Bill Fletcher and Rachelle Fletcher v. Erin Day and Patrick Vanderwarker

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 31, 2013
Docket04-12-00485-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Bill Fletcher and Rachelle Fletcher v. Erin Day and Patrick Vanderwarker (Bill Fletcher and Rachelle Fletcher v. Erin Day and Patrick Vanderwarker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bill Fletcher and Rachelle Fletcher v. Erin Day and Patrick Vanderwarker, (Tex. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-12-00485-CV

Bill FLETCHER and Rachelle Fletcher, Appellants

v. Erin Day and Patrick Erin DAY and Patrick Vanderwarker, Appellees

From the 348th District Court, Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 348-228247-08 The Honorable Dana M. Womack, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 31, 2013

AFFIRMED

Appellants Bill and Rachelle Fletcher appeal from a judgment requiring them to pay

appellees Erin Day and Patrick Vanderwarker $56,000.00 in actual damages. In a single issue, the

Fletchers argue the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support these damages. We

overrule the Fletchers’ sole issue, and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

In 2005, Day and Vanderwarker purchased a house, located in Haslet, Texas, from the

Fletchers. After living in the house for two years, Day and Vanderwarker began to notice problems 04-12-00485-CV

with the second story office and gameroom. The second story floors were extremely noisy. Bumps

appeared in the ceiling below. Subsequently, Day and Vanderwarker learned that the second story

rooms were an addition to the house that was built without any building permits. They hired a

structural engineer who examined the second story, determined the upstairs rooms were not

constructed in accordance with the building code, and drafted a proposal to repair the damage.

They also contacted two remodeling contractors to find out how much it would cost to carry out

the repairs recommended by the engineer. One contractor estimated the repairs would cost

$56,000.00.

Thereafter, Day and Vanderwarker filed the underlying lawsuit against the Fletchers,

bringing claims for common law and statutory fraud, breach of contract, negligence, breach of

express and implied warranties, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The

trial court held a two-day bench trial. At trial, the evidence showed that the house, as originally

built, did not have a second story living area. The Fletchers had renovated the upstairs attic,

converting it into a living area. The trial court found in favor of Day and Vanderwarker, awarding

them $56,000.000 in actual damages. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court

concluded the Fletchers’ actions with regard to the sale of the house, including their representations

that they were not aware of any room additions, structural modifications, or other alterations or

repairs made without the necessary permits or not in compliance with building codes, constituted

statutory and common law fraud. The trial court also found that, as a result of the Fletchers’ actions,

Day and Vanderwarker suffered actual damages in the amount of $56,000.00, and that this amount

represented the reasonable and necessary costs to them for the repair and restoration of the house.

The Fletchers appealed.

-2- 04-12-00485-CV

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In evaluating whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding, we must credit

evidence favorable to the judgment if a reasonable factfinder could, disregard contrary evidence

unless a reasonable factfinder could not, and reverse the factfinder’s determination only if the

evidence presented in the trial court would not enable a reasonable and fair-minded factfinder to

reach the judgment under review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We

will sustain legal sufficiency challenges only if the record reveals (1) that there is no evidence of

a vital fact; (2) that the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only

evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) that the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more

than a mere scintilla; or (4) that the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact.

Id. at 810. More than a scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence rises to a level that would enable

reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135

S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004).

In evaluating whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support a finding, we set aside

the finding only if, after considering and weighing all of the evidence in the record pertinent to

that finding, we determine that the evidence supporting is so weak, or so contrary to the

overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d

175, 176 (Tex. 1986). When the party without the burden of proof on a fact issue complains of an

adverse fact finding, that party must show that there is “insufficient evidence” supporting the

adverse finding. Gooch v. Am. Sling Co., Inc., 902 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995,

no writ).

THE EVIDENCE

To establish their damages, Day and Vanderwarker presented the testimony of two expert

witnesses and several documents. The first expert witness was Robert Lee Nicholas, the structural -3- 04-12-00485-CV

engineer who was hired by Day and Vanderwarker after they noticed the problems with the second

story. Nicholas performed a visual inspection of the premises, looking at the second story floor.

Nicholas cut a few holes in the garage ceiling to examine the framing, but he refrained from cutting

more holes to avoid damage to the living areas. He also examined the attic framing and looked at

the roof. Nicholas observed some signs of distress to the roof. Nicholas found that the ceiling joists

for the garage were being used for floor joists, a use for which they were not designed and which

added weight onto the center of the floor joists and overstressed them. Nicholas explained that this

was a problem because it caused the floor to bounce and move quite a bit, making it uncomfortable

for walking. According to Nicholas, the floor would continue to sag over time and, eventually, this

sagging could cause roof leaks and cracks in the ceiling. Nicholas also discovered that the stairs to

the addition failed to comply with the relevant building code. Specifically, the rise and runs were

of different lengths and exceeded the lengths required by the building code.

In addition to inspecting the structure, Nicholas contacted the City of Haslet to verify that

no permits had been requested for the addition. He also verified that the relevant construction code

was the 2003 International Residential Code (IRC). Then, Nicholas checked the design of the floor

joists and determined the proper specifications for the addition. He checked the beams and headers

over the garage and at the stairs to determine their specifications. According to Nicholas, the IRC

required that framing for a second floor space to be occupied by people, other than a bedroom,

must have at a minimum a live load capacity of 40 pounds per square foot. The second story

addition, which consisted of an office and game room, did not have a live load capacity of 40

pounds per square foot. Nicholas further recommended that a window be added to one of the

second story rooms. He explained that there was no window in the main room, and that the addition

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