Berry-Beall Dry Goods Co. v. Adams

1922 OK 326, 211 P. 79, 87 Okla. 291, 1922 Okla. LEXIS 298
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedNovember 28, 1922
Docket12612
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 1922 OK 326 (Berry-Beall Dry Goods Co. v. Adams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Berry-Beall Dry Goods Co. v. Adams, 1922 OK 326, 211 P. 79, 87 Okla. 291, 1922 Okla. LEXIS 298 (Okla. 1922).

Opinion

MILLER, J.

This action was commenced in the district court of Pittsburg county by Berry-Beall Dry Goods Company, a corporation, plaintiff, against F. E. Adams-, defendant, to recover approximately $1,500 claimed by plainftiff to he due from defendant on account.

On February 26, 3921, being the same day on which the petition was filed in said court, the plaintiff caused a garnishment summons to be issued and served on the Springfield Fire Insurance Company, Citizens Fire Insurance Company, and the National Fire Insurance Company as garnishees.

Thereafter the garnishees filed their answers, and thereupon the defendant, F. E. Adams; filed a motion to discharge the garnishment proceeding. Several grounds are relied upon by the defendant as shown in his motion to discharge, but it will not be necessary to set them out or even refer to them.

This motion came on for hearing on March 26, 1921, and on said day was by the court sustained. The plaintiff saved all necessary exceptions and, in open court, gave notice of its intention to appeal. to the Supreme Court of this state from the ruling and order of the court sustaining the motion and discharging the garnishee. It asked and was granted 90 days in which to make and serve a case-made. Thereafter the case-made was served, settled, and signed, and on September 3, 1921, the petition in error, with case-made attached, was filed in this court

The plaintiff below appears here as plaintiff in error and the defendant below appears here as defendant in error. For convenience the parties will be referred to as they appeared in the lower court.

The defendant on October 4, 1922, filed a motion to dismiss the petition in error and for judgment on the supersedeas bond. The ground relied on in said motion to dismiss is that the order discharging the garnishee was made and entered on March 26, 1921, and the petition in error was not filed in this court until September 3, 1921. That under section 5266, Revised Laws of Oklahoma, 3910, an appeal from an order discharging a garnishee must be lodged in the Supreme Court within 30 days from the date of the order. Said section reads as follows:

“When an order, discharging or modifying an attachment or a temporary injunction, shall be made in any case, and the party who obtained such attachment or injunction shall except to such order, for the purpose of having the same reviewed in the Supreme Court upon petition in error, the court or judge granting said order shall, upon application of the proper party, fix the time, not exceeding 30 days from the discharge or modification of said attachment or injunction, within which such petition in error shall be filed; and during such time the execution of said order shall be suspended, and until the decision of the case upon the petition in error, if the same shall be filed; and the undertaking, given upon the allowance of the attachment, shall be and remain in force until the order of discharge shall take effect. If such petition in error shall not be filed within the time limited, the order of discharge shall become operative and be carried into effect; and the certificate of the clerk of the Supreme Court that such- petition is or is not filed, shall be evidence thereof.”

On October 14, 1922, the plaintiff filed a response. It contends that this is a garnishment and said section 5266, supra, specifies attachment and makes no reference to garnishments, therefore said section does not apply. It further contends that this is not a garnishment in an attachment proceeding. That no grounds for attachment are pleaded and no attachment was issued.

We do not agree with these contentions. A garnishment is not only a species of attachment, but is in effect an attachment. The primary purpose and object of attachment is to bring certain property under the jurisdiction of the court and subject it to the court’s orders. In other words, to place the property in custodia legis. When an *293 officer attaches goods and chattels; he frequently places them in charge of and under the control of some third person to safely keep and protect, subject to the further orders of the court. When the officer levies upon such goods and chattels, they are immediately placed in custodia legis and so remain notwithstanding (he attaching officer may deliver said goods and chattels to some third person who holds them as trustee.

Garnishment is an attachment of goods, chattels, credits, and effects that are already in the hands of some third person, but belonging to or owing to the defendant or judgment debtor, as the case may be. When the officer serves the garnishment process on the garnishee, the goods, chattels, credits, and effects belonging to the defendant or judgment debtor, in the hands of such garnishee, are immediately placed in cus-todia legis. This constitutes an attachment of the goods, chattels, credits, and effects belonging to the defendant or to the extent of his interest .therein to the same extent as though the officer had taken actual possession and exercised exclusive authority and control over the same. But the officer serving the garnishment process would not have a right to demand that either the goods or money be forthwith delivered to him, because the garnishee may have some right to the possession of the goods or interest therein, or the debt may -not yet be due, and the plaintiff or attaching creditor cannot obtain any greater rights or interest than the defendant has. The attachment lien only fastens upon said attached property to the extent of defendant’s ownership,- rights, or interest therein. The service of the garnishment process suspends the defendant’s right to demand possession of the property or payment of the debt. This right is thereby transferred to the court from whence the garnishment process 'issued, .and the garnishee thereafter holds the property subject to the orders of the court. It is therefore in custodia legis. But the court should not make any order that changes, lessens, or affects the rights, interest, or time of payment of the garnishee. It is the duty of the court to protect and enforce all of the rights of the garnishee, but the property remains in his hands as trustee and subject to whatever right or interest he may have therein.

In Barton et al. v. Spencer et al., 3 Okla. 270, 41 Pac. 605, the syllabus reads:

“Where service of process in garnishment is had. the property found in the possession of the garnishee is in custodia legis, and no rights can be obtained in such property by subsequent attaching creditors, as' against a creditor causing the garnishment summons to issue.”

In Beamer et al. v. Winter et al., 41 Kan. 596, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the syllabus read.:

“(1) Garnishment is attachment in the hands of a third person, and thereby is a species of seizure by notice.
“(2) The garnishee is liable to the plaintiff in attachment for all personal property in his hands, from the time he is served with the notice of garnishment as prescribed in para. 37, ch. 81. Comp. Laws of 1885.”

In the body of -the opinion Horton, C. J., speaking for the court, said:

“In the briefs originally filed and in the former opinion handed down by this court, the question whether the service of the garnishee summons in Eureka city was an attachment or a seizure of the note in that city was not fully discussed.

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Bluebook (online)
1922 OK 326, 211 P. 79, 87 Okla. 291, 1922 Okla. LEXIS 298, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/berry-beall-dry-goods-co-v-adams-okla-1922.