Bill Ivan Mims v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare

581 F.2d 1211, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8400
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedOctober 16, 1978
Docket78-1950
StatusPublished
Cited by47 cases

This text of 581 F.2d 1211 (Bill Ivan Mims v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bill Ivan Mims v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 581 F.2d 1211, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8400 (5th Cir. 1978).

Opinion

AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Bill Mims filed an application in October 1974 for a period of disability and for disability benefits under sections 216 and 223 of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416 and 423, claiming that he has been continuously disabled since November 1964 due to a back injury and to a bronchial tube condition. The agency denied his application both initially and on reconsideration. Mims then requested a hearing which took place on July 28, 1976, with Mims, his wife and his attorney taking part. On October 1, 1976, the Administrative Law Judge rendered a decision upholding the denial of benefits. This decision became the final decision of the Secretary upon its affirmance by the Appeals Council on February 9, 1977. Mims sought judicial review pursuant to section 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), in the district court which, on cross motions for summary judgment, affirmed the Secretary’s denial of benefits. We reverse.

Appellant, a white male resident of Abilene, Texas, was born in 1917 and completed the eleventh grade and two years of junior college. From January 1947 to November 1964 he worked for the Texas Highway Department in a series of positions including rodman, junior inspector, party chief and senior inspector. These jobs all involved considerable walking and standing. Previously he had held a variety of jobs; he had issued parts to airplane mechanics, cleaned and repaired airplane engines, acted as a rodman with a surveying crew, and shingled roofs. He left the Highway Department voluntarily in 1964 to avoid a transfer to El Paso. Since then Mims’ only employment has been a brief stint as a construction laborer in 1966; he left that job after five days due to back pain and an inability to lift objects.

Mims has had back trouble since the mid-1950’s when he first injured it pulling a rod out of the ground. Although Mims left the Highway Department in 1964 to avoid transfer, he testified that at that time he was already experiencing severe back problems which thereafter prevented him from working. His condition worsened steadily after 1964 until, by the early part of 1968, his back was “going out” every two or three months. Although Mims obtained some relief through chiropractic treatment, persistent pain in his back and legs finally necessitated surgery on a damaged lumbar disc in May and again in September of 1968.

The second operation involved removal of the disc and subsequent examination indicated that there had been injury to the nerve roots along the spinal cord. Mims testified that since the operation he has experienced constant pain in his back and legs, partial paralysis of his legs, great difficulty in getting about, drowsiness, and an inability to remain up or to sit for more than a few hours at a time or to do anything but very light housework.

The amended Social Security Act requires that a claimant prove not only that he is unable to perform his previous work but that he is incapable of performing “any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 1 In *1213 this case Mims was last insured under the Act on March 31,1970 and, therefore, must show that he was disabled as of that date. 2 The Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder further specify that the disability must result from an impairment that is medically demonstrable and documented by medical evidence. 3

*1212 (1) The term “disability” means—
(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months:
(2) For purposes of paragraph (l)(a)—
(A) an individual . . . shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence . . ., “work which exists in the national economy” means work which exists in significant numbers either in *1213 the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.

The function of a reviewing court is limited to determining whether the Secretary’s findings are supported by substantial evidence considering the record as a whole. 4 Substantial evidence means

more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971), quoting, Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). Our function is not to reweigh the evidence or to substitute our judgment for that of the Secretary. Goodman v. Richardson, 5 Cir., 1971, 448 F.2d 388. Given the strict requirements for showing disability and the limited scope of judicial review, reversals of the Secretary are quite rare while affirmances abound. See, e. g., Laffoon v. Califano, 5 Cir., 1977, 558 F.2d 253; McDaniel v. Califano, 5 Cir., 1978, 568 F.2d 1172; Turner v. Califano, 5 Cir., 1977, 563 F.2d 669; Gaultney v. Wein-berger, 5 Cir., 1974, 505 F.2d 943.

However, the claimant’s burden is not insuperable. 5 The paucity of reversals in these cases does not mean

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581 F.2d 1211, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 8400, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bill-ivan-mims-v-joseph-a-califano-jr-secretary-of-health-education-ca5-1978.