Bettis v. Metropolitan Correction Center

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 4, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-07496
StatusUnknown

This text of Bettis v. Metropolitan Correction Center (Bettis v. Metropolitan Correction Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bettis v. Metropolitan Correction Center, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DELOECCUTMREONNTIC ALLY FILED SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOC #: DATE FILED: 10/4 /2021 ZUBEARU BETTIS, Plaintiff, -against- METROPOLITAN CORRECTIONAL CENTER; BUREAU OF PRISONS NORTH EAST REGION 21-CV-7496 (VEC) DIRECTOR; L. N’DIAYE, WARDEN ORDER OF SERVICE METROPOLITAN CORR. CENTER, N.Y.; LT. PEREZ; FACILITY DIRECTOR MCC NY; DR. BEAUDOIN; WALKES, COUNSELOR MCC NY; BULLOCK, COUNSELOR MCC NY; JANE DOE, PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT, Defendants. VALERIE CAPRONI, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated in the Westchester County Jail, brings this pro se action alleging that, while he was detained in the Metropolitan Correctional Center, Defendants violated his rights. By order dated September 28, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the

court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. DISCUSSION Because Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by employees of the federal government, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’ s complaint as asserting claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (“[Bivens] is the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under [§ 1983].”). A. Metropolitan Correctional Center Plaintiff’s claims against the Metropolitan Correctional Center must be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides that an action may be maintained against a “person” who has deprived another of rights under the “Constitution and Laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Metropolitan Correctional Center is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state is not a “person” for the purpose of § 1983 claims); Zuckerman v. Appellate Div., Second Dep’t Supreme Court, 421 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir. 1970) (court not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Whitley v. Westchester Cnty. Corr. Fac. Admin., No. 97-CV-420 (SS), 1997 WL 659100, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1997) (correctional facility or jail not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the Metropolitan Correctional Center are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. Bureau of Prisons North East Region Director Plaintiff’s claims against the Bureau of Prisons North East Region Director must also be dismissed. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants’ direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’ t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020).

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Murray v. Pataki
378 F. App'x 50 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Tangreti v. Bachmann
983 F.3d 609 (Second Circuit, 2020)

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Bluebook (online)
Bettis v. Metropolitan Correction Center, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bettis-v-metropolitan-correction-center-nysd-2021.