NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SANDRA LILIANA BETANCOURT No. 25-667 CANO; SALMA JANAI OBANDO Agency Nos. BETANCOURT, A220-717-224 A220-717-226 Petitioners,
v. MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 16, 2026** Portland, Oregon
Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Petitioners Sandra Liliana Betancourt Cano (“Betancourt Cano”) and Salma
Janai Obando Betancourt, natives and citizens of Colombia, seek review of a Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing their appeal from an
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying their claims for asylum, withholding of
removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief.1 We deny the petition.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Where, as here, the BIA “issues
its own decision but relies in part on the [IJ’s] reasoning, we review both decisions.”
Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2016). We review the agency’s
internal relocation determination for substantial evidence. See Arrey v. Barr, 916
F.3d 1149, 1161 (9th Cir. 2019). Under this standard, findings of fact are
“conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.” Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022). We
review the agency’s denial of humanitarian asylum for abuse of discretion. Belayneh
v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 2000). The agency does not abuse its discretion
if it “hear[s] the claim” and “consider[s] the evidence.” Marcu v. I.N.S., 147 F.3d
1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1206–07
(9th Cir. 2017).
1. The agency properly allocated the burden to the government to rebut the
presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution. And when evaluating whether
the government met its burden, the agency properly considered Betancourt Cano’s
1 Salma Janai Obando Betancourt, Betancourt Cano’s minor daughter, is a beneficiary of Betancourt Cano’s asylum application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). Petitioners do not challenge the agency’s denial of CAT relief. Thus, they have forfeited that claim. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).
2 25-667 testimony that, after leaving her abusers, she had lived safely in Bogota, Colombia
for several years. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(3), 1208.16(b)(3); Afriyie v. Holder,
613 F.3d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Bringas-Rodriguez
v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Gonzalez-Hernandez v.
Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2003).
2. The BIA did not fail to address Cano’s burden-shifting argument or ignore
the reasonableness prong of the internal relocation analysis. The BIA affirmed the
IJ’s findings that “DHS met its burden to show that [Betancourt Cano] could safely
relocate within Colombia,” and that Betancourt Cano could “safely and reasonably
relocate within Colombia.” (emphasis added).
3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Betancourt Cano
may safely and reasonably relocate within Colombia. The record reflects that
Betancourt Cano moved away from her father more than two decades ago and has
not had any contact with him in six years. The record also reflects that Betancourt
Cano has not suffered any harm or threat from her ex-partner Carlos since 2015 at
the latest, when she left him and moved to Bogota, where she lived safely for several
years. See Gonzalez-Hernandez, 336 F.3d at 999. Betancourt Cano further testified
that she could safely practice her religion while she lived in Bogota. While
Betancourt Cano contends the agency erred by not explicitly addressing evidence of
her post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in its relocation analysis, Betancourt Cano
3 25-667 did not raise this claim before the BIA and, therefore, failed to exhaust it. See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).
4. The agency did not abuse its discretion by denying Betancourt Cano’s
request for humanitarian asylum under the first prong, which considers whether the
petitioner has compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return to her home
country arising out of the severity of her past persecution. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A); see also Vongsakdy v. I.N.S., 171 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir.
1999). “Extremely severe persecution is required to warrant humanitarian relief.”
Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 662 (9th Cir. 2019). The agency did not abuse its
discretion by concluding that Betancourt Cano’s harm did not rise to the level of
“rare” and “atrocious” persecution that warrants a discretionary grant of
humanitarian asylum. Vongsakdy, 171 F.3d at 1205. The agency adequately
considered the severity of Betancourt Cano’s past persecution and compared it to the
persecution suffered by the applicant in Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec. 16, 19–20
(BIA 1989), as we have instructed the agency to do. See Vongsakdy, 171 F.3d at
1207. The agency further noted that, unlike the applicant in Matter of Chen,
Betancourt Cano’s “harm was inflicted for the most part in private settings and by
private actors.”
While Betancourt Cano contends that the agency erred by ignoring evidence
of her PTSD when assessing her claim for humanitarian asylum under this prong,
4 25-667 the agency was not required to “expressly parse or refute on the record each
individual argument or piece of evidence” that Betancourt Cano presented.
Ramirez-Villalpando v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). The IJ’s
written decision, which the BIA adopted, found the totality of Betancourt Cano’s
“sexual, physical, emotional[,] and verbal abuse” less severe than the persecution
described in Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec. at 19–20.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SANDRA LILIANA BETANCOURT No. 25-667 CANO; SALMA JANAI OBANDO Agency Nos. BETANCOURT, A220-717-224 A220-717-226 Petitioners,
v. MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 16, 2026** Portland, Oregon
Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Petitioners Sandra Liliana Betancourt Cano (“Betancourt Cano”) and Salma
Janai Obando Betancourt, natives and citizens of Colombia, seek review of a Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing their appeal from an
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying their claims for asylum, withholding of
removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief.1 We deny the petition.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Where, as here, the BIA “issues
its own decision but relies in part on the [IJ’s] reasoning, we review both decisions.”
Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2016). We review the agency’s
internal relocation determination for substantial evidence. See Arrey v. Barr, 916
F.3d 1149, 1161 (9th Cir. 2019). Under this standard, findings of fact are
“conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.” Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022). We
review the agency’s denial of humanitarian asylum for abuse of discretion. Belayneh
v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 2000). The agency does not abuse its discretion
if it “hear[s] the claim” and “consider[s] the evidence.” Marcu v. I.N.S., 147 F.3d
1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1206–07
(9th Cir. 2017).
1. The agency properly allocated the burden to the government to rebut the
presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution. And when evaluating whether
the government met its burden, the agency properly considered Betancourt Cano’s
1 Salma Janai Obando Betancourt, Betancourt Cano’s minor daughter, is a beneficiary of Betancourt Cano’s asylum application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). Petitioners do not challenge the agency’s denial of CAT relief. Thus, they have forfeited that claim. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).
2 25-667 testimony that, after leaving her abusers, she had lived safely in Bogota, Colombia
for several years. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(3), 1208.16(b)(3); Afriyie v. Holder,
613 F.3d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Bringas-Rodriguez
v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Gonzalez-Hernandez v.
Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2003).
2. The BIA did not fail to address Cano’s burden-shifting argument or ignore
the reasonableness prong of the internal relocation analysis. The BIA affirmed the
IJ’s findings that “DHS met its burden to show that [Betancourt Cano] could safely
relocate within Colombia,” and that Betancourt Cano could “safely and reasonably
relocate within Colombia.” (emphasis added).
3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Betancourt Cano
may safely and reasonably relocate within Colombia. The record reflects that
Betancourt Cano moved away from her father more than two decades ago and has
not had any contact with him in six years. The record also reflects that Betancourt
Cano has not suffered any harm or threat from her ex-partner Carlos since 2015 at
the latest, when she left him and moved to Bogota, where she lived safely for several
years. See Gonzalez-Hernandez, 336 F.3d at 999. Betancourt Cano further testified
that she could safely practice her religion while she lived in Bogota. While
Betancourt Cano contends the agency erred by not explicitly addressing evidence of
her post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in its relocation analysis, Betancourt Cano
3 25-667 did not raise this claim before the BIA and, therefore, failed to exhaust it. See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).
4. The agency did not abuse its discretion by denying Betancourt Cano’s
request for humanitarian asylum under the first prong, which considers whether the
petitioner has compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return to her home
country arising out of the severity of her past persecution. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A); see also Vongsakdy v. I.N.S., 171 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir.
1999). “Extremely severe persecution is required to warrant humanitarian relief.”
Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 662 (9th Cir. 2019). The agency did not abuse its
discretion by concluding that Betancourt Cano’s harm did not rise to the level of
“rare” and “atrocious” persecution that warrants a discretionary grant of
humanitarian asylum. Vongsakdy, 171 F.3d at 1205. The agency adequately
considered the severity of Betancourt Cano’s past persecution and compared it to the
persecution suffered by the applicant in Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec. 16, 19–20
(BIA 1989), as we have instructed the agency to do. See Vongsakdy, 171 F.3d at
1207. The agency further noted that, unlike the applicant in Matter of Chen,
Betancourt Cano’s “harm was inflicted for the most part in private settings and by
private actors.”
While Betancourt Cano contends that the agency erred by ignoring evidence
of her PTSD when assessing her claim for humanitarian asylum under this prong,
4 25-667 the agency was not required to “expressly parse or refute on the record each
individual argument or piece of evidence” that Betancourt Cano presented.
Ramirez-Villalpando v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). The IJ’s
written decision, which the BIA adopted, found the totality of Betancourt Cano’s
“sexual, physical, emotional[,] and verbal abuse” less severe than the persecution
described in Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec. at 19–20. In doing so, the IJ necessarily
compared the relative psychological harms in each case. See id. at 20–22. To
presume the agency ignored evidence simply because its written decision did not use
the terms “post-traumatic stress disorder” or “PTSD” would violate the presumption
of regularity we afford to agency decisions. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534
U.S. 1, 10 (2001).
5. The agency did not ignore Betancourt Cano’s request for humanitarian
asylum under the second prong, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B), or abuse its
discretion in denying humanitarian asylum under that prong. The agency considered
Betancourt Cano’s request under this prong. Betancourt Cano’s testimony that
Carlos did not harm or threaten her after she left him in 2015, supports the agency’s
determination that it is unlikely she will suffer serious harm from Carlos upon her
return. Before the BIA, Betancourt Cano did not raise her claim that she will likely
suffer serious harm due to gang violence and therefore failed to exhaust it. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1). Finally, there is no clear record evidence that Betancourt Cano’s
5 25-667 PTSD was exacerbated while she lived in Bogota, or that she will be unable to
receive adequate treatment for her PTSD if she returns. Thus, the agency did not
abuse its discretion by concluding that Betancourt Cano did not establish a
reasonable possibility she will suffer other serious harm upon her return to
Colombia. See Sowe v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1281, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2008).
PETITION DENIED.
6 25-667