Besse v. Blossman
This text of 521 So. 2d 570 (Besse v. Blossman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Lloyd O. BESSE and Julie Cotton Besse
v.
Richard S. BLOSSMAN, Jr., et al.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
*571 Douglas C. Ellis, Covington, for plaintiffs/appellants.
John Sneed, New Orleans, for defendant/appellee Fred Earhart.
Richard Muller, Mandeville, for defendant/appellee Kelly McHugh & Associates.
William J. Jones, Jr., Covington, for defendant/appellee Richard S. Blossman.
Before COVINGTON, C.J., and SAVOIE and LeBLANC, JJ.
SAVOIE, Judge.
Plaintiffs/appellants, Lloyd Besse and Julie Besse, filed suit against defendant/appellee, Richard S. Blossman, Jr. on January 29, 1985, seeking a rescission of a contract of sale of immovable property and damages or, in the alternative, a reduction of the purchase price. Also joined as defendants in the suit were Frederick Earhart, the closing attorney at the act of sale; and Kelly McHugh & Associates, who prepared a survey of the property for the appellants.
Prior to trial, appellants dismissed both Frederick Earhart and Kelly McHugh & Associates with prejudice.
FACTS
On December 30, 1983, appellants purchased by warranty deed, a lot and house from the appellee. The purchase price for the lot and home was $83,500.00. The property which appellants purchased was burdened with a servitude of right of way for a power line which traversed the easterly side of the property. The power line was evidenced by several large metal towers with girders on the top from which the utility lines were suspended. The power lines belonged to Central Louisiana Electric Company, Inc. (CLECO). Appellants testified unequivocally that they were aware of the power lines before they went to the act of sale.
At appellants' request, Kelly McHugh & Associates prepared a survey of the property for the appellants, the cost of which was paid by the appellants at the act of sale. This survey was introduced into evidence at trial, and it erroneously indicated that a 100 foot servitude of right of way existed on the property when in fact the correct width of the right of way was later found to be 125 feet.
Appellants also testified that they were told by the closing attorney and the realtor that a 100 foot right of way existed on the property.
Approximately three months after appellants moved into the house, they began preparations to construct a garage on the easterly side of their house. However, upon noticing the preliminary work on the garage, a representative of CLECO halted the project. Appellants allege that they were informed for the first time by the CLECO representative that the right of *572 way on the property was 125 feet wide rather than 100 feet wide.
According to the testimony of appellant, Lloyd Besse, the proposed garage was to be located approximately 15 feet from the house. The proposed garage encroached approximately 10 feet into the right of way. The 125 foot right of way of which appellants complain has been a part of the public records in St. Tammany Parish since May 25, 1957.
In addition to the right of way problems, appellants claim that upon moving into the house in January of 1984, they began noticing incomplete work in different rooms of the house.
In January of 1985, appellants filed suit against appellee seeking to rescind the sale or, in the alternative, a reduction in the purchase price. The suit was based on the seller's warranty against eviction under La. Civil Code Articles 2500 through 2519 and on the sellers warranty against the existence of redhibitory defects under La.Civil Code Articles 2520 through 2548. Appellants also sought damages in the nature of mental anguish and inconvenience due to the alleged problems with the property and house. The suit was tried on August 4, 1986.
ACTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT
The trial court ruled in favor of appellee and held that appellants were not entitled to rescind the sale. However, the trial court did find that a reduction of $11,000.00 in the purchase price was warranted. The trial court rejected appellants' claim for mental anguish. The trial court also rejected appellants' claim for damages resulting from a defective septic tank located on the premises.
The trial court awarded appellants damages in the amount of $1,000.00 for the "loss of usable" area which resulted from the existence of 125 foot right of way. The trial court also found that appellants were entitled to $285.49, which was the amount spent in preparation for the construction of a garage on the premises. The trial court awarded appellants $1,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs of the trial court proceedings.
Lastly the trial court also found that appellants had been inconvenienced by the problems which they had encountered with the property and house, and awarded $1,000.00 to compensate them for this inconvenience.
Appellants filed a devolutive appeal and listed four assignments of error. Appellees answered the appeal claiming five assignments of error. However, all assignments of error can be concisely covered by review of the following issues:
1. Whether the trial court was correct in denying appellants' claim for rescission of the sale; and in granting appellants a reduction in the purchase price of the house.
2. Whether the trial court was correct in denying appellants' claim for mental anguish.
3. Whether the trial court was correct in denying appellants' claim for damages for a defective septic tank.
4. Whether the trial court was correct in finding that appellants were entitled to an award for the "loss of usable area" and reimbursement of costs incurred in preparation for building a garage.
5. Whether the trial court was correct in denying appellants' claim for damages for partial eviction.
6. Whether the trial court was correct in awarding appellants attorney's fees.
7. Whether the trial court was correct in awarding appellants damages for inconvenience.
ISSUE NO. 1
The trial court ruled that appellants were not entitled to a rescission of the sale based on the seller's warranty against eviction due to the fact that the right of way in this case was an apparent charge on the property and the seller did not warrant its nonexistence. We agree. Louisiana courts have adopted the view that a vendor does not warrant the property conveyed as free from apparent servitudes. Richmond v. Zapata Development Corp., 350 So.2d 875 (La.1977).
*573 The trial court also stated that the sale would not be rescinded "on the basis... that the thing sold was so useless to the purchasers in the state that it was sold that it must be presumed they would not have bought it knowing of these defects. These are defects which can be cured...." The trial court found that redhibitory defects existed at the time of sale to such an extent as to warrant a reduction in the purchase price of the house. The trial court has the discretion to deny a rescission of the sale if a reduction in the purchase price is more appropriate. LSA-C.C. art. 2543; Wade v. McInnis-Peterson Chevrolet, Inc., 307 So.2d 798 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975). Such a finding is supported by the record.
A principal element in formulating the amount of the reduction in the purchase price is the cost of repairs. Griffin v. Coleman Oldsmobile, Inc., 424 So.2d 1116 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982).
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521 So. 2d 570, 1988 WL 15858, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/besse-v-blossman-lactapp-1988.