Opinion by
Mr. Justice O’Brien,
Appellant instituted this action for wrongful death and survival in the Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County, and named as defendants: The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, the individual members of the Board, the Director of State Stores, and the manager of a specific State Store.
Appellant alleged that the decedent, a sixteen-year-old boy, purchased a bottle of Scotch whiskey from a State Store. The boy consumed part of the bottle, became drunk, and, as a result of his intoxicated condition, fell eleven floors from a fire escape to his death.
The Attorney General filed preliminary objections, averring that the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board is an instrumentality and agency of the Commonwealth; that an action against the Board is an action against the Commonwealth; that the Commonwealth cannot be sued without its consent; and that there has been no such consent in this case. Appellant answered these preliminary objections.
The proceeding was transferred subsequently to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, where the At[182]*182torney General’s preliminary objections were sustained, with two judges dissenting, Biello v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 179 (1971), and the complaint was dismissed; this appeal followed.
This case raises the question of the immunity of an agency of the state from actions in tort.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity arrived in Pennsylvania in Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dallas 357 (1788). That case was a suit to recover the value of flour relocated by the Pennsylvania War Board pursuant to a legislative directive to prevent British capture of supplies should they occupy Philadelphia.
The plaintiff in Sparhawk did not contend “that, generally speaking, citizens may sue the State; but only that every Government, which is not absolutely despotic, has provided some means (in England, for instance, by petition in Chancery) to obtain a redress of injuries from the sovereign.” 1 Dallas at 361.
Chief Justice M’Kean responded by affirming the legislature’s right to order relocation of private belongings when the necessity of war demands. He was not impressed with the plaintiff’s plea that the loss be spread. “It is a rule, however, that it is better to suffer a private mischief, than a public inconvenience; and the rights of necessity form a part of our law.” 1 Dallas at 362.
Sparhawk was extended in John Black v. Rempublicam, 1 Yeates 110 (1792), a case in which Pennsylvania galley captains had seized private provisions while fleeing from the British across the Delaware River. The captains used the provisions to feed their own troops and promised the landowner compensation. The court held that since the captains had no authority to contract, there could be no recovery in contract, and, further that Sparhawk precluded recovery in tort.
Were sovereign immunity a creature of pure common law, we might be disposed to a consideration of the [183]*183abrogation of that much criticized doctrine.1 However, Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, inter alia: “Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.” This language consistently has been interpreted to mean that no suit may be maintained against the state in tort until the legislature specifically has provided for such an action. Meagher v. Commonwealth, 439 Pa. 532, 266 A. 2d 684 (1970); Bannard v. N.Y.S. Nat. Gas Corp., 404 Pa. 269, 172 A. 2d 306 (1961); Brewer v. Commonwealth, 345 Pa. 144, 27 A. 2d 53 (1942); Bell Telephone Co. v. Lewis, 313 Pa. 374, 169 A. 571 (1934); Collins v. Commonwealth, 262 Pa. 572, 106 A. 229 (1919); Fitler v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 406 (1858). Pennsylvania is thus consistent with the majority of the states of this nation who have refused to treat similar constitutional provisions as being self-executing.2 The rationale seems to have been that such a constitutional provision must be strictly construed since it is in derogation of the states’ inherent exemption from suit.
The question of whether a particular action is one against the Commonwealth is not to be determined [184]*184solely by reference to the nominal parties to the record. Rader v. Pa. Turnpike Commission, 407 Pa. 609, 182 A. 2d 199 (1962); Merchants’ Co. v. Gelder, 349 Pa. 1, 36 A. 2d 444 (1944); Bell Telephone Co. v. Lewis, supra.
In Rader, this Court held: “that the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission [is] an instrumentality of the Commonwealth engaged in a governmental function and therefore is not liable for . . . injuries and damages in a trespass action.” At page 611. (Emphasis in original.) We subsequently approved of immunity for agencies engaged in governmental function in Thomas v. Baird, 433 Pa. 482, 252 A. 2d 653 (1969) (Turnpike Authority); Roney v. General State Authority, 413 Pa. 218, 196 A. 2d 349 (1964) (General State Authority); and in Anderson Appeal, 408 Pa. 179, 182 A. 2d 514 (1962) (Delaware River Port Authority).
While in Pennsylvania we have not before expressly employed the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions when considering the sovereign immunity doctrine, it has nonetheless been implicitly present in our application of the doctrine. In many of our decisions where we have found the bar to exist, we have noted that the function being performed was a governmental one. Roney v. General State Authority, supra; Anderson Appeal, supra; Rader v. Pa. Turnpike Commission, supra, and Merchants’ Co. v. Gelder, supra.
In accepting the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions, we are appreciative of the difficulties experienced by our courts using this distinction in the context of the governmental immunity cases and are mindful of the warning of Mr. Justice Cohen that “perhaps there is no issue known to the law which is surrounded by more confusion.” Morris v. Mt. Lebanon Twp. Sch. Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 637, 144 A. 2d 737 (1958). See also Mr. Justice Musmanno’s dissent [185]*185in Boorse v. Springfield Twp., 377 Pa. 109, 103 A. 2d 708 (1954).
The sole issue remaining is whether the Liquor Control Board was acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity when it sold young Joseph Biello a bottle of whiskey. In Merchants’ Co. v. Gelder, supra, a case where a warehouseman sought contractual relief against the Liquor Control Board for liquor storage, we held that the State could prescribe the manner and procedure to be used in such suits because the Board enjoyed the State’s immunity. In Gelder, the court reasoned that the Board, while storing whiskey as a wholesaler, was performing an essentially governmental function under the exhaustive set of regulations set forth in our Liquor Code. Act of April 12, 1951, P. L. 90, Art. I, §101 et seq., 47 P.S. §1-101 et seq. We are unable to distinguish Gelder from the instant case. The retail sale of liquor herein engaged in by the board is as much a part of the Commonwealth’s comprehensive scheme to regulate the sale and consumption of alcohol as is storing the alcohol for distribution to the state stores, the activity in question in Gelder.
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Opinion by
Mr. Justice O’Brien,
Appellant instituted this action for wrongful death and survival in the Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County, and named as defendants: The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, the individual members of the Board, the Director of State Stores, and the manager of a specific State Store.
Appellant alleged that the decedent, a sixteen-year-old boy, purchased a bottle of Scotch whiskey from a State Store. The boy consumed part of the bottle, became drunk, and, as a result of his intoxicated condition, fell eleven floors from a fire escape to his death.
The Attorney General filed preliminary objections, averring that the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board is an instrumentality and agency of the Commonwealth; that an action against the Board is an action against the Commonwealth; that the Commonwealth cannot be sued without its consent; and that there has been no such consent in this case. Appellant answered these preliminary objections.
The proceeding was transferred subsequently to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, where the At[182]*182torney General’s preliminary objections were sustained, with two judges dissenting, Biello v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 179 (1971), and the complaint was dismissed; this appeal followed.
This case raises the question of the immunity of an agency of the state from actions in tort.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity arrived in Pennsylvania in Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dallas 357 (1788). That case was a suit to recover the value of flour relocated by the Pennsylvania War Board pursuant to a legislative directive to prevent British capture of supplies should they occupy Philadelphia.
The plaintiff in Sparhawk did not contend “that, generally speaking, citizens may sue the State; but only that every Government, which is not absolutely despotic, has provided some means (in England, for instance, by petition in Chancery) to obtain a redress of injuries from the sovereign.” 1 Dallas at 361.
Chief Justice M’Kean responded by affirming the legislature’s right to order relocation of private belongings when the necessity of war demands. He was not impressed with the plaintiff’s plea that the loss be spread. “It is a rule, however, that it is better to suffer a private mischief, than a public inconvenience; and the rights of necessity form a part of our law.” 1 Dallas at 362.
Sparhawk was extended in John Black v. Rempublicam, 1 Yeates 110 (1792), a case in which Pennsylvania galley captains had seized private provisions while fleeing from the British across the Delaware River. The captains used the provisions to feed their own troops and promised the landowner compensation. The court held that since the captains had no authority to contract, there could be no recovery in contract, and, further that Sparhawk precluded recovery in tort.
Were sovereign immunity a creature of pure common law, we might be disposed to a consideration of the [183]*183abrogation of that much criticized doctrine.1 However, Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, inter alia: “Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.” This language consistently has been interpreted to mean that no suit may be maintained against the state in tort until the legislature specifically has provided for such an action. Meagher v. Commonwealth, 439 Pa. 532, 266 A. 2d 684 (1970); Bannard v. N.Y.S. Nat. Gas Corp., 404 Pa. 269, 172 A. 2d 306 (1961); Brewer v. Commonwealth, 345 Pa. 144, 27 A. 2d 53 (1942); Bell Telephone Co. v. Lewis, 313 Pa. 374, 169 A. 571 (1934); Collins v. Commonwealth, 262 Pa. 572, 106 A. 229 (1919); Fitler v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 406 (1858). Pennsylvania is thus consistent with the majority of the states of this nation who have refused to treat similar constitutional provisions as being self-executing.2 The rationale seems to have been that such a constitutional provision must be strictly construed since it is in derogation of the states’ inherent exemption from suit.
The question of whether a particular action is one against the Commonwealth is not to be determined [184]*184solely by reference to the nominal parties to the record. Rader v. Pa. Turnpike Commission, 407 Pa. 609, 182 A. 2d 199 (1962); Merchants’ Co. v. Gelder, 349 Pa. 1, 36 A. 2d 444 (1944); Bell Telephone Co. v. Lewis, supra.
In Rader, this Court held: “that the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission [is] an instrumentality of the Commonwealth engaged in a governmental function and therefore is not liable for . . . injuries and damages in a trespass action.” At page 611. (Emphasis in original.) We subsequently approved of immunity for agencies engaged in governmental function in Thomas v. Baird, 433 Pa. 482, 252 A. 2d 653 (1969) (Turnpike Authority); Roney v. General State Authority, 413 Pa. 218, 196 A. 2d 349 (1964) (General State Authority); and in Anderson Appeal, 408 Pa. 179, 182 A. 2d 514 (1962) (Delaware River Port Authority).
While in Pennsylvania we have not before expressly employed the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions when considering the sovereign immunity doctrine, it has nonetheless been implicitly present in our application of the doctrine. In many of our decisions where we have found the bar to exist, we have noted that the function being performed was a governmental one. Roney v. General State Authority, supra; Anderson Appeal, supra; Rader v. Pa. Turnpike Commission, supra, and Merchants’ Co. v. Gelder, supra.
In accepting the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions, we are appreciative of the difficulties experienced by our courts using this distinction in the context of the governmental immunity cases and are mindful of the warning of Mr. Justice Cohen that “perhaps there is no issue known to the law which is surrounded by more confusion.” Morris v. Mt. Lebanon Twp. Sch. Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 637, 144 A. 2d 737 (1958). See also Mr. Justice Musmanno’s dissent [185]*185in Boorse v. Springfield Twp., 377 Pa. 109, 103 A. 2d 708 (1954).
The sole issue remaining is whether the Liquor Control Board was acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity when it sold young Joseph Biello a bottle of whiskey. In Merchants’ Co. v. Gelder, supra, a case where a warehouseman sought contractual relief against the Liquor Control Board for liquor storage, we held that the State could prescribe the manner and procedure to be used in such suits because the Board enjoyed the State’s immunity. In Gelder, the court reasoned that the Board, while storing whiskey as a wholesaler, was performing an essentially governmental function under the exhaustive set of regulations set forth in our Liquor Code. Act of April 12, 1951, P. L. 90, Art. I, §101 et seq., 47 P.S. §1-101 et seq. We are unable to distinguish Gelder from the instant case. The retail sale of liquor herein engaged in by the board is as much a part of the Commonwealth’s comprehensive scheme to regulate the sale and consumption of alcohol as is storing the alcohol for distribution to the state stores, the activity in question in Gelder.
We do not believe, as appellant contends, that the Commonwealth is in the liquor business solely in order to raise revenue. If revenue were, in fact, the real purpose for the Liquor Control Board’s activities, it would not need to operate all retail outlets. Instead, a tax in the nature of a sales tax could have been enacted to raise all necessary revenue without the concommitant regulation.
Appellant also argues that by enacting §493(1) of the Liquor Code [47 P.S. §4-493(1)], the Legislature has, in the language of Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, “directed” that the Commonwealth may be sued in cases such as this. Section 493(1) of the Liquor Code provides: “It shall be unlawful ... [f]or . . . the board, or any employe, servant [186]*186or agent of . . . the board ... to sell . . . any liqnor ... to any minor. . . .”
According to appellant’s argument, the only possible explanation for the Legislature’s having made it unlawful for the Board to sell liquor to minors was to indicate that the Board could be held civilly liable for the consequences of such sales, since no criminal sanctions are imposed. However, Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution indicates that if the Commonwealth is to be liable to suit, the Legislature must direct the “manner and courts” in which such suits may be brought, as well as the types of cases in which suit is permitted. We do not believe that the enactment of §493(1) of the Liquor Code is the type of “direction” which the Constitution requires.
Consequently, because we believe that this case is controlled by G-elder, Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution requires that we affirm. Were this a case of first impression, we might interpret the language otherwise. However, the interpretation given by our courts is steeped in historical precedent apparently concurred in by the Legislature and the people of Pennsylvania, in that no effort has been made over the years to change the provision. We, therefore, believe that the meaning of this provision, interpreted as it has been for so long and so consistently, can now only be appropriately changed by legislative action.3
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Manderino took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice Eagen and Mr. Justice Pomeroy concur in the result.