The opinion of the court was delivered by
Miller, J.:
This is an appeal by the defendant, Shannon M. Murdock, from an order of the Shawnee District Court changing the custody of her daughter, Misty Dawn Bills, from Mrs. Murdock to Misty’s father, the plaintiff, Phillip Bills. In this proceeding we are called upon to interpret the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, K.S.A. 38-1301 et seq., to determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction of the matter of child custody under that act and, if jurisdiction is found, then to determine whether the trial court erred in exercising that jurisdiction. For clarity we will refer to the plaintiff as the father, to the defendant as the mother, and to the child by her given name.
The parties were divorced in Laramie County, Wyoming, on November 8, 1976. The Wyoming court granted the custody of Misty Dawn to her mother. The father was given reasonable visitation and was required to pay child support. The Wyoming court has not modified or changed its order.
The father moved from Wyoming to Maryland, and in 1978 moved to Topeka where he has since resided. In December, 1977, the parties had some disagreement, and the father has not paid the court-ordered support since that time. He has had Misty Dawn in his home for frequent visits and has bought her some clothing and has given her gifts. He has remarried and has two children.
The mother left Wyoming and she and her daughter moved to Missouri. They moved to Kansas for a brief time, then returned to Missouri. In 1979 they moved to Texas and have lived there for the past three years. The mother remarried and had three children.
[238]*238We need not describe in detail the homes and living arrangements of the parties, since those facts are not material to our decision. On June 22,1981, Misty Dawn came to Kansas to visit her father. He promised the mother that he would return Misty Dawn on August 7. On August 5 he filed this action in the District Court of Shawnee County against the mother, asking that custody be changed to him. On August 7, the mother called him; he did not mention the pending action but told her that he was unable to return Misty Dawn because of “scheduling problems at work.”
The mother was personally served with summons in Texas on August 10. Immediately, she came to Kansas and filed a petition for habeas corpus; a hearing was scheduled for August 31. She returned on that date; the hearing was held; the court consolidated the two cases, determined that it should give full faith and credit to the Wyoming decree, and restored the custody of Misty Dawn to her mother. The trial court also ordered the mother and child to return for a hearing of the custody case on September 22. In addition, the court ordered social studies of the homes of both parties.
On September 22, 1981, the consolidated cases came on for hearing. Mother and child returned from Texas and were present. The habeas action was dismissed as moot since custody had already been restored to the mother. Evidence was introduced in the custody matter, and the court then changed custody from mother to father. In announcing this ruling, the judge found that Wyoming now has no jurisdiction since father, mother, and child no longer live in or have any substantial connection with that state, and that both Kansas and Texas are the appropriate states to exercise jurisdiction. The court also found that it had jurisdiction under K.S.A. 38-1303(a)(2) because (1) it is in the best interests of the child that the Kansas court take jurisdiction and decide the case without further delay, (2) the father lives in Kansas and has significant connections with this state, and (3) the minor child has a significant connection with this state. In support of the latter conclusion, the judge said:
“[T]he child in question has a significant connection with this State since one parent lives as a resident now permanently within the State and the child has visited this summer for a period of a number of weeks and will now be presumably having some significant contact with that parent while in the State of Kansas either by way of visitation or custody, but, in any event, will have a child-parent relationship and that, therefore, the Court is persuaded that a significant connec[239]*239tion does exist particularly in view of the fact that the child was physically present at the time the action was commenced and also is physically present within the State now. However, the most important consideration is the continuing parental relationship of the parent who now resides within the State of Kansas.”
It is from this ruling that the mother appeals.
Did the trial court have jurisdiction of the proceeding before it? This issue must be decided under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, K.S.A. 38-1301 et seq., enacted by the legislature in 1978 and effective here since January 1, 1979. While we have mentioned that act in two cases, Beebe v. Chavez, 226 Kan. 591, 599, 602 P.2d 1279 (1979), and Nixon v. Nixon, 226 Kan. 218, 220, 596 P.2d 1238 (1979), the enactment was not the basis of either decision. In Beebe, the action arose in 1977, before the uniform act was adopted in this state. We cited it only to illustrate that the legislature had since made clear our long-standing rule that courts of this state could and should properly refuse to exercise jurisdiction, absent any showing of emergency or abuse, when a court of another state has continuing jurisdiction. [See also Jolly v. Avery, 220 Kan. 692, 556 P.2d 449 (1976), and Anderson v. Anderson, 214 Kan. 387, 520 P.2d 1239 (1974).] In Nixon, we cited the act, along with various sections of our divorce and alimony laws, K.S.A. 60-1601 et seq., to support our conclusion that a court of this state which first acquires jurisdiction over child custody matters in a divorce case retains that jurisdiction to the exclusion of other Kansas courts of concurrent jurisdiction. Neither Beebe nor Nixon is helpful here.
The first section of the uniform act states the purposes of the act. It reads in part:
“38-1301. ... (a) The general purposes of this act are to: (1) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state, to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
“(2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest of the child;
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
Miller, J.:
This is an appeal by the defendant, Shannon M. Murdock, from an order of the Shawnee District Court changing the custody of her daughter, Misty Dawn Bills, from Mrs. Murdock to Misty’s father, the plaintiff, Phillip Bills. In this proceeding we are called upon to interpret the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, K.S.A. 38-1301 et seq., to determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction of the matter of child custody under that act and, if jurisdiction is found, then to determine whether the trial court erred in exercising that jurisdiction. For clarity we will refer to the plaintiff as the father, to the defendant as the mother, and to the child by her given name.
The parties were divorced in Laramie County, Wyoming, on November 8, 1976. The Wyoming court granted the custody of Misty Dawn to her mother. The father was given reasonable visitation and was required to pay child support. The Wyoming court has not modified or changed its order.
The father moved from Wyoming to Maryland, and in 1978 moved to Topeka where he has since resided. In December, 1977, the parties had some disagreement, and the father has not paid the court-ordered support since that time. He has had Misty Dawn in his home for frequent visits and has bought her some clothing and has given her gifts. He has remarried and has two children.
The mother left Wyoming and she and her daughter moved to Missouri. They moved to Kansas for a brief time, then returned to Missouri. In 1979 they moved to Texas and have lived there for the past three years. The mother remarried and had three children.
[238]*238We need not describe in detail the homes and living arrangements of the parties, since those facts are not material to our decision. On June 22,1981, Misty Dawn came to Kansas to visit her father. He promised the mother that he would return Misty Dawn on August 7. On August 5 he filed this action in the District Court of Shawnee County against the mother, asking that custody be changed to him. On August 7, the mother called him; he did not mention the pending action but told her that he was unable to return Misty Dawn because of “scheduling problems at work.”
The mother was personally served with summons in Texas on August 10. Immediately, she came to Kansas and filed a petition for habeas corpus; a hearing was scheduled for August 31. She returned on that date; the hearing was held; the court consolidated the two cases, determined that it should give full faith and credit to the Wyoming decree, and restored the custody of Misty Dawn to her mother. The trial court also ordered the mother and child to return for a hearing of the custody case on September 22. In addition, the court ordered social studies of the homes of both parties.
On September 22, 1981, the consolidated cases came on for hearing. Mother and child returned from Texas and were present. The habeas action was dismissed as moot since custody had already been restored to the mother. Evidence was introduced in the custody matter, and the court then changed custody from mother to father. In announcing this ruling, the judge found that Wyoming now has no jurisdiction since father, mother, and child no longer live in or have any substantial connection with that state, and that both Kansas and Texas are the appropriate states to exercise jurisdiction. The court also found that it had jurisdiction under K.S.A. 38-1303(a)(2) because (1) it is in the best interests of the child that the Kansas court take jurisdiction and decide the case without further delay, (2) the father lives in Kansas and has significant connections with this state, and (3) the minor child has a significant connection with this state. In support of the latter conclusion, the judge said:
“[T]he child in question has a significant connection with this State since one parent lives as a resident now permanently within the State and the child has visited this summer for a period of a number of weeks and will now be presumably having some significant contact with that parent while in the State of Kansas either by way of visitation or custody, but, in any event, will have a child-parent relationship and that, therefore, the Court is persuaded that a significant connec[239]*239tion does exist particularly in view of the fact that the child was physically present at the time the action was commenced and also is physically present within the State now. However, the most important consideration is the continuing parental relationship of the parent who now resides within the State of Kansas.”
It is from this ruling that the mother appeals.
Did the trial court have jurisdiction of the proceeding before it? This issue must be decided under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, K.S.A. 38-1301 et seq., enacted by the legislature in 1978 and effective here since January 1, 1979. While we have mentioned that act in two cases, Beebe v. Chavez, 226 Kan. 591, 599, 602 P.2d 1279 (1979), and Nixon v. Nixon, 226 Kan. 218, 220, 596 P.2d 1238 (1979), the enactment was not the basis of either decision. In Beebe, the action arose in 1977, before the uniform act was adopted in this state. We cited it only to illustrate that the legislature had since made clear our long-standing rule that courts of this state could and should properly refuse to exercise jurisdiction, absent any showing of emergency or abuse, when a court of another state has continuing jurisdiction. [See also Jolly v. Avery, 220 Kan. 692, 556 P.2d 449 (1976), and Anderson v. Anderson, 214 Kan. 387, 520 P.2d 1239 (1974).] In Nixon, we cited the act, along with various sections of our divorce and alimony laws, K.S.A. 60-1601 et seq., to support our conclusion that a court of this state which first acquires jurisdiction over child custody matters in a divorce case retains that jurisdiction to the exclusion of other Kansas courts of concurrent jurisdiction. Neither Beebe nor Nixon is helpful here.
The first section of the uniform act states the purposes of the act. It reads in part:
“38-1301. ... (a) The general purposes of this act are to: (1) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state, to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
“(2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest of the child;
“(3) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily in the state with which the child and the child’s family have the closest connection and where significant evidence concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and the child’s family have a closer connection with another state;
[240]*240“(b) This act shall be construed to promote the general purposes stated in this section.”
Next follows the definitions section- It defines “home state” as follows:
“38-1302.
“(e) ‘home state’ means the state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his or her parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than six months old the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of temporary absence of any of the named persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period . . . .”
The third section deals with jurisdiction. It reads:
“38-1303 . . . (a) A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if:
“(1) This state (A) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or (B) had been the child’s home state within six months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state because of the child’s removal or retention by a person claiming the child’s custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this state; or
“(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because (A) the child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this state, and (B) there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
“(3) the child is physically present in this state and (A) the child has been abandoned or (B) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise dependent and neglected; or
“(4) (A) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with paragraphs (1), (2), or (3), or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (B) it is in the best interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction.
“(b) Except under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), physical presence in this state of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a child custody determination.
“(c) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine the child’s custody.”
The eighth section directs or authorizes courts to decline jurisdiction under certain circumstances. It reads in part:
“38-1308 ....
[241]*241“(b) Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without consent of the person entitled to custody, has improperly removed the child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly retained the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physical custody. If the petitioner has violated any other provision of a custody decree of another state the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances.”
Misty Dawn lived with her mother in Texas for some three years before this action was commenced. She had been in Kansas, visiting her father, for less than two months when the petition in this case was filed. Clearly, Texas was Misty Dawn’s “home state.” K.S.A. 38-1302(c). Texas being the home state, jurisdiction does not lie in Kansas under K.S.A. 38-1303(a)(l). Similarly, there was no showing of abandonment, mistreatment or abuse, and nothing to indicate that Texas either did not have jurisdiction or had declined to exercise it. Thus, Kansas jurisdiction cannot be premised upon K.S.A. 38-1303(a)(3) or (4).
The only subsection upon which jurisdiction can be based is K.S.A. 38-1303(a)(2), which grants jurisdiction if it is in the best interest of the child that a Kansas court assume jurisdiction because (A) the child and at least one parent “have a significant connection with this state,” and (B) there is available here substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships. That subsection, however, is somewhat clarified by K.S.A. 38-1303(b), which provides in substance that under subsections (a)(1) and (2), the physical presence in this state of the child and one of the contestants is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state. In this connection, the following Commissioners’ Note to section 3 of the uniform act is instructive:
“Paragraph (2) of subsection (a) is supplemented by subsection (b) which is designed to discourage unilateral removal of children to other states and to guard generally against too liberal an interpretation of paragraph (2). Short-term presence in the state is not enough even though there may be an intent to stay longer, perhaps an intent to establish a technical ‘domicile’ for divorce or other purposes.
“Paragraph (2) perhaps more than any other provision of the Act requires that it be interpreted in the spirit of the legislative purposes expressed in section 1. The paragraph was phrased in general terms in order to be flexible enough to cover many fact situations too diverse to lend themselves to exact description. But its purpose is to limit jurisdiction rather than to proliferate it. The first clause of the paragraph is important: jurisdiction exists only if it is in the child’s interest, not merely the interest or convenience of the feuding parties, to determine custody in [242]*242a particular state. The interest of the child is served when the forum has optimum access to relevant evidence about the child and family. There must be maximum rather than minimum contact with the state. ” (Emphasis supplied.) 9 U.L.A. 124 (1979).
The trial court here found that it was in the best interest of the child that the Kansas court assume jurisdiction in order that the matter might be determined without delay, the prolonging of the dispute being inconsistent with the best interest of the child. The trial court found that the father is a resident of Kansas and thus has a significant connection with this state. The final finding supporting jurisdiction is that the minor child has a significant connection with this state. This was based upon the findings that (1) the father lives here, (2) the child has visited in the father’s home for a few weeks, (3) the child will have a continuing child-parent relationship with the father, and (4) the child was physically present when the action was commenced and at the time of the hearing. These findings would generally be true in any action filed by a Kansas resident whose child was visiting him at the time of filing.
Does a child have a “significant connection with this state” simply because (1) a parent lives in Kansas, (2) the child has visited the parent, and (3) the child is here when the parent files an action for change of custody? We think not. K.S.A. 38-1301(a)(3) indicates that child custody litigation should ordinarily take place in the state with which the child and the child’s parents have the closest connection. Ordinarily this is the child’s home, not a state where the child is an occasional and temporary visitor in the home of a parent. K.S.A. 38-1303(a)(1) first provides for jurisdiction in Kansas if Kansas is the home state of the child, or if it had been the child’s home within six months before commencement, of the action. K.S.A. 38-1303(6) clearly provides that the physical presence of a child and one of its parents within this state is’ not in itself sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Finally, K.S.A. 38-1308(6) states that courts shall not exercise jurisdiction if a parent has improperly removed a child from the custody of the person entitled to custody, or has improperly retained the child after a visit. Taken all together, these provisions convince us that for a child to have a significant connection with this state, something beyond the residency of a parent in Kansas, the visiting of the child with that parent, and the presence of the child in [243]*243Kansas when a petition for change of custody is filed, must be shown.
We have not overlooked the Court of Appeals opinion in Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Kan. App. 2d 284, 615 P.2d 806, rev. denied 228 Kan. 807 (1980). The facts in that case make it readily distinguishable. The Larsens were married in Kansas and lived here for about ten years, the duration of their marriage. Their children were born here, and lived here for their first four years and nine years respectively. The divorce was granted in Kansas, custody was awarded by the Kansas court, and one parent remained at all times a resident of this state. The children regularly visited in Kansas during the summers. Clearly, Kansas was “home” to the children even though it was not technically the “home state” under K.S.A. 38-1302(e). The Larsens twice previously litigated change of custody motions in the court which initially granted the divorce and awarded custody. On those facts, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals determined that jurisdiction existed.
Other courts have wrestled with jurisdictional problems similar to those now before us. More recent decisions have either determined that jurisdiction does not exist, or if it does exist, trial courts should decline to exercise it where the motion is not filed in the “home state,” absent any showing of abandonment, mistreatment, neglect, abuse or emergency. See William L v. Michelle P, 99 Misc. 2d 346, 351, 416 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1979); In re Sagan, 261 Pa. Super. Ct. 384, 396 A.2d 450 (1978); and Matteson v. Matteson, 379 So. 2d 677 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). We agree.
Our research has not disclosed a judicial definition of “significant connection” as that term is used in the uniform act, and we shall not try to devise a precise definition. We hold only that a child who resides with his or her custodial parent in a sister state and who occasionally visits a parent who lives in Kansas, does not have a “significant connection” with this state sufficient to establish jurisdiction under K.S.A. 38-1303(c)(2). To hold otherwise would be to widen the jurisdiction of trial courts under the act, while the purpose of the act is obviously to narrow the jurisdiction and to require child custody litigation, if at all possible, to be held where the child resides.
In view of our disposition of this matter upon jurisdictional grounds, other issues raised in the briefs need not be determined.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded, with [244]*244directions to dismiss the petition for change of custody for lack of jurisdiction.
Fromme, J., not participating.