Bilson v. The City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 23, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-02479
StatusUnknown

This text of Bilson v. The City of New York (Bilson v. The City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bilson v. The City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

□□ USDC SDNY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOCUMENT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #:

Plaintiff, -against- —— 25-CV-2479 (MMG) THE CITY OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; DEDER OY EEEMICE RIKER’S ISLAND; RIKER’S ISLAND MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, Defendants. MARGARET M. GARNETT, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who currently is incarcerated at Mid-State Correctional Facility, brings this action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights when he was detained on Rikers Island. Named as Defendants are the City of New York, the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”), Rikers Island, and the Rikers Island Medical Department. The Court construes the complaint as asserting constitutional claims under Section 1983 that Defendants failed to protect Plaintiff against attack by another incarcerated individual, failed to provide him with adequate medical care, used excessive force against him, and deprived him of his property without due process, as well as claims under state law. By order dated April 15, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees..!

' Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal references omitted). DISCUSSION A. Claims against New York City Department of Correction, Rikers Island, and Rikers Island Medical Department Plaintiff’s claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N-Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson vy. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court must also dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Rikers Island and Rikers Island Medical Department. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). Rikers Island — an island in the middle of the East River — and the departments located on that island, are not “persons” for the purpose of Section 1983. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against DOC, Rikers Island, and Rikers Island Medical Department for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ai). B. Claims for failure to protect Plaintiff alleges that unspecified correction officers failed to protect him from being slashed by another incarcerated person. Prison officials are required to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners, including protecting them from harm caused by other prisoners. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994): Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1997). Because Plaintiff was detained on Rikers Island at the time of the events giving rise to his claims, the Court assumes for the purposes of this order that he was a pretrial detainee and that his claims are therefore analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29, 33 n.9 (2d Cir. 2017). A pretrial detainee asserting a failure to protect claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause must plead two elements: (1) an “objective” element, which requires a showing that the risk of harm is sufficiently serious, and (2) a “mental” element, which requires a showing that the officer knew or should have known of the risk of serious harm but acted with deliberate indifference to that risk. Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29; Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Evidence that a risk was obvious or otherwise must have been known to a defendant may be sufficient for a fact finder to conclude that the defendant was actually aware of the risk.” (quotation marks omitted)). The mere negligence of a correctional official is not a basis for a claim of a federal constitutional violation under Section 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 US. 327, 335-36 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986); Morales v. New York State

Dept of Corr., 842 F.2d 27, 28 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[A] prisoner cannot base a federal civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on claims of a negligent failure of state prison officials to protect him from injury at the hands of another inmate[.]”). Here, Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to state a failure-to-protect claim because he does not satisfy the second element. While Plaintiff alleges that unidentified correction officials were “negligent” and that “there was reasonable and probable cause that an event of personal injury was suspected to transpire” (ECF 1, at 4), Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that any correction official knew or should have known that he was at risk of attack by the other incarcerated individual. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 for failure to protect for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) Gi).

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Bluebook (online)
Bilson v. The City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bilson-v-the-city-of-new-york-nysd-2025.