Beverly v. Davis

Supreme Court of Colorado

Beverly v. Davis

648 P.2d 621, 1982 Colo. LEXIS 637

CourtSupreme Court of Colorado

DecidedJune 28, 1982

Docket81SA122

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 648 P.2d 621 (Beverly v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Beverly v. Davis, 648 P.2d 621, 1982 Colo. LEXIS 637 (Colo. 1982).

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HODGES, Chief Justice.

This appeal is from a district court judgment denying appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordering his extradition to the state of Texas. We affirm the judgment.

A Texas grand jury indicted Bruce Cane Beverly for aggravated robbery. He was later arrested in Colorado and charged in the district court with being a fugitive from justice. Section 16-19-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (1978 RepLVol. 8). Thereafter, pursuant to a demand for the extradition of Bruce Cane Beverly submitted by the state of Texas, a Colorado governor’s warrant was issued ordering his arrest and return to Texas.

At the hearing on his petition for writ of habeas corpus, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the requisition documents on the sole ground that his name was not as shown on the documents. A driver’s license and birth certificate were introduced which showed his name to be Bruce Lane Beverly and not Bruce Cane Beverly as shown in the requisition documents. Appellant, however, presented no additional evidence to disprove that he was the individual sought to be extradited, or that he was not also known by the name of Bruce Cane Beverly. It is significant to note also that appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus does not allege he is not in fact the same individual indicted in the state of Texas for aggravated robbery, or named in the extradition documents. The district court, therefore, denied his petition for habeas corpus and ordered his extradition to Texas.

Appellant again argues on appeal that the extradition documents were insufficient to establish that he is the fugitive sought by the state of Texas. We disagree. In Guy v. Nelson, Colo., 630 P.2d 610 (1981), this court recently rejected a similar argument as made here, and ruled that:

“The identity between the name in the extradition document and the name in the governor’s warrant establishes a pri-ma facie case that the person charged as a fugitive is indeed the fugitive sought by the demanding state.... Once a pri-ma facie showing of identity is made, the person charged as a fugitive must carry the burden of disproving the presumed identity.... Clear and convincing evidence must be shown by the accused that he is not the person sought in order to rebut the prima facie showing of identity....”

The extradition documents issued by the state of Texas and the Colorado governor’s warrant both set forth the name of the fugitive as Bruce Cane Beverly. Thus, the presumption arose that the appellant is in fact the fugitive sought by the state of Texas. The minor discrepancy in the middle name, standing alone, does not affect this presumption under the facts of this case where appellant remained silent at the hearing with reference to any showing that he was not in fact the fugitive sought by the state of Texas, and where his petition for a writ of habeas corpus does not allege he is not in fact the fugitive named in the extradition documents. See Richardson v. Cronin, Colo., 621 P.2d 949 (1980); Samples v. Cronin, 189 Colo. 40, 536 P.2d 306 (1975); Dilworth v. Leach, 183 Colo. 206, 515 P.2d 1130 (1973).

As stated in section 13-45-103(1), C.R.S. 1973, habeas corpus proceedings are summary in nature. Under the facets of this [623]*623case, we therefore hold that it was incumbent upon the appellant to make some showing in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus or at the hearing that he was not in fact the person sought by Texas authorities. See In re Extradition of Leonard, 27 Ill.App.3d 870, 327 N.E.2d 480 (1975). Here, the appellant relies solely on a technical discrepancy in a middle name in challenging the sufficiency of the extradition documents. Under summary proceedings, sole reliance on such a technical item, when appellant does not allege or represent that he is not the fugitive, will not suffice to defeat extradition. See Wollweber v. Martin, 226 Ga. 20, 172 S.E.2d 605 (1970).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

LOHR, J., dissents. DUBOFSKY, J., does not participate.

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HODGES, Chief Justice.

This appeal is from a district court judgment denying appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordering his extradition to the state of Texas. We affirm the judgment.

A Texas grand jury indicted Bruce Cane Beverly for aggravated robbery. He was later arrested in Colorado and charged in the district court with being a fugitive from justice. Section 16-19-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (1978 RepLVol. 8). Thereafter, pursuant to a demand for the extradition of Bruce Cane Beverly submitted by the state of Texas, a Colorado governor’s warrant was issued ordering his arrest and return to Texas.

At the hearing on his petition for writ of habeas corpus, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the requisition documents on the sole ground that his name was not as shown on the documents. A driver’s license and birth certificate were introduced which showed his name to be Bruce Lane Beverly and not Bruce Cane Beverly as shown in the requisition documents. Appellant, however, presented no additional evidence to disprove that he was the individual sought to be extradited, or that he was not also known by the name of Bruce Cane Beverly. It is significant to note also that appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus does not allege he is not in fact the same individual indicted in the state of Texas for aggravated robbery, or named in the extradition documents. The district court, therefore, denied his petition for habeas corpus and ordered his extradition to Texas.

Appellant again argues on appeal that the extradition documents were insufficient to establish that he is the fugitive sought by the state of Texas. We disagree. In Guy v. Nelson, Colo., 630 P.2d 610 (1981), this court recently rejected a similar argument as made here, and ruled that:

“The identity between the name in the extradition document and the name in the governor’s warrant establishes a pri-ma facie case that the person charged as a fugitive is indeed the fugitive sought by the demanding state.... Once a pri-ma facie showing of identity is made, the person charged as a fugitive must carry the burden of disproving the presumed identity.... Clear and convincing evidence must be shown by the accused that he is not the person sought in order to rebut the prima facie showing of identity....”

The extradition documents issued by the state of Texas and the Colorado governor’s warrant both set forth the name of the fugitive as Bruce Cane Beverly. Thus, the presumption arose that the appellant is in fact the fugitive sought by the state of Texas. The minor discrepancy in the middle name, standing alone, does not affect this presumption under the facts of this case where appellant remained silent at the hearing with reference to any showing that he was not in fact the fugitive sought by the state of Texas, and where his petition for a writ of habeas corpus does not allege he is not in fact the fugitive named in the extradition documents. See Richardson v. Cronin, Colo., 621 P.2d 949 (1980); Samples v. Cronin, 189 Colo. 40, 536 P.2d 306 (1975); Dilworth v. Leach, 183 Colo. 206, 515 P.2d 1130 (1973).

As stated in section 13-45-103(1), C.R.S. 1973, habeas corpus proceedings are summary in nature. Under the facets of this [623]*623case, we therefore hold that it was incumbent upon the appellant to make some showing in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus or at the hearing that he was not in fact the person sought by Texas authorities. See In re Extradition of Leonard, 27 Ill.App.3d 870, 327 N.E.2d 480 (1975). Here, the appellant relies solely on a technical discrepancy in a middle name in challenging the sufficiency of the extradition documents. Under summary proceedings, sole reliance on such a technical item, when appellant does not allege or represent that he is not the fugitive, will not suffice to defeat extradition. See Wollweber v. Martin, 226 Ga. 20, 172 S.E.2d 605 (1970).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

LOHR, J., dissents. DUBOFSKY, J., does not participate.

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648 P.2d 621, 1982 Colo. LEXIS 637, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beverly-v-davis-colo-1982.

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