsel for Claimant stated “she [Claimant] was forced to marry outside of the catholic church and a result of that situation, the school terminated her employment.” ⁷ N.T. at 4. Further, Claimant’s own testimony corroborates that she was terminated because of her marriage. Claimant testified that “it was just a matter of an hour she [principal] came back and said, you know, you have to be terminated.” N.T. at 14. (emphasis added). Claimant remained employed as long as she was in compliance with Bishop Leonard’s policy or until December 22, 1989.

Lastly, Claimant argues that her marriage was in compliance with the laws of Pennsylvania and that a denial of benefits based on religious dogma constitutes an unconstitutional establishment of religion.

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion____” U.S. Constitution, Amendment I. Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution relevantly provides that “no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.” The primary purpose of the Establishment Clause is to prevent “the sponsorship, financial support and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.” Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1411, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970).

Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), 43 P.S. § 802(e)⁸ provides in pertinent part that “[a]n employee shall be ineligible for compensation for any week ... (e) [i]n which unemployment is due to [her] discharge ... from work for willful misconduct connected with [her] work.” As stated earlier, Bishop Leonard established the existence of a reasonable policy, that Claimant was aware of the policy and that her violation of policy constituted willful misconduct. Claimant argues that denying her benefits because her marriage is a violation of Bishop Leonard’s policy serves to advance the Catholic religion.

In Lemon the United States Supreme Court set out a three-pronged test⁹ to determine. whether “the Government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influences.” Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 328, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 2864, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987) (emphasis in original).

In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987), Paula Hobbie was employed by Lawton and Company (Employer), a jeweler, for two and one-half years. In April of 1984, Paula Hobbie informed her Employer that she was to become a practicing Seventh-Day Adventist and that she would no longer be able to work from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday. Paula Hobbie was terminated and her claim for unemployment compensation benefits was denied because of “misconduct connected with ... work.” Fla.Stat. § 443.101(l)(a) (1985). The Unemployment Appeals Commission (Appeals Commission) affirmed the denial of benefits. “Hobbie challenged the Appeals Commission’s order in the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeals” and “that court summarily affirmed the Appeals Commission.” Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 139, 107 S.Ct. at 1048. The United States Supreme Court reversed determining that “[u]nder our precedent, the Appeals Commission’s disqualification of ... [Paula Hobbie] from receipt of benefits violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 139, 140, 107 S.Ct. at 1048 (footnote omitted). The United States Supreme Court also rejected the Appeals Commission’s argument that the award of benefits would violate the Establishment Clause. In Hobbie the United States Supreme Court determined that “[t]his Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 144-145, 107 S.Ct. at 1051 (footnote omitted).

In Corporation of Presiding Bishop, the United States Supreme Court also recognized that the accommodation of the religious beliefs of the employer does not violate the Establishment Clause. The United States Supreme Court stated:

[R]eligious groups have been better able to advance their purposes on account of many laws that have passed constitutional muster: for example, the property tax exemption at issue in Walz v. Tax Comm’n supra, or the loans of school books to school children, including parochial school students, upheld in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968). A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose.

Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 336-337, 107 S.Ct. at 2869 (emphasis in original).

A denial of benefits pursuant to the Act, secular in nature, is not an excessive entanglement of government and religion. The failure to charge the coffers of Bishop Leonard because of Claimant’s failure to follow its policy does not advance or promote a particular religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Commonwealth accommodates Bishop Leonard by allowing it to advance its religion and as a result to discharge any employee in violation of its policy and the teachings and laws of the Church.

Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Board.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 12th day of June, 1991, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, dated May 23, 1990, at B-282301, is reversed.

KELLEY, J., dissents.

1 . Claimant has intervened in the present controversy pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1531(a).

2 . The referee determined that Bishop Leonard’s policy was unreasonable because it forced Claimant to choose between marriage and her job and as a result Claimant had good cause for violating the policy.

3 . The Board and Claimant assert that this Court is able to render a decision as to the unemployment compensation issues and need not address the constitutional issues. See Brief of the Board at 5 and Brief of Claimant at 7.

4 . Fr. Donardo testified that "a non-catholic teacher who marries a catholic person and this marriage is not in conformity with the rules of the church ... that person would be subject to ... discharge.” N.T. at 9.

5 . Paragraph four of the standard contract for full time lay teachers states:

Teacher recognizes the religious nature of the Catholic School and agrees that Employer has the right to dismiss a teacher for ... public rejection of the official teachings, doctrine or laws of the Roman Catholic Church, thereby terminating any and all rights that the Teacher may have hereunder____

Contract For Elementary School Full Time Lay Teachers, Item No. 3.

6 . Fr. Donardo stated:

Very briefly ... the primary purpose is to teach ... young people, about the catholic faith. And therefore, the people who happen to teach there, happen to be responsible for the school. The primary interest is that they not only be skilled teachers, but that they also have within their own minds the philosophy of catholic education and their own actions as ... as obviously that they live out the faith both the Christian gospel and obviously the catholic faith____

N.T. at 10.

7 . The referee confirmed that there was no factual dispute between the parties. The referee stated:

So, where ... does that leave us? ... To proceed, claimant went ahead with the marriage ... and then was terminated by the employer under the policy you have been discussing. Okay, well why don’t you call a witness, then, for the purposes that we just outlined.

N.T. at 6.

8 . Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess.P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 751-914.

9 . The Lemon test requires that the law serve “a secular legislative purpose"; that the law have "a principal or primary effect ... that neither advances or inhibits religion"; and that the law does not promote an excessive entanglement of government and religion. Id. at 612, 91 S.Ct. at 2111.