Billy Merritt v. Gordon H. Faulkner

823 F.2d 1150, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797

Opinions

PER CURIAM.

This appeal involves a challenge to the validity of a settlement of an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The district court found that the settlement agreement was valid and enforceable and that neither party had breached the agreement. We affirm.

I.

The plaintiff, Billy Merritt, brought a section 1983 suit alleging that certain prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical problems while he was an inmate at Indiana State Prison. Merritt initially brought this suit pro se, but this court on an earlier appeal held that Merritt had the right to a court-appointed lawyer. Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir.1983). Because the facts are set forth in that first appeal, we will repeat them here only to the extent necessary to evaluate the enforceability of the settlement agreement.

In July 1978, Merritt injured his left eye and complained of blurred vision to the officials of the Indiana State Prison where Merritt was an inmate. Several prison physicians examined Merritt, including the prison ophthalmologist who discovered a vitreous hemorrhage in Merritt’s left eye. Approximately one month later, Merritt was diagnosed as having sickle cell disease, which the prison ophthalmologist believed was related to Merritt’s eye condition. Approximately six months after the injury, Merritt was sent to an Indianapolis hospital for treatment of his left eye. The surgeons at the hospital performed a vitrecto-my (an operation to remove fluid from the eye) on the right eye, even though there were apparently no medical problems with that eye. Merritt alleges that subsequently the vision in his right eye deteriorated and he became functionally blind in both eyes.

The district court held a status conference on August 20, 1985 which was attended by Merritt, his counsel Ernest Beal, and counsel for the state defendants. At that conference the parties informed the court that they had reached an agreement whereby the case could be settled. Beal described the agreement to the court as follows:

Working under permission given to me by the client — my client, Mr. Merritt, the State and I have made some agreements which, I believe, are acceptable to my client which we believe will resolve the case.

One of the things that the State has agreed to do — and which I believe to be a very important part of the care and treatment for Mr. Merritt — is to make arrangements for the development of a treatment plan to deal with the current state of his visual condition and to deal with the future course of care.

We have talked among ourselves that the arrangements for and timetable for developing such a treatment plan ought to be something like 45 days from this date. We have talked about who should provide the direction for the development of that treatment plan, and the State has agreed to allow the University of Illinois Eye and Ear Infirmary, which performed the evaluation, to be the entity which develops the treatment plan; and it’s my understanding that the arrangements will be made for them to do so.

The development of that treatment plan may or may not involve another visit by Mr. Merritt to their facilities. If it does, it’s my understanding that we, the State and the plaintiff will allow this case to remain open, allow the Court to retain jurisdiction such that an application for habeas corpus relief may be granted, essentially at the parties’ consent so that Mr. Merritt may be transferred by the marshals to that facility.

I understand that if there’s a cost or expense associated with the care and treatment associated with the treatment plan, that that will be borne by the State.

It is understood that the treatment that will be required will be at the plaintiff’s option, obviously. He has the right to refuse it if he chooses. If he elects to have treatment provided, it is understood that it will be provided by the medical providers contracted by, supplied by the Department of Corrections.

We have asked that the treatment plan include two ingredients at a minimum. One is a provision for annual visual examinations, and the other is a provision that such emergency care as is necessary will be provided when it’s necessary.

The State has indicated that both of those conditions are reasonable and acceptable.

As an additional element of the resolution, we have agreed not to pursue and, indeed, to waive any claim for attorney’s fees or costs associated with the representation of the plaintiff. Obviously, the State has accepted that offer.

And I think that represents the agreement of the parties.

Merritt v. Faulkner, No. S-80-207, at 3-5 (N.D.Ind. Aug. 21, 1985) (transcript of status conference).

After confirming with counsel for the defendants that Beal’s description of the agreement was accurate, the district court judge made certain that Merritt understood and agreed with the terms under which the case was being settled:

The Court: All right. Mr. Merritt?

The Plaintiff: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: You may remain seated.

I take it that you understood and heard all of Mr. Beal’s remarks to me about the agreement that’s generally been concluded between yourself and the State?

The Plaintiff: Yes, sir, your Honor.

The Court: And do you understand that essentially the case is going to be settled, as I understand it, in consideration for the state providing you the opportunity to go to the Illinois facility and develop a treatment plan and then for the State to provide the medical services to you under that treatment plan?

The Plaintiff: Yes, sir, your Honor.

The Court: And is that agreeable with you?

The Plaintiff: Yes, sir, your Honor.

The Court: All right. Do you have any questions you want to ask me or Mr. Beal here in open court about the settlement?

The Plaintiff: No, sir, your Honor.

Id. at 5-6.

Pursuant to this agreement, Merritt was examined on January 8, 1986 by Dr. Howard C. Charles at the University of Illinois Sickle Cell Eye Clinic (the “Eye Clin ic”). In his report based on that examination, Dr. Charles briefly reviewed the history of Merritt’s vision condition. Although Merritt unquestionably suffers from some visual impairment, the precise extent of that impairment is unclear. During an examination performed at the Indiana School of Medicine on September 12, 1980, Merritt was found to have no light perception in both eyes; the diagnosis in that report was blindness of an undetermined etiology. Merritt first visited the University of Illinois Sickle Cell Eye Clinic on July 25, 1984, at which time he was examined by Dr. Ralph Paylor. Dr. Paylor found that Merritt had sickle cell disease, cataracts and a great deal of old vitreous hemorrhage in his left eye, and marked iris atrophy in both eyes. In addition, he found that Merritt had some light perception in both eyes. Dr. Paylor concluded that his examination revealed no “obvious reason for [Merritt’s] level of visual dysfunction,” but noted that the “lack of findings in the eyes itself do [sic] not preclude the possibility that the patient could be suffering from some disorder posterior to the eye that we are unable to see.”

During the January 8, 1986 examination held pursuant to the settlement agreement, Dr. Charles found that Merritt’s condition was unchanged from the time of the July 1984 visit. He stated, “[w]e still believe that based on the patient’s ocular examination, the visual acuity should be much better than light perception with projection.” ¹ In a letter dated February 18, 1986, Dr. Charles summarized his findings based on Merritt’s two examinations at the Eye Clinic. Dr. Charles concluded that Merritt’s loss of vision is incurable and likely to be permanent, and he recommended annual eye examinations to prevent further vision loss: There is no cure for this condition. Laser and surgical intervention is inappropriate. Because the changes involve the neural component of Mr. Merritt’s retina, we suspect that any changes present are permanent.

[W]e believe that [Merritt’s] vision loss is referable to choroidal and retinal ische-mia based on sickle cell retinopathy.

We suggest annual ophthalmologic exams to prevent further loss of vision from some of the other stigmata of sickle cell retinopathy (i.e. retinal neovasculari-zation). Given the extent of Mr. Merritt’s visual loss, we doubt that a referral to a low vision specialist for telescopic or magnified glasses would help,

II.

Merritt raises a number of related objections to the enforcement of the settlement agreement, including absence of a “meeting of the minds,” indefinite contract terms, unilateral mistake and lack of consideration. Merritt argues that the settlement reached at the status conference was only a preliminary agreement, the terms of which are too indefinite to be enforceable. Merritt also claims that he believed that the “treatment” promised in the agreement “was more than a mere visit to a clinic for a determination that his condition was non-curable.” Appellant’s Brief at 21. He argues that “on the bottom line, [he] received essentially nothing for dismissing his case.” Id. at 22.

We agree with the district court’s determination (to which we show considerable deference) that the agreement reached was a final settlement agreement containing the following elements:

1. That Merritt would be sent to the University of Illinois Sickle Cell Eye Clinic in Chicago, Illinois, for an examination and the development of a treatment plan to deal with Merritt’s vision condition;

2. That the Indiana Department of Corrections would arrange for the exami nation in Chicago, and that the costs of the examination would be borne by the Department of Corrections;

3. That any treatment plan recommended by the Eye Clinic would be provided by the Department of Corrections through physicians chosen by the Department, and all costs of such treatment would be borne by the state;

4. That Merritt could refuse such treatment if he chose to;

5. That the Department of Corrections would provide Merritt with an annual examination and any emergency treatment as would be necessary;

6. Beal would waive all costs and fees incurred in the action; and

7. That Merritt would dismiss the action with prejudice.

Merritt v. Faulkner, No. S-80-207, at 2 (N.D.Ind. Aug. 13, 1986) (order). These settlement terms are sufficiently definite to be enforceable. And Merritt did gain something valuable from the settlement. He was guaranteed, among other things, an eye examination and the development of a treatment plan by the University of Illinois Sickle Cell Eye Clinic, a clinic that Merritt’s attorney described as “the foremost facility in this country.”

Merritt very likely did expect that the treatment plan he would be provided pursuant to the agreement would be more extensive than a single visit to the Eye Clinic and subsequent annual eye examinations. That initial visit, however, revealed that his blindness was incurable and no further treatment was available. The settlement agreement did not guarantee that Merritt’s blindness would be cured, and Merritt could not have reasonably believed that it made that promise.

Now that his blindness has been diagnosed as incurable, Merritt may well regret having agreed to settle his suit as he did. Nonetheless, Merritt is bound by the terms of the settlement agreement. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of this case.

Affirmed.

Footnotes

1

. Dr. Charles also mentioned in his report that a Dr. Gerald Fishman had examined Merritt, but Dr. Charles did not have a copy of that report and thus did not comment on its findings. Dr. Fishman’s report is dated August 13, 1984 and concluded, "Although the exact level cannot be quantitated with great certainty, the probability exists that vision in the left eye is either within normal limits or is only minimally reduced. Regardless, with his ability to discriminate colors and have excellent stereo acuity, the patient's vision cannot be hand motion or light perception. The level must be appreciably better.”