1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRITANYA RANITA BEY, Case No. 23-cv-1042-BAS-BGS
12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING IN FORMA 14 STEVE SCHNEIDER, et al., PAUPERIS APPLICTION (ECF 15 Defendants. No. 2); and
16 (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 17 WITHOUT PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO 18 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 19
20 21 Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff Britanya Ranita Bey (“Bey”) brought this civil action on 22 June 5, 2023. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) That same day, Bey filed an application to proceed 23 in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (IFP App., ECF No. 2.) For the reasons set forth below, the 24 Court GRANTS Bey’s IFP Application (ECF No. 2), DISMISSES without prejudice the 25 Complaint (ECF No. 1); and GRANTS Bey leave to file a First Amended Complaint. 26 I. IFP APPLICATION 27 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 28 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 1 $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 2 prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted IFP status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 4 Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 5 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, indigency is the benchmark for whether a plaintiff may 6 proceed IFP. The determination of indigency falls within the district court’s sound 7 discretion. See Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding 8 that “[s]ection 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion 9 in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement on indigency”), 10 rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). A party need not be completely destitute to 11 satisfy the IFP indigency threshold. See Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 12 U.S. 331, 339–40. To qualify for IFP status, “an affidavit is sufficient which states that 13 one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for costs . . . and still be able to 14 provide himself and the dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339. 15 However, “care must be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered to 16 underwrite, at public expense, . . . the remonstrances of a suitor who is financially able, in 17 whole or in material part, to pull his own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 18 850 (D.R.I. 1984). District courts, therefore, tend to reject IFP applications where the 19 applicant can pay the filing fee with acceptable sacrifice to other expenses. See Skyler v. 20 Saul, No. 19-CV-1581-NLS, 2019 WL 4039650, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2019). 21 There is ample evidence on the record demonstrating Bey cannot afford the filing 22 fee. The affidavit proffered alongside the IFP Application indicates Bey has no gainful 23 employment, no funds in either a checking or savings account, and no tangible assets. 24 Based on this information, the Court GRANTS Bey’s IFP Application. (ECF No. 2.) 25 II. MANDATORY SCREENING OF PLEADING 26 A. Legal Standard 27 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), courts must sua sponte dismiss IFP complaints, 28 or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek 1 damages from defendants who are immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 2 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but 3 requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”); Chavez 4 v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)(B) 5 “mandates dismissal—even if dismissal comes before the defendants are served”). “The 6 provisions of section 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to [complaints filed by] prisoners,” but 7 extend to all IFP pleadings. Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per 8 curiam). 9 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 10 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 11 Civil Procedure [(“Rule”)] 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. 12 Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 13 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (instructing courts to “incorporate[] the familiar standard applied in 14 the context of failure to state a claim under [Rule] 12(b)(6)” when assessing the sufficiency 15 of an IFP pleading under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain 16 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. 17 R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The pleader fails to satisfy this requirement under Rule 8 if the factual 18 allegations in his or her complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court 19 plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 20 alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal 21 in such instances. Importantly, Rule 8 does not mandate “detailed factual allegations” in 22 support of a claim. Id. But “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 23 accusations” are patently insufficient. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 24 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 25 B. Discussion 26 The allegations in Bey’s Complaint are set forth in a single page. In essence, Bey 27 alleges that on April 4, 2023, Bey “delivered” a “common law copyright” to Defendants 28 “to put them on notice of copyright infringement of a private trust” under the name 1 “Britanya Ranita Lewis©.” (Compl. at p. 2.) In response, Defendant William P. Joslin, 2 Esq., emailed Bey “stating[,] [‘]your demand is refused.[’]” (Id.) Bey then “delivered” to 3 Defendants “a Conditional Acceptance Proof of Claim” on April 10.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRITANYA RANITA BEY, Case No. 23-cv-1042-BAS-BGS
12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING IN FORMA 14 STEVE SCHNEIDER, et al., PAUPERIS APPLICTION (ECF 15 Defendants. No. 2); and
16 (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 17 WITHOUT PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO 18 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 19
20 21 Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff Britanya Ranita Bey (“Bey”) brought this civil action on 22 June 5, 2023. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) That same day, Bey filed an application to proceed 23 in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (IFP App., ECF No. 2.) For the reasons set forth below, the 24 Court GRANTS Bey’s IFP Application (ECF No. 2), DISMISSES without prejudice the 25 Complaint (ECF No. 1); and GRANTS Bey leave to file a First Amended Complaint. 26 I. IFP APPLICATION 27 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 28 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 1 $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 2 prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted IFP status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 4 Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 5 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, indigency is the benchmark for whether a plaintiff may 6 proceed IFP. The determination of indigency falls within the district court’s sound 7 discretion. See Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding 8 that “[s]ection 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion 9 in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement on indigency”), 10 rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). A party need not be completely destitute to 11 satisfy the IFP indigency threshold. See Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 12 U.S. 331, 339–40. To qualify for IFP status, “an affidavit is sufficient which states that 13 one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for costs . . . and still be able to 14 provide himself and the dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339. 15 However, “care must be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered to 16 underwrite, at public expense, . . . the remonstrances of a suitor who is financially able, in 17 whole or in material part, to pull his own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 18 850 (D.R.I. 1984). District courts, therefore, tend to reject IFP applications where the 19 applicant can pay the filing fee with acceptable sacrifice to other expenses. See Skyler v. 20 Saul, No. 19-CV-1581-NLS, 2019 WL 4039650, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2019). 21 There is ample evidence on the record demonstrating Bey cannot afford the filing 22 fee. The affidavit proffered alongside the IFP Application indicates Bey has no gainful 23 employment, no funds in either a checking or savings account, and no tangible assets. 24 Based on this information, the Court GRANTS Bey’s IFP Application. (ECF No. 2.) 25 II. MANDATORY SCREENING OF PLEADING 26 A. Legal Standard 27 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), courts must sua sponte dismiss IFP complaints, 28 or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek 1 damages from defendants who are immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 2 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but 3 requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”); Chavez 4 v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)(B) 5 “mandates dismissal—even if dismissal comes before the defendants are served”). “The 6 provisions of section 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to [complaints filed by] prisoners,” but 7 extend to all IFP pleadings. Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per 8 curiam). 9 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 10 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 11 Civil Procedure [(“Rule”)] 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. 12 Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 13 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (instructing courts to “incorporate[] the familiar standard applied in 14 the context of failure to state a claim under [Rule] 12(b)(6)” when assessing the sufficiency 15 of an IFP pleading under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain 16 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. 17 R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The pleader fails to satisfy this requirement under Rule 8 if the factual 18 allegations in his or her complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court 19 plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 20 alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal 21 in such instances. Importantly, Rule 8 does not mandate “detailed factual allegations” in 22 support of a claim. Id. But “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 23 accusations” are patently insufficient. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 24 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 25 B. Discussion 26 The allegations in Bey’s Complaint are set forth in a single page. In essence, Bey 27 alleges that on April 4, 2023, Bey “delivered” a “common law copyright” to Defendants 28 “to put them on notice of copyright infringement of a private trust” under the name 1 “Britanya Ranita Lewis©.” (Compl. at p. 2.) In response, Defendant William P. Joslin, 2 Esq., emailed Bey “stating[,] [‘]your demand is refused.[’]” (Id.) Bey then “delivered” to 3 Defendants “a Conditional Acceptance Proof of Claim” on April 10. (Id.) It appears that, 4 in this document, Bey levied claims against Defendants “for antitrust violation laws [sic], 5 copyright infringement, defamation of character, false allegations, equity violations and/or 6 misrepresentations of antitrust for the online publication of a private trust.” (Id.) Bey gave 7 Defendants “10 days to respond.” (Id.) When Defendants did not respond, Bey “delivered” 8 to Defendants a “Notice of Default Opportunity to Cure and Contest Acceptance.” (Id.) 9 Bey gave Defendants a week to reply to this document. (Id.) Defendants allegedly ignored 10 it. (Id.) Bey alleges Defendants’ “non-response equates to tacit agreement” of their 11 violations” and their failure to “adhere to the Conditional Acceptance . . . places them in 12 dishonor.” (Id.) Bey then instituted this action, asking the Court to order, inter alia, each 13 Defendant to pay $1,000,000 in “compensatory damages, punitive damages, and emotional 14 distress.” (Id. at p.3.) 15 The Complaint appears to identify the claims Bey seeks to pursue against the 16 Defendants (and to chronologize the process Bey undertook to notify Defendants of these 17 apparent violations). But the Complaint crucially does not provide any facts supporting 18 each of the alleged causes of action. Hence, the Court simply does not understand the 19 factual basis or legal theory of any of Bey’s claims. The Complaint, therefore, clearly is 20 deficient through the lens of Rule 8’s “short-and-plain statement” requirement because it 21 fails to accomplish that Rule’s principal object: to provide “fair notice of what plaintiff’s 22 claim is and the grounds upon which it rests in order to enable [defendants] to prepare an 23 answer . . ., and to identify the nature of th[e] case.” Ísídro Mejía v. N.Y.P.D., 1:16-cv- 24 9706-GHW, 2019 WL 3412151, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2019) (quoting Middleton v. 25 United States, No. 10-CV-6057 (JFB)(ETB), 2012 WL 394559, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 26 2012)); see also Bowman v. Health & Human Servs. Agency, 3:21-cv-1287-BTM-MDD, 27 2022 WL 3030947, at *3 (S.D. Ca. Aug. 1, 2022) (dismissing complaint under § 28 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failing to abide by Rule (a)(2)’s notice requirement). Because the 1 Court does not understand Bey’s claims, it is unfair for Defendants to have to prepare an 2 answer to these vague and unsupported allegations. 3 A complaint that “contains no facts about what occurred, where the alleged 4 violations occurred, or how the defendants or any other person allegedly violated plaintiff’s 5 rights, . . . fails to articulate viable legal claim[].” See Chavez v. DHS Chain/Command, 6 No. 21-CV-7259 (LTS), 2021 WL 5853580, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2021) (dismissing IFP 7 complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as violative of Rule 8). For this reason, the Complaint 8 warrants dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B). Cf. Hussey v. N.Y. Police Dep’ts & 9 Precincts, No. 23-cv-2906 (LTS), 2023 WL 4106378, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2023) 10 (dismissing under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as violative of Rule 8 an IFP complaint that listed 11 claims but pled “no facts describing any of the specific events giving rise to [plaintiff’s] 12 claims”); Grimes v. A1-Auto Care, No. 21cv2093-LL-BLM, 2022 WL 959273, at *7 (S.D. 13 Cal. Mar. 30, 2022) (dismissing under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as violative of Rule 8 certain 14 claims in an IFP complaint that lacked supporting facts); Tamayo v. City of Glendale, No. 15 2:19-cv-10284-ODW(SK), 2020 WL 136633, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2020) (dismissing 16 under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as violative of Rule 8 an 88-page IFP complaint that “list[ed] 67 17 causes of action by parroting general elements of federal and state law claims without any 18 supporting facts,” including “the basic who, what, when, where, and why of [plaintiff’s] 19 claims against [d]efendants”). 20 * * * * 21 Having concluded the Complaint warrants dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 22 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court must determine whether that dismissal should be with 23 prejudice. Because the Court cannot say at this time there is no merit to the underlying 24 action, it GRANTS Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. If Bey decides to file a new 25 amended complaint, Bey should include a short and plain statement, which not only 26 identify the claims Bey is pressing against the Defendants, but that also provides the facts 27 Bey says support each of those claims and how each of the Defendants have harmed Bey. 28 The amendments need not be detailed. But Bey must include enough supporting facts in 1 amended complaint that enable Defendants to understand the claims against them and 2 || for the Court to plausibly infer the claims Bey alleges entitle Bey to relief. 3 CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, the Court: 5 1) GRANTS the IFP Application (ECF No. 2); 6 2) DISMISSES without prejudice the Complaint for failure to state a claim 7 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i1); and 8 3) GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff chooses 9 to file an Amended Complaint, it must be filed by no later than September 10 5.2023. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. ) fl +t. aif f 12 || DATED: August 3, 2023 iw UG A UWADd How. Cynthia Bashant 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 || ——- ' Bey is warned that failure to abide by that deadline may result in dismissal of the action. See 27 || Link vy. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (holding that courts are vested with the inherent power 28 to dismiss an action, including where a plaintiff has failed to prosecute the case or failed to comply with a court order).