USCA11 Case: 18-14397 Date Filed: 07/16/2021 Page: 1 of 21
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-14397 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 7:16-cv-01334-LSC
BEVERLY SPENCER, C.B.S. PROPERTIES LLC, B & V WRECKER SERVICE INC,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
SHERIFF JONATHAN BENISON, in his individual and official capacities,
Defendant-Appellant,
DREAM INC, BELLE MERE PROPERTIES, LLC, ACCUITY CAPITAL GROUP LLC, BERNARD GOMEZ, individually and as registered agent of Belle Mere Properties LLC, CHE D. WILLIAMSON, individually and as registered agent of Belle Mere Properties LLC,
Defendants-Appellees. USCA11 Case: 18-14397 Date Filed: 07/16/2021 Page: 2 of 21
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ________________________
(July 16, 2021)
Before NEWSOM and BRANCH, Circuit Judges, and BAKER,* District Judge.
BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
Sheriff Jonathan Benison appeals from the district court’s denial of summary
judgment to him in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. Beverly Spencer sued Benison,
alleging that Benison violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by
ordering him to remove cones and vehicles that were preventing Spencer’s
neighbor from completing construction that Spencer alleged encroached on his
property. The district court denied Benison’s motion for summary judgment
because it found that Benison acted outside the scope of his discretionary authority
when he ordered Spencer to remove the cones and vehicles and thus was not
entitled to qualified immunity on Spencer’s individual capacity claims, and also
that Spencer had presented adequate evidence of a constitutional violation to
sustain his § 1983 claims against Benison in both his individual and official
capacities. Because we conclude that Benison was acting within the scope of his
* Honorable R. Stan Baker, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Georgia, sitting by designation.
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discretionary authority when he ordered Spencer to remove the cones and vehicles
and that Spencer failed to present adequate evidence of a constitutional violation to
sustain his § 1983 claims, we reverse.
I. Background 1
A. Facts
On April 1, 2011, Belle Mere Properties, LLC, purchased a parcel of real
estate from Spencer.2 As part of the sale, Spencer granted Belle Mere “an
easement of 25 feet on either side of the existing power line . . . for the purpose of
ingress and egre[ss].” Belle Mere then leased the property to Accuity Capital
Group, LLC, which leased the property to Dream, Inc., which began operating a
bingo hall on the property, called Frontier Bingo.
Shortly thereafter, Spencer and Belle Mere began to disagree over the
boundaries of the easement. In late 2015 or early 2016, Belle Mere decided to
expand a previously constructed roadway running through the easement from
Frontier Bingo to U.S. Highway 11. On January 13, 2016, Spencer called 911 to
1 For purposes of this appeal, we will “take the facts that the district court assumed when it denied qualified immunity as a given.” Stanley v. City of Dalton, 219 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000). 2 The plaintiffs in this lawsuit are Beverly Spencer, CBS Properties, LLC, and B & V Wrecker Services, Inc. We will refer to the plaintiffs collectively as “Spencer.” We will also refer to defendants Belle Mere, Bernard Gomez, and Che Williamson collectively as “Belle Mere.” If we need to identify Beverly Spencer, Bernard Gomez, or Che Williamson individually, we will use their full names.
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report that a bulldozer was trespassing on his property. A sheriff’s deputy
responded to the call and asked the bulldozer operator to stop working. The
bulldozer operator complied with the deputy’s request. On January 18, 2016,
Spencer again called 911 to report that a bulldozer was trespassing on his property.
Another sheriff’s deputy responded to the call and asked the bulldozer operator to
stop working, and the bulldozer operator complied. Finally, on February 24, 2016,
Spencer called 911 to complain about continued construction. This time, Benison
responded to the call.
When Benison arrived, he observed that Spencer had placed cones and
vehicles to block construction from taking place. 3 He also observed that traffic
was backed up on U.S. Highway 11. Benison told Spencer that he was concerned
that the cones and vehicles would prevent customers from being able to access
Frontier Bingo and that the obstructions were a public safety issue because the fire
department might not be able to access Frontier Bingo in case of an emergency. 4
He then said “I’ve got customers in here. People got customers in here. You can’t
3 We note that the parties dispute whether Benison knew that the cones and vehicles were on Spencer’s property. But even assuming, as the district court did, that “Sheriff Benison knew of the boundaries of the easement,” “that Frontier Bingo and its construction workers were trespassing on [Spencer’s] property,” and that Benison “knowingly allowed the construction workers to continue to trespass on [Spencer’s] land,” Benison is entitled to summary judgment on Spencer’s claims. 4 Spencer alleges that, after Benison arrived, Benison entered and exited Frontier Bingo with Bernard Gomez before speaking to Spencer.
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block these folks.” Spencer denied that his cones and vehicles were preventing
people from entering or exiting the bingo hall.5
Benison then ordered Spencer to remove the cones and vehicles and
threatened to arrest Spencer if he continued to block the road. While at the scene,
Benison spoke by phone with Spencer’s lawyer. Spencer’s lawyer informed
Benison that “they were attempting to get an injunction to prevent the construction
workers from coming onto Spencer’s property.”6 Spencer alleges that, as a result
of Benison’s order, he stopped confronting Belle Mere about its construction and
that, accordingly, Belle Mere ultimately was able to complete the construction of a
roadway that encroached on his property. Belle Mere’s road construction, Spencer
contends, deprived him of his property.
Spencer asserts that Benison had a personal financial interest in the success
of Frontier Bingo. Under the Alabama Constitution, Benison had the authority to
“promulgate rules and regulations for the licensing, permitting, and operation of
bingo games within [Greene County].” Ala. Const. amend. 743. In 2011, pursuant
to this authority, Benison promulgated the Rules and Regulations for the Operation
of Bingo Within Greene County Alabama (“Rules and Regulations”). The Rules
5 Although Spencer alleged that “[n]othing was blocking the roadway to hinder any vehicle from entering or exiting the . . . property,” and that his “vehicles were not blocking access to the . . . bingo hall,” he did not dispute that traffic was backed up on U.S. Highway 11. 6 Spencer failed to present any evidence that he pursued litigation or continued to seek an injunction in state court after Benison issued the order.
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and Regulations provided that Benison had the authority to license and regulate
bingo halls in Greene County and that the Greene County Sherriff’s Office would
receive half of each $2,500.00 license fee paid by the bingo halls. Subsequent
amendments to the Rules and Regulations provided that the Greene County
Sheriff’s Office would receive $110 a month for each electronic bingo machine.
B. Procedural History
On August 16, 2016, Spencer sued Benison in his individual and official
capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of property and liberty rights,
and conspiracy to commit § 1983 violations.7 He alleged that Benison deprived
him of property without due process and that Benison conspired with others to
“take and use” his property “without due process or compensation.”8 In particular,
he alleged that, because of Benison’s actions, Belle Mere had been able to “buil[d]
a roadway outside the bounds of [its] easement and on [his] property,” and
“remove[] dirt and many trees from [his] property for [its] own use.” After
discovery, Benison moved for summary judgment on Spencer’s claims and
asserted the defense of qualified immunity.
7 Spencer also sued Gomez, Williamson, Belle Mere, Accuity, and DREAM; however, the claims against those defendants are not the subject of this appeal. 8 Spencer also alleged state-law claims against Benison, but the district court dismissed those claims after finding that Benison was entitled to absolute immunity under Alabama law for those claims because he was “executing his duties as sheriff” at the relevant time.
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On October 9, 2018, the district court denied Benison’s motion for summary
judgment. It found that Benison was not entitled to qualified immunity on
Spencer’s individual capacity claims because he “failed to establish that he was
acting within the scope of his discretionary authority” when he ordered Spencer to
remove the cones and vehicles. It also found that Benison was not entitled to
summary judgment on Spencer’s individual or official capacity claims because
Spencer had presented sufficient evidence of a constitutional violation, at that stage
of the proceedings, to sustain his § 1983 constitutional and conspiracy claims. 9
Benison timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Benison de
novo. Patel v. City of Madison, 959 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2020). “The court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1246 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2010). We also review issues of appellate jurisdiction de novo. Patel, 959
F.3d at 1337.
9 The district court had previously dismissed Spencer’s § 1983 claim “[t]o the extent that [Spencer sought] money damages from Benison in his official capacity,” but permitted Spencer’s claims for injunctive relief to proceed against Benison in his official capacity.
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III. Appellate Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, Spencer argues that we lack appellate jurisdiction over
this interlocutory appeal because Benison has only appealed issues of evidentiary
sufficiency. See Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e
lack interlocutory appellate jurisdiction . . . where the sole issues on appeal are
issues of evidentiary sufficiency.”). In general, “we are . . . barred from
entertaining appeals of non-final orders.” Hall v. Flournoy, 975 F.3d 1269, 1274
(11th Cir. 2020); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States . . . .”). But under the “collateral order doctrine,” we may review “some
determinations, including certain denials of qualified immunity . . . even though
the underlying case is still ongoing in the trial court.” 10 Hall, 975 F.3d at 1274. In
particular, we may review the denial of a claim of qualified immunity “to the
extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530
(1985); see Hall, 975 F.3d at 1276 (“[T]he Supreme Court has reiterated that when
legal questions of qualified immunity are raised—either to determine whether any
constitutional right was violated or whether the violation of that right was clearly
established—interlocutory appellate jurisdiction exists.”); Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1485
10 A collateral order is a decision that “(1) conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, (2) resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Hall, 975 F.3d at 1274.
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(holding that we may exercise jurisdiction “where the denial is based even in part
on a disputed issue of law”).
We have jurisdiction over Benison’s appeal because it turns on issues of law.
Benison disputes the level of generality the district court used to assess the scope
of his discretionary authority, which is an issue of law. See Estate of Cummings v.
Davenport, 906 F.3d 934, 940 (11th Cir. 2018) (treating the scope of an officer’s
discretionary authority as an issue of law). He also challenges whether Spencer
can establish a “violation of a constitutional right” and whether Spencer’s
“constitutional right[s] [were] ‘clearly established’ at the time” he acted—both
issues of law as well. Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1485 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S.
226, 232 (1991)). Accordingly, we have appellate jurisdiction to entertain this
appeal.
IV. Spencer’s Individual Capacity Claims
The district court found that Benison acted outside the scope of his
discretionary authority when he ordered Spencer to remove the cones and vehicles
and that Spencer sufficiently demonstrated, at this stage of the proceedings, that
Benison violated clearly established law under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Benison argues that the district court erred in denying him summary
judgment on Spencer’s individual capacity claims on qualified immunity grounds.
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“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To invoke the defense of qualified
immunity, a government official must have been acting within the scope of his
“discretionary authority” when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. Grider, 618
F.3d at 1254 n.19. After a government official establishes that he was acting
within the scope of his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
show that the official’s conduct (1) violated federal law (2) that was clearly
established at the relevant time. Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1281
(11th Cir. 1998). This “two-pronged analysis may be done in whatever order is . . .
most appropriate for the case.”11 Grider, 618 F.3d at 1254 (citing Pearson, 555
U.S. at 236).
11 Spencer argues that we may not address the district court’s analysis of the merits of his § 1983 claim. He maintains that the district court’s discussion of these issues was dictum because it had already concluded that Benison acted outside the scope of his discretionary authority and was not entitled to qualified immunity. We disagree. “[I]n this circuit additional or alternative holdings are not dicta, but instead are as binding as solitary holdings.” Bravo v. United States, 532 F.3d 1154, 1162 (11th Cir. 2008). Thus, we may address the district court’s analysis of the merits of Spencer’s § 1983 claim.
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A Scope of Benison’s Discretionary Authority
Benison argues that the district court erred when it found that he was acting
outside the scope of his discretionary authority when he ordered Spencer to remove
the cones and vehicles. To prove that he acted within the scope of his
discretionary authority, Benison was required to show that he acted: “(1) . . .
pursuant to the performance of his duties, and (2) within the scope of his
authority.” Davenport, 906 F.3d at 940 (quoting Harbert Int’l, 157 F.3d at 1282).
Put differently, he was required to show that he was “(a) performing a legitimate
job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through means that
were within his power to utilize.” Id. (quoting Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.
Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004)).
The district court framed its inquiry as “whether it is within a sheriff’s
responsibilities as a law enforcement officer to order the removal of a private
landowner’s property, while it is on that landowner’s property, absent a court
order.” But this framing of the inquiry was erroneous because it failed to strip out
the allegedly illegal conduct—ordering the removal of a private landowner’s
property, while it is on that landowner’s property, absent a court order. See
Harbert Int’l, 157 F.3d at 1282 (“The inquiry is not whether it was within the
defendant’s authority to commit the allegedly illegal act. Framed that way, the
inquiry is no more than an untenable tautology.” (quotation omitted)); Carruth v.
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Bentley, 942 F.3d 1047, 1055 (11th Cir. 2019) (“A plaintiff cannot plead around
qualified immunity simply by saying that the official was animated by an unlawful
purpose. The exception would swallow the rule.”).
Instead, the district court should have “look[ed] to the general nature of
[Benison’s] action, temporarily putting aside the fact that it may have been
committed for an unconstitutional purpose, in an unconstitutional manner, to an
unconstitutional extent, or under constitutionally inappropriate circumstances.”
Davenport, 906 F.3d at 940 (quoting Mikko v. City of Atlanta, 857 F.3d 1136, 1144
(11th Cir. 2017)); see Harbert Int’l, 157 F.3d at 1282 (asking “whether the act
complained of, if done for a proper purpose, would be within, or reasonably related
to, the outer perimeter of an official’s discretionary duties” (quotation omitted)).
“[T]o pass the first step of the discretionary function test for qualified
immunity, the defendant must have been performing a function that, but for the
alleged constitutional infirmity, would have fallen with his legitimate job
description.” Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1266. “[W]e must be sure not to characterize
and assess the defendant’s act at too high a level of generality” because “[n]early
every act performed by a government employee can be described, in general terms,
as ostensibly ‘furthering the public interest.’” Id. Thus, “[i]f we jump to such a
high level of abstraction, it becomes impossible to determine whether the
employee was truly acting within the proper scope of his job-related activities.” Id.
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We therefore must evaluate a government official’s actions at “the minimum level
of generality necessary to remove the constitutional taint.” Id.
“We look to state law to determine the scope of [Benison’s] discretionary
authority.” Davenport, 906 F.3d at 940. Under Alabama law, “[a] sheriff and his
or her deputies are law-enforcement officers authorized to preserve peace and
public order.” Ex parte Fielding, 86 So. 3d 354, 358 (Ala. 2011). Sheriffs have
the duty to “ferret out crime” and “perform such . . . duties as are or may be
imposed by law.” Ala. Code § 36-22-3. “His duty in this respect is similar to that
of a policeman.” Jones v. Buckelew, 25 So. 2d 23, 25 (Ala. 1946). Further, the
motor vehicle and traffic laws of Alabama provide that “[o]utside a business . . . no
person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or
unattended, upon the roadway when it is practicable to stop, park, or so leave such
vehicle off the roadway . . . .” Ala. Code. § 32-5A-136(a). The motor vehicle and
traffic laws also provide that “no person shall . . . park a vehicle . . . [a]longside or
opposite any street excavation or obstruction when stopping, standing, or parking
would obstruct traffic” or “in front of a public or private driveway.” Ala. Code
§ 32-5A-137(a)(1) & (2). Accordingly, it was a legitimate job-related function for
Benison, as an Alabama sheriff, to seek the removal of cones and vehicles for the
purposes of achieving public safety.
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Benison also acted “through means that were within his power to utilize.”
See Davenport, 906 F.3d at 940 (quoting Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1265). Here,
Benison carried out his duties by verbally commanding Spencer to remove the
cones and vehicles and by threatening arrest should he fail to comply. Spencer has
not argued that these specific means were beyond Benison’s “power to utilize.”
Thus, we conclude that Benison was acting within the scope of his discretionary
authority.
B. Due Process Clause
Benison argues that the district court erred in finding that Spencer had
presented sufficient evidence, at this stage of the proceedings, to prove a violation
of clearly established law under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.12 “Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard before any governmental deprivation of a property interest.” Vineyard v.
Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1356 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Zipperer v. City of Fort
Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995)). To prevail on his § 1983 due process
claim, Spencer was required to prove three elements: “(1) a deprivation of a
constitutionally-protected . . . property interest; (2) state action; and (3)
constitutionally-inadequate process.” Catron v. City of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d
12 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232
(11th Cir. 2003)). The district court found that, at this stage of the proceedings,
Spencer “presented sufficient evidence that [he] was deprived of a constitutionally
protected property interest,” “that there was state action,” and that there was
constitutionally-inadequate process.
Benison does not dispute that his order to move cones and vehicles
constituted “state action,” but he contends that the district court erred by finding
that his actions caused a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected property
interest. “A § 1983 claim requires proof of an affirmative causal connection
between the defendant’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional
deprivation.” Troupe v. Sarasota Cnty., 419 F.3d 1160, 1165 (11th Cir. 2005); see
Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007). Spencer alleges that
he suffered “the taking and disturbance of [his] soil and timber” and the denial of
his “use of and access to [his] property.”13 The district court assumed that
Benison’s order to remove the cones and vehicles caused Spencer to suffer those
injuries. But Spencer provided no evidence that Benison’s order caused him to
13 We assume, without deciding, that Belle Mere’s construction deprived Spencer of a constitutionally-protected property interest. To the extent Spencer argues that Benison’s order to move cones and vehicles temporarily was itself a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected property interest, such a temporary deprivation is de minimis and cannot support his claims. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1997) (“There is, of course a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned.”).
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suffer those injuries. Instead, he alleged that “as a result of Sheriff Benison’s
order, he stopped confronting Frontier Bingo, and it was able to complete
construction that encroached upon his property.”
This allegation was plainly inadequate to establish the required causal
connection between Benison’s order and the alleged deprivation. Under § 1983,
Benison was “responsible for the natural and foreseeable consequences of [his]
actions.” Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1168 (11th Cir. 2000); see id. (“[A]
plaintiff must show that . . . [their] injuries and damages were the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of the tortious acts or omissions in issue.”). But
Spencer’s decision to stop confronting Frontier Bingo about its construction was
not a natural and foreseeable consequence of Benison’s order, and Spencer thus
failed to demonstrate that Benison’s actions caused him to be deprived of a
constitutionally-protected property interest. See Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d
1047, 1056 (“The requisite causal relation for a § 1983 claim does not exist when
the continuum between Defendant’s action and the ultimate harm is occupied by
the conduct of deliberative and autonomous decision-makers.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). In fact, after Benison issued the order, Spencer’s
lawyers informed him that they were seeking an injunction to prevent the
construction from continuing. Spencer’s later decision not to pursue litigation or
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continue to seek an injunction in state court lacks an adequate causal connection to
Benison’s order.
Because Spencer failed to show that Benison’s actions caused a deprivation
of a constitutionally-protected property interest, Benison is entitled to summary
judgment on Spencer’s due process claim in his individual capacity.
C. Takings Clause
Benison also argues that the district court erred in finding that Spencer
presented sufficient evidence, at this stage of the proceedings, to prove a violation
of clearly established law under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.14 A
taking must be the “intended or . . . foreseeable result of authorized government
action.” Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 39 (2012); see
Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A]
taking only results when the government intends to invade a protected property
interest or the asserted invasion is the direct, natural, or probable result of an
authorized activity and not the incidental or consequential injury inflicted by the
action.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Spencer had “the burden
of proof to establish that the government action caused [his] injury.” St. Bernard
14 The Takings Clause provides: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V; see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994) (acknowledging that the Takings Clause was “made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment”).
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Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also In re
Upstream Addicks & Barker (Tex.) Flood-Control Reservoirs, 146 Fed. Cl. 219,
257 (2019) (“Establishing causation is a vital component of the foreseeability
inquiry.”). Foreseeability in this context is an objective inquiry. See Moden v.
United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1344 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
The district court found that Benison caused a taking by giving “Frontier
Bingo’s customers a ‘continuous right to pass to and fro’” across Spencer’s
property. 15 But Benison did not give Frontier Bingo’s customers such a right—
rather, he ordered Spencer to remove vehicles and cones that he claimed were
creating a public safety issue. Spencer argues that he stopped confronting Frontier
Bingo because of Benison’s order, which allowed Frontier Bingo to complete the
construction that encroached on his property. But Benison’s order cannot
reasonably be construed as an order for Spencer to stop confronting Frontier
Bingo. Spencer’s unilateral decision to do so—and his failure to pursue litigation
or continue to seek an injunction—is what caused the alleged taking. Thus,
Spencer failed to establish that Benison’s actions caused a taking. See Cary v.
15 A per se taking occurs when the government directly appropriates private property. Chmielewski v. City of St. Pete Beach, 890 F.3d 942, 949 (11th Cir. 2018). A taking can also occur “when the government gives third parties ‘a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed,’” or even when the government commits “a temporary or intermittent invasion of private property.” Id. (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987)).
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United States, 552 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[I]njury may not be
foreseeable if an intervening cause breaks the chain of causation.” (quotation
omitted)); L & W Constr. LLC v. United States, 148 Fed. Cl. 417, 424 (2020) (“A
mere causal link through the agency of a third force, perhaps appropriate in a tort
context, is not sufficient to allege a taking.”). Because Spencer failed to prove that
Benison’s order caused a taking, Benison is entitled to summary judgment on
Spencer’s takings claim in his individual capacity.
V. Spencer’s § 1983 Conspiracy Claim
Benison next argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Spencer’s
§ 1983 conspiracy claim. The district court denied Benison’s motion for summary
judgment on that claim, finding that Spencer “presented sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to infer that . . . Benison reached an agreement to violate [his]
constitutional rights.”
Because Spencer failed to establish an underlying violation of his
constitutional rights, which is required to sustain a § 1983 conspiracy claim, we
reverse the district court’s denial of Benison’s motion for summary judgment on
Spencer’s § 1983 conspiracy claim. See Grider, 618 F.3d at 1260 (“A plaintiff
may state a § 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights by showing
a conspiracy existed that resulted in the actual denial of some underlying right.”);
Corey Airport Servs., Inc. v. Decosta, 587 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2009) (per
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curiam) (noting that “a plaintiff must demonstrate a denial of constitutional rights
to sustain a conspiracy claim under § 1983”).
VI. Spencer’s Official Capacity Claims
Benison’s final argument is that he is entitled to summary judgment on
Spencer’s official capacity claims. Although “[w]e do not have interlocutory
appellate jurisdiction to review a denial of summary judgment on an official
capacity claim standing alone,” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1272 (11th Cir.
1999), we may exercise pendant appellate jurisdiction to review those claims to the
extent that they are “inextricably intertwined with an appealable decision,” Hudson
v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). “Matters may
be sufficiently intertwined where they implicate the same facts and the same law.”
Smith v. LePage, 834 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted; alteration adopted). Here, we choose to exercise pendant
appellate jurisdiction over Spencer’s official capacity claims because the resolution
of those claims is inextricably intertwined with our resolution of Spencer’s
individual capacity claims. See id.
We have already concluded that Spencer failed to establish a violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Because those alleged violations form the basis of Spencer’s
official capacity claims, the two sets of claims “implicate the same facts and the
20 USCA11 Case: 18-14397 Date Filed: 07/16/2021 Page: 21 of 21
same law,” Smith, 834 F.3d at 1292 (quotation omitted; alteration adopted), and are
inextricably intertwined. Because Spencer failed to establish a violation of his
constitutional rights, Benison is entitled to summary judgment on Spencer’s
official capacity claims. See Hudgins v. City of Ashburn, 890 F.2d 396, 407 (11th
Cir. 1989).
VII. Conclusion
For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s order denying Benison’s
motion for summary judgment.
REVERSED.