Bien-Aime v. DOCCS

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 6, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-08797
StatusUnknown

This text of Bien-Aime v. DOCCS (Bien-Aime v. DOCCS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bien-Aime v. DOCCS, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

USDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT oe ee SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ee

ELIJAH BLAISE BIEN-AIME, Plaintiff, -V.- 24 Civ. 8797 (JHR) (BCM) DOCCS; 6 BUILDING RYKERS ISLAND; ORDER OF SERVICE CAPTAIN KELLY; JANE DOE; JOHN DOE 1; JOHN DOE 2, Defendants. JENNIFER H. REARDEN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Elijah Blaise Bien-Aime, who is appearing pro se and is currently incarcerated in the United States Penitentiary (Big Sandy), located in Inez, Kentucky, brings this action asserting claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His claims arise from alleged events while he was held in an unspecified New York City Department of Correction (“NYCDOC’”) jail on Rikers Island. Plaintiff sues: (1) “DOCCS”; (2) ““6 [B]uilding’ Rykers Island”; (3) NYCDOC Correction Captain Kelly; and (4) three unidentified “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” NYCDOC Correction Officers. The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims under Section 1983, as well as claims under state law. By order dated January 7, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.! For the reasons discussed below, the Court (1) dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 against “‘6 [B]uilding’ Rykers Island”; (2) dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims against “DOCCS”; and (3) directs the Clerk of Court to add the City of New York as a Defendant, pursuant to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil

' Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

Procedure. The Court also (4) requests that Captain Kelly and the City of New York waive service of summonses; (5) directs Captain Kelly and the City of New York to comply with Local Civil Rule 33.2; and (6) directs the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York to provide Plaintiff and the Court with the identities and badge numbers of the unidentified “Jane Doe” and “John Doe” Defendants.

STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal in any of these scenarios, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475, has its limits—to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 8”), which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating

legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether the latter makes it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. DISCUSSION A. Claims under Section 1983 against “‘6 [B]uilding’ Rykers Island” The Court understands Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting only claims under Section 1983 against “‘6 [B]uilding’ Rykers Island,” which appears to be a reference to a jail on Rikers Island. The Court must dismiss these claims. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2)the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A jail, however, is not a “person” for the purpose of Section 1983 liability. See, e.g., Williams v. Fryermuth, 23 Civ. 2156 (PMH), 2024 WL 4557444,

at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2024). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 against “‘6 [B]uilding’ Rykers Island” for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). B. Claims against DOCCS Normally, a pro se litigant’s reference to “DOCCS” is a reference to the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. Because Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to his claims occurred in a jail on Rikers Island, however, which is operated by the NYCDOC, the Court interprets Plaintiff’s reference to DOCCS as a reference to the NYCDOC. Nonetheless, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the NYCDOC. As an agency of the City of New York, the NYCDOC is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Edwards v. Arocho, 125 F.4th 336, 354 (2d

Cir. 2024) (“A plaintiff cannot bring a claim against a municipal agency that does not have the capacity to be sued under its municipal charter.” (emphasis in original)); see also Johnson v. Dobry, 660 F. App’x 69, 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (the NYCDOC is not a “suable entity”); Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”).

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Emerson v. City of New York
740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Johnson v. Dobry
660 F. App'x 69 (Second Circuit, 2016)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
Bien-Aime v. DOCCS, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bien-aime-v-doccs-nysd-2025.