UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-10118-RGS
BIOPOINT, INC.
v.
ANDREW DICKHAUT & CATAPULT STAFFING, LLC d/b/a CATAPULT SOLUTIONS GROUP
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, A NEW TRIAL, REMITTITUR, AND TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT
June 22, 2023
STEARNS, D.J. On June 22, 2022, a jury found defendants Andrew Dickhaut and Catapult Staffing, LLC (Catapult) liable for the misappropriation of trade secrets from plaintiff BioPoint, Inc. (BioPoint). The court thereafter held a bench trial on BioPoint’s equitable claims for unjust enrichment, violation of the Massachusetts Fair Business Practices Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (Chapter 93A), and an award of enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees. The court issued its ruling on April 25, 2023, finding that Catapult was unjustly enriched through its appropriation of BioPoint’s trade secret information and that defendants had engaged in unfair and deceptive acts within the meaning of Chapter 93A. The court also awarded Biopoint enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees. Defendants now move for judgment as a matter
of law, for a new trial, for remittitur, and to amend the judgment. For the following reasons, the court will deny each request. I. Judgment as a Matter of Law A verdict may be set aside under Rule 50(b) only on a “determination
that the evidence could lead a reasonable person to only one conclusion.” Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original), quoting Hiraldo-Cancel v. Aponte, 925 F.2d 10, 12 n.2 (1st Cir. 1991).
Defendants cannot meet this stringent standard on any of the jury claims for which they seek judgment as a matter of law. a. Tortious Interference The court will not disturb the jury’s finding that defendants tortiously
interfered with BioPoint’s prospective business relationship with Candida Fratazzi. While they claim that it is “legally impossible” to attribute BioPoint’s losses to their tortious conduct, Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. [Dkt # 237] at 2, the evidence indicated that Catapult used BioPoint’s
information about Fratazzi to recruit her at BioPoint’s expense, see Hunt Test., Jury Trial Day 2 Tr. [Dkt # 215] at 48; Trial Ex. 20; Trial Ex. 28; see also 4/25/2023 Order [Dkt # 227] ¶¶ 65-68 (noting the temporal proximity between the chain of events leading up to Fratazzi’s placement at Vedanta as additional evidentiary support for the jury’s implicit finding that Fratazzi’s
ultimate placement at Vedanta was a direct result of the information supplied to Dickhaut by Leah Attis). b. Trade Secret Misappropriation The court will not depart from the jury verdict and its bench trial
finding that Catapult misappropriated BioPoint’s trade secrets. Defendants argue that neither the jury nor the court identified the misappropriated trade secrets, or found that the purloined trade secrets were actually exploited, or
found that Catapult’s profits were attributable to the use of BioPoint’s trade secrets. These assertions are blatantly incorrect. See 4/25/2023 Order ¶¶ 11, 59 (noting the various forms of BioPoint’s trade secret information that Attis disclosed to defendants and finding that defendants misappropriated
BioPoint’s confidential trade secret information with respect to Vedanta, Shire, Candida Fratazzi, Stephen Haworth, and Chris Da Costa); id. ¶ 44 (noting that the jury had already determined that Catapult had used BioPoint’s trade secrets); id. ¶¶ 42-45, 65-71 (finding Catapult’s Vedanta
profits attributable to defendants’ trade secret misappropriation). c. Chapter 93A Claim Defendants merely cite to their proposed findings of fact to support the
assertion that the evidence does not support a finding of a Chapter 93A violation. Even if Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) governed bench trials, which it does not, the court cited evidence to the contrary in its bench trial order. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 51, 52 (noting that the jury’s findings of Catapult’s wholesale trade
secret misappropriation and rampant tortious interference with BioPoint’s clients were independently sufficient to establish a willful Chapter 93A violations); id. ¶ 75 (discussing record evidence of Dickhaut’s knowledge and
willfulness). II. Remittitur or Amendment of the Judgment Relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) is to be granted “sparingly” and “only when the original judgment evidenced a manifest error of law, if there is
newly discovered evidence, or in certain other narrow situations.” Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2007). A party cannot use a motion to amend “to advance arguments it should have
developed prior to judgment,” or to “regurgitate ‘old arguments previously considered and rejected.’” Id., quoting first Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 104 (1st Cir. 2006), then Nat’l Metal Finishing Co., Inc. v. BarclaysAmerican/Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 1990).
For purposes of a remittitur, “the award must exceed ‘any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based upon the evidence before it.’” Climent-Garcia v. Autoridad de Transporte Maritmo y Las Islas Municipo, 754 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting Wortley v. Camplin, 333
F.3d 284, 297 (1st Cir. 2003). Remittitur is appropriate only when a verdict is “grossly excessive, inordinate, shocking to the conscience of the court, or so high that it would be a denial of justice to permit it to stand.” Correa v.
Hospital San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1197 (1st Cir. 1995), quoting Segal v. Gilbert Color Sys., Inc., 746 F.2d 78, 81 (1st Cir. 1984). a. Remittitur of Gross Profits The court will explain, for at least the third time, why defendants
cannot rely on their proffered net profits evidence. Defendants yet again argue that awarding gross profits as a sum total is inappropriate and that this figure should be offset by sales commissions. The court cannot do so in light of defendants’ own decisions made during discovery. Defendants did not
produce setoff evidence during discovery despite it being requested by BioPoint and defendants having the information. See Salustri Test., Bench Trial Day 1 Tr. [Dkt # 210] at 110-114. They cannot stonewall during the discovery process, see, e.g., Trial Ex. 120 at 19-20 (BioPoint requesting from defendants documents sufficient to show Catapult’s revenue and profit and
defendants rejecting the request as a “fishing expedition”), and then seek to bring this evidence into the case only after it becomes advantageous to do so. To permit this would encourage the very behavior Rule 37(c)(1) seeks to prevent.
b.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-10118-RGS
BIOPOINT, INC.
v.
ANDREW DICKHAUT & CATAPULT STAFFING, LLC d/b/a CATAPULT SOLUTIONS GROUP
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, A NEW TRIAL, REMITTITUR, AND TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT
June 22, 2023
STEARNS, D.J. On June 22, 2022, a jury found defendants Andrew Dickhaut and Catapult Staffing, LLC (Catapult) liable for the misappropriation of trade secrets from plaintiff BioPoint, Inc. (BioPoint). The court thereafter held a bench trial on BioPoint’s equitable claims for unjust enrichment, violation of the Massachusetts Fair Business Practices Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (Chapter 93A), and an award of enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees. The court issued its ruling on April 25, 2023, finding that Catapult was unjustly enriched through its appropriation of BioPoint’s trade secret information and that defendants had engaged in unfair and deceptive acts within the meaning of Chapter 93A. The court also awarded Biopoint enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees. Defendants now move for judgment as a matter
of law, for a new trial, for remittitur, and to amend the judgment. For the following reasons, the court will deny each request. I. Judgment as a Matter of Law A verdict may be set aside under Rule 50(b) only on a “determination
that the evidence could lead a reasonable person to only one conclusion.” Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original), quoting Hiraldo-Cancel v. Aponte, 925 F.2d 10, 12 n.2 (1st Cir. 1991).
Defendants cannot meet this stringent standard on any of the jury claims for which they seek judgment as a matter of law. a. Tortious Interference The court will not disturb the jury’s finding that defendants tortiously
interfered with BioPoint’s prospective business relationship with Candida Fratazzi. While they claim that it is “legally impossible” to attribute BioPoint’s losses to their tortious conduct, Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. [Dkt # 237] at 2, the evidence indicated that Catapult used BioPoint’s
information about Fratazzi to recruit her at BioPoint’s expense, see Hunt Test., Jury Trial Day 2 Tr. [Dkt # 215] at 48; Trial Ex. 20; Trial Ex. 28; see also 4/25/2023 Order [Dkt # 227] ¶¶ 65-68 (noting the temporal proximity between the chain of events leading up to Fratazzi’s placement at Vedanta as additional evidentiary support for the jury’s implicit finding that Fratazzi’s
ultimate placement at Vedanta was a direct result of the information supplied to Dickhaut by Leah Attis). b. Trade Secret Misappropriation The court will not depart from the jury verdict and its bench trial
finding that Catapult misappropriated BioPoint’s trade secrets. Defendants argue that neither the jury nor the court identified the misappropriated trade secrets, or found that the purloined trade secrets were actually exploited, or
found that Catapult’s profits were attributable to the use of BioPoint’s trade secrets. These assertions are blatantly incorrect. See 4/25/2023 Order ¶¶ 11, 59 (noting the various forms of BioPoint’s trade secret information that Attis disclosed to defendants and finding that defendants misappropriated
BioPoint’s confidential trade secret information with respect to Vedanta, Shire, Candida Fratazzi, Stephen Haworth, and Chris Da Costa); id. ¶ 44 (noting that the jury had already determined that Catapult had used BioPoint’s trade secrets); id. ¶¶ 42-45, 65-71 (finding Catapult’s Vedanta
profits attributable to defendants’ trade secret misappropriation). c. Chapter 93A Claim Defendants merely cite to their proposed findings of fact to support the
assertion that the evidence does not support a finding of a Chapter 93A violation. Even if Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) governed bench trials, which it does not, the court cited evidence to the contrary in its bench trial order. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 51, 52 (noting that the jury’s findings of Catapult’s wholesale trade
secret misappropriation and rampant tortious interference with BioPoint’s clients were independently sufficient to establish a willful Chapter 93A violations); id. ¶ 75 (discussing record evidence of Dickhaut’s knowledge and
willfulness). II. Remittitur or Amendment of the Judgment Relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) is to be granted “sparingly” and “only when the original judgment evidenced a manifest error of law, if there is
newly discovered evidence, or in certain other narrow situations.” Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2007). A party cannot use a motion to amend “to advance arguments it should have
developed prior to judgment,” or to “regurgitate ‘old arguments previously considered and rejected.’” Id., quoting first Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 104 (1st Cir. 2006), then Nat’l Metal Finishing Co., Inc. v. BarclaysAmerican/Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 1990).
For purposes of a remittitur, “the award must exceed ‘any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based upon the evidence before it.’” Climent-Garcia v. Autoridad de Transporte Maritmo y Las Islas Municipo, 754 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2014), quoting Wortley v. Camplin, 333
F.3d 284, 297 (1st Cir. 2003). Remittitur is appropriate only when a verdict is “grossly excessive, inordinate, shocking to the conscience of the court, or so high that it would be a denial of justice to permit it to stand.” Correa v.
Hospital San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1197 (1st Cir. 1995), quoting Segal v. Gilbert Color Sys., Inc., 746 F.2d 78, 81 (1st Cir. 1984). a. Remittitur of Gross Profits The court will explain, for at least the third time, why defendants
cannot rely on their proffered net profits evidence. Defendants yet again argue that awarding gross profits as a sum total is inappropriate and that this figure should be offset by sales commissions. The court cannot do so in light of defendants’ own decisions made during discovery. Defendants did not
produce setoff evidence during discovery despite it being requested by BioPoint and defendants having the information. See Salustri Test., Bench Trial Day 1 Tr. [Dkt # 210] at 110-114. They cannot stonewall during the discovery process, see, e.g., Trial Ex. 120 at 19-20 (BioPoint requesting from defendants documents sufficient to show Catapult’s revenue and profit and
defendants rejecting the request as a “fishing expedition”), and then seek to bring this evidence into the case only after it becomes advantageous to do so. To permit this would encourage the very behavior Rule 37(c)(1) seeks to prevent.
b. Remittitur or Amendment of Unjust Enrichment Award Defendants attempt to relitigate the issues with respect to their argument for remitting or amending the unjust enrichment award, once
again arguing that Catapult’s profits had nothing to do with BioPoint’s trade secrets. The court will not further address these regurgitated arguments. Defendants also request that the court specify that the unjust enrichment award is against Catapult only and not Dickhaut. The court will
not. The case on which defendants rely, Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020), did not address situations in which multiple parties engage in concerted wrongdoing. Id. at 1945. Following Liu, courts have found that parties can be held joint-and-severally liable where the individual “collaborated with
and ranks high in the firm.” SEC v. Bahgat, 2023 WL 3491733, at *9 n.5 (W.D.N.Y. May 17, 2023). Such is the case here, where Dickhaut was Managing Director of Catapult’s Boston office and the court has found that the record supports the inference that Catapult executives were communicating with Dickhaut about his solicitation of BioPoint’s trade
secrets. See 4/25/2023 Order ¶ 73 n.4. c. Remittitur of Treble Damages Defendants’ argument that the Massachusetts Uniform Trade Secrets Act (MUTSA) supersedes Chapter 93A is waived. See Crawford v. Clark, 578
F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 2009) (“We have emphasized that Rule 59(e) ‘. . . certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court
prior to the judgment.’”), quoting Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997). Defendants argue that they did not waive this argument because the court could have found a Chapter 93A violation based on something other than defendants’ theft of trade secrets. This argument fails
because the court stated (without objection) prior to the jury trial that the jury verdict on whether defendants stole BioPoint’s trade secrets would serve as the “factual predicate” of any eventual Chapter 93A determination. See 5/19/2022 Emergency Motion for Reconsideration Tr. [Dkt # 155] at 10-11.
Despite the warning, defendants did not raise the MUTSA argument prior to this post-bench trial motion. d. Attorneys’ Fees Defendants argue that MUTSA requires a finding of malice for
attorneys’ fees and that MUTSA supersedes Chapter 93A. For the same reasons stated above with respect to enhanced damages, this argument is waived. III. New Trial
A new trial under Rule 59 will be granted only “if [the court] believes that the outcome is against the clear weight of the evidence such that upholding the verdict will result in a miscarriage of justice.” Velazquez v.
Figueroa-Gomez, 996 F.2d 425, 427 (1st Cir. 1993). “A federal court may not set aside a jury verdict and direct the entry of a contrary verdict unless no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict adverse to the moving party.” Havinga v. Crowley Towing & Transp. Co., 24 F.3d 1480, 1483 (1st Cir.
1994). Defendants have not met this high burden. The jury reasonably found that Catapult and Dickhaut misappropriated BioPoint’s trade secrets. The court, as it is permitted to do under First Circuit law, see Makuc v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 835 F.2d 389, 294 (1st Cir. 1987), adopted the jury’s factual findings in finding that defendants had violated the Massachusetts Fair Business Practices Act and had misappropriated BioPoint’s trade secrets. The court also made independent findings that defendants’ trade secret misappropriation led to their unjust enrichment. See 4/25/2023
Order ¶¶ 60-71. No new trial is warranted. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, the court will DENY defendants’ motions.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns ___________ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE