Big a 1894 Route 23n, LLC v. Vans & Trucks, LLC

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1597-24

BIG A 1894 ROUTE 23N, LLC,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

VANS & TRUCKS, LLC and YOURIK ATAKHANIAN,

Defendants-Appellants. ____________________________

Submitted January 14, 2026 – Decided July 28, 2026

Before Judges Mayer and Gummer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. LT-000718-24.

Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for appellants (Michael Confusione, of counsel and on the briefs).

Aronsohn Weiner Salerno & Kaufman, attorneys for respondent (Gerald R. Salerno and Steven R. Vanderlinden, on the brief).

PER CURIAM In this commercial landlord-tenant case, defendants Vans & Trucks, LLC

(Vans) and Yourik Atakhanian appeal a judgment for possession of property,

which the trial court entered after finding defendants had breached the parties'

settlement agreement. They also appeal subsequent orders temporarily staying

a warrant of removal and denying their order to show cause (OTSC) application,

seeking a stay of the judgment and the warrant. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I.

On September 29, 2021, plaintiff Big A 1894 Route 23N, LLC, as

landlord, and Vans, as tenant, entered into a twenty-year commercial lease

agreement for property located in West Milford. Atakhanian was a "shareholder,

officer and director of" Vans. He signed the lease on behalf of Vans and

individually as a guarantor of Vans's "financial obligations" and "all of [its]

other obligations."

Under the lease, the parties agreed Vans would "use the [property] for all

autobody shop [sic], a mechanical shop and any other licenses that are granted

by the Township of West Milford, pertaining to the sales, servicing, repairing

and/or salvage yard." The lease required monthly payments of rent, which

increased every year by a pre-determined amount specified in the lease. The

lease also provided that if Vans "le[ft] any property in the [r]ental [s]pace,"

A-1597-24 2 plaintiff could "[d]ispose of such property and charge [Vans] for [t]he cost of

disposal" or "[k]eep such property as having been abandoned."

On February 4, 2024, plaintiff filed an eviction action against defendants,

alleging non-payment of rent in the amount of $15,331.93. After conducting a

bench trial, the court entered a May 21, 2024 order of disposition and a June 5,

2024 judgment for possession, finding plaintiff had proven a cause of action for

possession based on non-payment of rent totaling $76,425 through the date of

the trial. A warrant for removal was subsequently issued based on the judgment

for possession.

While before the court on defendants' application for an OTSC, the parties

entered into a settlement agreement and placed its terms on the record on June

12, 2024. The oral settlement included defendants' timely payment of July rent

in full and the execution of a written consent judgment. Because defendants

failed to comply with the settlement agreement placed on the record, on July 6,

2024, plaintiff moved to enforce the settlement, contending defendants had

failed to pay the July rent timely and to execute the consent order memorializing

the June 12 settlement terms. The court entered a July 12, 2024 judgment for

possession, indicating it previously had conducted a trial on plaintiff's complaint

A-1597-24 3 for possession based on non-payment of rent and finding plaintiff had proven

that claim, with rent arrears totaling $16,555.50.

On July 23, 2024, the parties executed and filed a consent order

memorializing their June 12, 2024 settlement agreement. The parties agreed the

June 5, 2024 judgment for possession entered after the May 21 trial would

"remain in full force and effect" while the warrant of removal was stayed until

November 30, 2024. The parties characterized the stay as a "[h]ardship [s]tay."

Hardship stays "mitigate the harsh nature of the summary-dispossess procedure

by postponing for a limited time the execution of a warrant of removal if the

eviction presents a hardship to the tenant." Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little,

135 N.J. 274, 282 (1994). Pursuant to the express terms of the parties'

agreement, defendants were obligated to "continue to abide by all [l]ease

provisions and pay rent and additional rent in a timely fashion in accordance

with the [l]ease" during the stay.

On November 12, 2024, plaintiff moved to enforce the July 23, 2024

consent order embodying the June 12, 2024 settlement agreement, citing Rule

6:7-1(d), and for a warrant of removal based on defendants' purported breach of

the agreement. Plaintiff supported its motion with a certification of its

A-1597-24 4 representative. Plaintiff asked the court to terminate the stay and immediately

issue a warrant of removal.

Plaintiff alleged defendants had breached the provision of the consent

order requiring them to "continue to abide by all lease provisions." According

to plaintiff, defendants "ha[d] encroached on the property of the Newark

Watershed and parked disabled cars which [we]re cut open and leaking fluids,"

thereby "contaminating both the leased premises and the Watershed property."

In addition, plaintiff contended defendants had hired a contractor to place

improperly-contained "asphalt millings on the leased premises and the

Watershed property," describing "[m]illings" as "a major environmental

problem in the State." Plaintiff asserted defendants had "polluted both

properties" and "endangered [p]laintiff's standing with the Newark Watershed."

"[T]he Newark Watershed Property, [is] a large tract located in seven

municipalities and three counties, which contain[s] a reservoir and surrounding

land." Newark City v. Jefferson Twp., 13 N.J. Tax 217, 219 (App. Div. 1992).

Plaintiff contended that by those actions, defendants had violated

paragraphs 1(c), 1(f), 14, and 21 of the lease. Paragraph 1(c) prohibited Vans

from "us[ing the property] for any unlawful or hazardous purpose." Paragraph

1(f) required Vans to "operate its business and maintain the [property] in

A-1597-24 5 accordance with all laws and ordinances . . . of all federal, state, county and

municipal governments." Paragraph 14 barred Vans from "mak[ing] any

changes or additions to the [property] without [plaintiff's] written consent."

Paragraph 21 required Vans, among other things, to "comply with the Industrial

Site [Recovery] Act, N.J.S.A. 13:1K-6 [to -14] . . . and all requirements of[] the

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection."

On appeal, defendants dispute plaintiff's factual assertions regarding their

breaches of the lease, citing to certifications of defense counsel and Atakhanian

they submitted in support of their March 11, 2025 motion before this court for a

stay pending appeal and documents they submitted in support of their July 8,

2025 motion before this court to vacate the November 18, 2024 judgment of

possession. Nothing in the record indicates those documents were submitted to

the trial court in opposition to plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement.

On November 18, 2024, the court entered a judgment for possession in

plaintiff's favor based on defendants' breach of the consent order. A warrant of

removal was issued the next day.

After a December 2, 2024 lockout, defendants applied for an OTSC,

stating they "need[ed] to know more about the [case] that was brought against

[them]" and to retain counsel. Defendants were represented by counsel when

A-1597-24 6 they entered into the July 23, 2024 consent order. At the OTSC hearing,

defendants requested a stay of the judgment of possession. Opposing that

request, plaintiff's counsel asserted defendants "ha[ve]n't been taking th[e] stay

seriously" because they had "not made any attempt to start removing cars" from

the property. He also pointed out the time period for the hardship stay had ended

on November 30.

The court issued a December 2, 2024 order for orderly removal, directing

plaintiff to restore Vans to possession of the leased premises and staying the

execution of the warrant of removal until December 10, 2024. The court

explained on the record that "[n]o further applications will be granted for extra

time to move or remove tenant's personal property from the premises" and that

any personal property not removed in those seven days would "be deemed

abandoned" and plaintiff would be allowed to "dispose of such property in any

manner in which the landlord may decide and the landlord shall have no

responsibility or liability for any such property or the proceeds of any sale or

other dispositions thereof."

On December 10, 2024, defendants again applied for an OTSC,

"requesting [an] [e]xtension" of the stay. At the hearing, defendants argued

"seven days [wa]s not enough [time] to remove a whole junkyard" and asked the

A-1597-24 7 judge to grant them additional time to remove their personal property from the

leased premises. In a December 10, 2024 order, the court denied defendants'

application, permitting the judgment for possession and warrant of removal to

"remain in effect and the lockout [to] proceed as scheduled."

This appeal of the November 18, 2024 judgment and the December 2,

2024 and December 10, 2024 orders followed.

II.

A lease is a contract. Town of Kearny v. Disc. City of Old Bridge, Inc.,

205 N.J. 386, 411 (2011). A settlement agreement is a contract "which 'may be

freely entered into and which a court, absent a demonstration of fraud or other

compelling circumstances, should honor and enforce as it does other contracts.'"

Jennings v. Reed, 381 N.J. Super. 217, 227 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Pascarella

v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-25 (App. Div. 1983)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). "A consent order is, in essence, an agreement of the parties that

has been approved by the court." Hurwitz v. AHS Hosp. Corp., 438 N.J. Super.

269, 292 (App. Div. 2014). Accordingly, we analyze the lease and the parties'

settlement agreement, as memorialized in the July 23, 2024 consent order, under

the familiar rules of contract interpretation. See Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34,

A-1597-24 8 45 (2016) (finding "[a] settlement agreement is governed by basic contract

principles").

"The interpretation and construction of a contract is a matter of law for

the trial court, subject to de novo review on appeal." Cumberland Farms, Inc.

v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 447 N.J. Super. 423, 438 (App. Div. 2016). "The

plain language of the contract is the cornerstone of [a court's] interpretive

inquiry." Extech Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. E&N Constr. Inc., 262 N.J. 271, 280

(2025) (alteration in original) (quoting Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park,

241 N.J. 595, 616 (2020)). "[U]nambiguous contracts will be enforced as written

unless they are illegal or otherwise violate public policy." Ibid. (quoting

Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 118 (2014)). The "court's

task was 'not to rewrite a contract for the parties better than or different from the

one they wrote for themselves.'" Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 483

(2016) (quoting Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011)).

We note at the outset that our courts generally "do not resolve issues that

have become moot due to the passage of time or intervening events."

Wisniewski v. Murphy, 454 N.J. Super. 508, 518 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting

State v. Davila, 443 N.J. Super. 577, 584 (App. Div. 2016)). "An issue is 'moot

when [the] decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical

A-1597-24 9 effect on the existing controversy.'" Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87, 104 (2015)

(quoting Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 221-22

(App. Div. 2011)). The July 23, 2024 consent order granted defendants a

hardship stay until November 30, 2024. The initial attempted lockout occurred

on December 2, 2024, after the hardship stay had expired. Defendants have not

demonstrated Vans was entitled to remain on the premises after the parties'

agreed-upon November 30, 2024 deadline. Having "no practical effect,"

defendants' arguments on appeal are moot. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. at 221.

We, however, consider them in the interest of completeness.

Defendants fault plaintiff for filing the motion to enforce the settlement

agreement sixteen days before the expiration of the hardship stay. But nothing

in the settlement agreement required plaintiff to forbear moving to enforce its

terms until the stay ended. Moreover, given that no lockout occurred until after

the hardship stay ended, we discern no prejudice to defendants based on the

timing of the filing of the motion.

Defendants contend the consent order did not expressly identify

termination of its terms as a remedy for defendants' breach. Basic contract law

provides that remedy. In the July 23, 2024 consent order, the parties agreed the

June 5, 2024 judgment for possession would remain "in full force and effect."

A-1597-24 10 Defendants agreed to "continue to abide by all [l]ease provisions" while plaintiff

agreed to a hardship stay of the warrant of removal. Because defendants

breached the settlement agreement by failing to abide by all lease provisions,

plaintiff was no longer bound by the stay provision in the settlement agreement.

See Vosough v. Kierce, 437 N.J. Super. 218, 243 (App. Div. 2014) (finding "[a]

material breach of a contract relieves an aggrieved party of its obligations under

the contract"); Magnet Res., Inc. v. Summit MR, Inc., 318 N.J. Super. 275, 285

(App. Div. 1998) (finding "[i]t is black letter contract law that a material breach

by either party to a bilateral contract excuses the other party from rendering any

further contractual performance").

Defendants argue the enforcement motion was "invalid" because it

"charged the tenant with violating the [s]ettlement [a]greement . . . without

providing [Vans] with the [thirty]-day notice to cure that the lease provides."

That argument is flawed in that neither the settlement agreement nor the lease

provided for a thirty-day cure period or otherwise required plaintiff to give a

thirty-day notice before moving to enforce the settlement agreement.

Defendants contend the November 18, 2024 judgment for possession is

"not valid on its face" because the phrase "COMMERCIAL NON-PAYMENT"

is contained underneath the docket number in its caption. The caption, however,

A-1597-24 11 also names the document as a "JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION AFTER

BREACH" and the court expressly stated in the substance of the judgment that

the basis for plaintiff's application was defendants' "failure to comply with the

terms of the parties' settlement agreement." The one-word error does not render

the judgment invalid.

Defendants fault the court for not conducting an evidentiary hearing

regarding plaintiff's motion. Defendants assert they "disputed" plaintiff's factual

allegations regarding their breach of the lease. But in support of their assertion

that they had disputed plaintiff's allegations in the trial court, defendants cite

documents they submitted in support of the 2025 motions they filed in this court.

Defendants have not demonstrated they actually contested plaintiff's allegations

in the trial court, opposed plaintiff's motion, or requested or otherwise merited

a hearing. On this record, we discern no error by the court in not conducting an

evidentiary hearing.

Finally, defendants contend the court "erred in failing to order [plaintiff]

to return [Vans's] property remaining on the premises." They fault the court for

explaining on the record at the end of the December 2, 2024 hearing that any

personal property left on the premises after the delayed enforcement of the

warrant of possession would "be deemed abandoned" and plaintiff could

A-1597-24 12 "dispose of such property in any manner in which [it] may decide . . . [with] no

responsibility or liability for any such property or the proceeds of any sale or

other dispositions thereof." They also suggest plaintiff violated the Abandoned

Tenant Property Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-72 to -84.

Appellate courts "review orders and not opinions." Primmer v. Harrison,

472 N.J. Super. 173, 187 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 470 N.J.

Super. 457, 463 (App. Div. 2022)). We discern no error in the November 18,

2024 judgment or the December 2, 2024 and December 10, 2024 orders that

warrants reversal and, accordingly, affirm them.

To the extent defendants believe that plaintiff violated the law after the

court entered that judgment and those orders, defendants may seek recourse, if

any, in a separate Law Division action. An evicted tenant may seek in the Law

Division damages arising from a wrongful eviction. Daoud v. Mohammad, 402

N.J. Super. 57, 61 (App. Div. 2008). "We do not suggest that such an action

should be pursued or would have a favorable outcome; we simply point out that

there are means of relief for an aggrieved tenant other than retention of the

premises." Id. at 61-62.

Affirmed.

A-1597-24 13