Larry D. Vaught, Judge.
Appellant Victor Bettis appeals the trial court’s order modifying the divorce decree that extended and increased alimony payments to his former wife, appellee Wendy Bettis. We affirm.
Victor and Wendy were divorced in 2002. They have three children — Megan, Jacqueline, and Evan. Jacqueline and Evan were minors at the time of the divorce, age sixteen and fourteen respectively. Jacqueline suffers from cerebral palsy and is confined to a wheelchair. Although Jacqueline requires twenty-four hour a day care, she is currently enrolled at the University of Central Arkansas and maintains a 3.0 grade-point average.
The divorce decree awarded custody of Jacqueline and Evan to Wendy; awarded Wendy child support for Jacqueline and Evan; acknowledged that child support for Jacqueline would continue beyond the age of majority because of her disability; and awarded $1000 per month in alimony to Wendy until Evan graduated from high school.
In November 2004, the trial court entered an order that, among other things, stated that child support would continue for Jacqueline due to her disability; however, the parties agreed that child support for Jacqueline was abated as of May 1, 2004, so that she could receive government assistance.1 According to the testimony at trial, Jacqueline is not entitled to government benefits if Wendy receives child-support payments for Jacqueline.
On March 20, 2006, Victor filed a motion for termination of alimony and child support. He alleged that child support payments for Evan should be terminated, because Evan turned eighteen and was about to graduate from high school. Wendy conceded this issue, and the trial court terminated these payments. Victor also alleged that alimony should be terminated because the divorce decree stated that alimony will be terminated upon Evan’s graduation from high school. Wendy filed a response and counter-motion seeking the continuation and increase of alimony.
At trial, Wendy testified that she is employed as a teacher at the Cathedral School where she has worked for twelve years. Her salary for the 2006-07 school year was $33,000. Since the divorce, her salary has increased $5100. She fives in the home that she and Victor built to accommodate Jacqueline’s special needs. The testimony was undisputed that Wendy is the primary-care giver for Jacqueline year round and that Jacqueline needs assistance with every task. Also, while Jacqueline is in college during the school year, she fives with Wendy during the weekends, holidays, and summers.
Victor testified that he is employed with Remington Arms where he earns $82,500 a year. He testified that since the divorce,his salary has increased in excess of $10,000. He admitted that Wendy is the primary care giver for Jacqueline, but he testified that he provides help when needed.
Lyles Henry testified on behalf of Wendy as an expert witness. He reviewed Victor’s tax returns and his Affidavit of Financial Means. Mr. Henry testified that Victor had a net annual income of $60,022 and expenses of $36,732. Therefore, Mr. Henry concluded that Victor had the ability to pay $1000-$2000 per month in alimony.
The trial court subsequently entered an order finding that there had been a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the divorce decree justifying an increase in the duration and amount of alimony awarded to Wendy. The trial court stated:
The substantial change in circumstances include the following:
a. The Defendant’s annual income increased by at least $10,000 since the entry of the Divorce Decree and the Plaintiffs annual income increased by at least $5000 since the entry of the Divorce Decree.
b. The Defendant received a $30,000 bonus from his employer.
c. The child support for Jacqueline has been abated. The Plaintiff anticipated at the time of the divorce that she would be receiving child support payments to assist in Jacqueline’s care and to provide her a home. Plaintiff is not receiving child support payments to assist her in the care of Jacqueline, who is an adult and who is in need of care because of her disability.
d. Jacqueline is attending college.
e. The Defendant is not paying any child support for Jacqueline and therefore has a higher level of income than he anticipated at the time of the divorce.
f. Plaintiff provides a substantial amount of care for Jacqueline.
g. Either of the parties could have chosen to provide the care for their adult daughter, who is in need of substantial care, however, the party who provided the care for Jacqueline was Plaintiff.
The trial court further stated that it considered the tax effect of Victor’s continued alimony payments. The court found that Wendy’s weekly income was approximately $512 while Victor’s weekly income was approximately $1,184.55. The trial court then awarded alimony to Wendy in the amount of $1150 per month and awarded her $3000 in attorney’s fees and expenses. Victor has appealed from this order.
Victor first argues that the trial court erred in finding that there had been a change in circumstances sufficient to continue and increase alimony to Wendy. He argues that Wendy is actually seeking child support but calling it alimony. A decision whether to award alimony is a matter that lies within the trial court’s sound discretion, and on appeal we will not reverse a trial court’s decision to award alimony absent an abuse of that discretion. McKay v. McKay, 340 Ark. 171, 8 S.W.3d 525 (2000); Cole v. Cole, 82 Ark. App. 47, 110 S.W.3d 310 (2003). Alimony is intended to rectify any economic imbalance in the earning power and standard of living of the parties in light of the particular facts of the case. Cole, 82 Ark. App. at 58, 110 S.W.3d at 317. The primary factors to be considered are the financial need of one spouse and the ability of the other spouse to pay. Id.
Modification of an award of alimony must be based on a change of circumstances of the parties. Herman v. Herman, 335 Ark. 36, 977 S.W.2d 209 (1998). The burden of showing a change of circumstances is always on the party seeking the change in the amount of alimony. Hass v. Hass, 80 Ark. App. 408, 97 S.W.3d 424 (2003). In the divorce decree, the parties agreed that alimony would discontinue when Evan graduated from high school. Therefore, the burden of showing a change of circumstances to support a continuation and increase of alimony was on Wendy.
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the divorce decree by continuing and increasing alimony. First, the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of Victor’s ability to pay and Wendy’s need. Wendy’s annual income is $33,000 while Victor’s is $82,500. Wendy’s expert witness testified that Victor had the ability to pay up to $2000 per month in alimony.
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Larry D. Vaught, Judge.
Appellant Victor Bettis appeals the trial court’s order modifying the divorce decree that extended and increased alimony payments to his former wife, appellee Wendy Bettis. We affirm.
Victor and Wendy were divorced in 2002. They have three children — Megan, Jacqueline, and Evan. Jacqueline and Evan were minors at the time of the divorce, age sixteen and fourteen respectively. Jacqueline suffers from cerebral palsy and is confined to a wheelchair. Although Jacqueline requires twenty-four hour a day care, she is currently enrolled at the University of Central Arkansas and maintains a 3.0 grade-point average.
The divorce decree awarded custody of Jacqueline and Evan to Wendy; awarded Wendy child support for Jacqueline and Evan; acknowledged that child support for Jacqueline would continue beyond the age of majority because of her disability; and awarded $1000 per month in alimony to Wendy until Evan graduated from high school.
In November 2004, the trial court entered an order that, among other things, stated that child support would continue for Jacqueline due to her disability; however, the parties agreed that child support for Jacqueline was abated as of May 1, 2004, so that she could receive government assistance.1 According to the testimony at trial, Jacqueline is not entitled to government benefits if Wendy receives child-support payments for Jacqueline.
On March 20, 2006, Victor filed a motion for termination of alimony and child support. He alleged that child support payments for Evan should be terminated, because Evan turned eighteen and was about to graduate from high school. Wendy conceded this issue, and the trial court terminated these payments. Victor also alleged that alimony should be terminated because the divorce decree stated that alimony will be terminated upon Evan’s graduation from high school. Wendy filed a response and counter-motion seeking the continuation and increase of alimony.
At trial, Wendy testified that she is employed as a teacher at the Cathedral School where she has worked for twelve years. Her salary for the 2006-07 school year was $33,000. Since the divorce, her salary has increased $5100. She fives in the home that she and Victor built to accommodate Jacqueline’s special needs. The testimony was undisputed that Wendy is the primary-care giver for Jacqueline year round and that Jacqueline needs assistance with every task. Also, while Jacqueline is in college during the school year, she fives with Wendy during the weekends, holidays, and summers.
Victor testified that he is employed with Remington Arms where he earns $82,500 a year. He testified that since the divorce,his salary has increased in excess of $10,000. He admitted that Wendy is the primary care giver for Jacqueline, but he testified that he provides help when needed.
Lyles Henry testified on behalf of Wendy as an expert witness. He reviewed Victor’s tax returns and his Affidavit of Financial Means. Mr. Henry testified that Victor had a net annual income of $60,022 and expenses of $36,732. Therefore, Mr. Henry concluded that Victor had the ability to pay $1000-$2000 per month in alimony.
The trial court subsequently entered an order finding that there had been a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the divorce decree justifying an increase in the duration and amount of alimony awarded to Wendy. The trial court stated:
The substantial change in circumstances include the following:
a. The Defendant’s annual income increased by at least $10,000 since the entry of the Divorce Decree and the Plaintiffs annual income increased by at least $5000 since the entry of the Divorce Decree.
b. The Defendant received a $30,000 bonus from his employer.
c. The child support for Jacqueline has been abated. The Plaintiff anticipated at the time of the divorce that she would be receiving child support payments to assist in Jacqueline’s care and to provide her a home. Plaintiff is not receiving child support payments to assist her in the care of Jacqueline, who is an adult and who is in need of care because of her disability.
d. Jacqueline is attending college.
e. The Defendant is not paying any child support for Jacqueline and therefore has a higher level of income than he anticipated at the time of the divorce.
f. Plaintiff provides a substantial amount of care for Jacqueline.
g. Either of the parties could have chosen to provide the care for their adult daughter, who is in need of substantial care, however, the party who provided the care for Jacqueline was Plaintiff.
The trial court further stated that it considered the tax effect of Victor’s continued alimony payments. The court found that Wendy’s weekly income was approximately $512 while Victor’s weekly income was approximately $1,184.55. The trial court then awarded alimony to Wendy in the amount of $1150 per month and awarded her $3000 in attorney’s fees and expenses. Victor has appealed from this order.
Victor first argues that the trial court erred in finding that there had been a change in circumstances sufficient to continue and increase alimony to Wendy. He argues that Wendy is actually seeking child support but calling it alimony. A decision whether to award alimony is a matter that lies within the trial court’s sound discretion, and on appeal we will not reverse a trial court’s decision to award alimony absent an abuse of that discretion. McKay v. McKay, 340 Ark. 171, 8 S.W.3d 525 (2000); Cole v. Cole, 82 Ark. App. 47, 110 S.W.3d 310 (2003). Alimony is intended to rectify any economic imbalance in the earning power and standard of living of the parties in light of the particular facts of the case. Cole, 82 Ark. App. at 58, 110 S.W.3d at 317. The primary factors to be considered are the financial need of one spouse and the ability of the other spouse to pay. Id.
Modification of an award of alimony must be based on a change of circumstances of the parties. Herman v. Herman, 335 Ark. 36, 977 S.W.2d 209 (1998). The burden of showing a change of circumstances is always on the party seeking the change in the amount of alimony. Hass v. Hass, 80 Ark. App. 408, 97 S.W.3d 424 (2003). In the divorce decree, the parties agreed that alimony would discontinue when Evan graduated from high school. Therefore, the burden of showing a change of circumstances to support a continuation and increase of alimony was on Wendy.
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the divorce decree by continuing and increasing alimony. First, the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of Victor’s ability to pay and Wendy’s need. Wendy’s annual income is $33,000 while Victor’s is $82,500. Wendy’s expert witness testified that Victor had the ability to pay up to $2000 per month in alimony. At trial, Victor admitted that “I’ve got more than enough [money] to cover my expenses and continue to pay the alimony.” In contrast, Wendy testified that, “I cannot make my house payment without the current alimony.” Wendy’s ability to pay the mortgage is significant in light of the undisputed fact that she is the primary care giver for Jacqueline who, along with Wendy, must have a place to live. Even Victor testified about the importance ofWendy having a home: “I would agree that Jacqueline needs a place to stay on the weekends. [I] [n]ever denied that [Jacqueline] needs a place to stay on holidays and in the summer. My ex-wife has been the only one to provide that.”
Furthermore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a change of circumstances. Since the entry of the divorce decree, Victor’s income increased by $10,000 while Wendy’s increased only by $5000. At the time of the divorce, Victor anticipated paying child support indefinitely, and because it was abated, he has experienced an unexpected increase in income. When the parties divorced, Wendy testified that she never anticipated that Jacqueline would be able to attend college. Moreover, Wendy did not anticipate that Jacqueline’s child support would be abated so that Jacqueline could receive government benefits. These facts alone demonstrate a significant change in circumstances since the entry of the divorce decree.
We disagree with Victor, and the dissent, that this case is nothing more than Wendy’s effort to collect child support by calling it alimony. We further acknowledge the unusual circumstances of this case: Jacqueline will likely need care and support for the rest of her life, but she cannot be the beneficiary of child-support payments because of her receipt of government benefits. Nevertheless, based on the findings of the trial court Wendy is, independent from the child-support issue, entitled to continued and increased alimony.
Victor also argues that the trial court erred in awarding $3000 in attorney’s fees and expenses in favor of Wendy. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-309(b) (Repl. 2002) provides that a court may allow either party additional attorney’s fees for the enforcement of alimony. Victor contends that his motion to terminate alimony and Wendy’s counter motion to continue and increase alimony does not fall within the purview of that statute. We disagree. There was only one issue in this case — whether Wendy was entitled to alimony. We also note that the trial court has great discretion on the issuance of an attorney’s fee award in alimony cases. McKay, 340 Ark. at 183, 8 S.W.3d at 532. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to Wendy, and we affirm the award.
Affirmed.
Pittman, C.J., and Hart, Bird and Heffley, JJ., agree. Gladwin, Griffen, Glover and Miller, JJ., dissent.