[494]*494OPINION
By the Court,
Hardesty, J.:
For the first time, we consider NRS 11.340, a statute enacted by the Legislature in 19 ll2 that provides a plaintiff whose judgment is subsequently reversed on appeal with the right to file a new action within one year after the reversal. We conclude that this [495]*495statute violates the separation of powers doctrine because it unconstitutionally interferes with the judiciary’s authority to manage the judicial process and this court’s ability to finally resolve matters on appeal by precluding subsequent and repetitive efforts to re-litigate the same claims. As we strike NRS 11.340, we necessarily examine the district court’s dismissal of the underlying action on preclusion grounds. We affirm the district court’s order because appellants relied solely on NRS 11.340 and failed to provide any arguments to explain why claim and issue preclusion should not apply. Finally, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs to respondents to sanction appellants for filing a frivolous complaint, and therefore, we reverse the post-judgment attorney fees and costs award to respondents.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2001, respondent Howard Bloom filed a petition in the district court seeking the appointment of special administrators for the estate of Rose Miller. The petition was subsequently opposed by two of Miller’s nieces, appellants Marilyn Berkson and Gertrude Malacky, on the grounds of undue influence and a lack of testamentary capacity. Bloom also filed a separate petition for the appointment of a trustee regarding the Rose Miller Living Trust, which was also opposed by appellants on the same grounds. Berk-son and Malacky subsequently filed a civil complaint in district court against respondent Barbara LePome. These three actions were ultimately consolidated by the district court, which later dismissed Berkson and Malacky’s civil complaint, concluding that the causes of action raised were either not recognized in Nevada or were duplicative of the claims raised in the estate and trust actions. In 2004, the district court dismissed the lack-of-testamentary-capacity claims pending in the estate and trust actions and concluded that the sole issue remaining for trial was the undue influence issue. At the trial, the jury found in favor of Berkson and Malacky, but this court reversed that judgment on appeal, in a July 12, 2006, unpublished order, concluding that the jury’s verdict was not supported by substantial evidence.
Thereafter, in November 2006, Berkson and Malacky filed a new complaint in district court asserting claims for undue influence, breach of contract, fraud, elder abuse and neglect, intentional misstatement of facts, negligence, conspiracy and per se violation of Nevada law, and misconduct. Their complaint also sought attorney fees and costs. This complaint continued the litigation against Barbara LePome and Bloom and added respondents Robert LePome, John Gorman, and Richard Donaldson as additional defendants. Respondents moved the district court to dismiss [496]*496the complaint based on, among other things, their assertion that the complaint was barred by claim and issue preclusion. The district court subsequently entered an order summarily granting the motion to dismiss the complaint “in its entirety” over Berkson and Malacky’s opposition. Berkson and Malacky have now appealed the district court’s dismissal order. After the notice of appeal was filed, the district court awarded respondents attorney fees and costs to sanction Berkson and Malacky for filing a frivolous complaint. Berkson and Malacky have also appealed from this post-judgment award.
DISCUSSION
We begin our discussion of the issues presented in this appeal by addressing Berkson and Malacky’s challenge to the district court’s application of the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion to their complaint. After concluding that the district court properly dismissed the underlying complaint on this basis, we then turn to Berkson and Malacky’s appellate arguments related to the post-judgment award of attorney fees and costs to respondents, which, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude must be reversed.3
Dismissal of Berkson and Malacky’s complaint
On appeal, Berkson and Malacky argue that the district court erred in dismissing their complaint because NRS 11.340 clearly and unambiguously granted them the right to file a new complaint after this court reversed the jury verdict in their favor. NRS 11.340 provides that
[i]f an action shall be commenced within the time prescribed therefor, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be reversed on appeal, the plaintiff, or if the plaintiff dies and the cause of action survives, the plaintiff’s heirs or representatives, may commence a new action within 1 year after the reversal.
According to Berkson and Malacky, because NRS 11.340 authorizes the filing of a new complaint after the reversal on appeal of a judgment in their favor, that statute necessarily precludes the application of claim and issue preclusion to their new complaint, and thus, the district court’s dismissal of their complaint on such grounds was improper. This court has not previously addressed [497]*497NRS 11.340, which has not been substantively amended or altered since its enactment.4
Words in a statute will be given their plain meaning unless such an approach would violate the spirit of the act. V & S Railway v. White Pine County, 125 Nev. 233, 239, 211 P.3d 879, 882 (2009). Further, a statute will be construed in order to give meaning to its entirety, and this court ‘ ‘ ‘will read each sentence, phrase, and word to render it meaningful within the context of the purpose of the legislation.’ ” Harris Assocs. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 119 Nev. 638, 642, 81 P.3d 532, 534 (2003) (quoting Coast Hotels v. State, Labor Comm’n, 117 Nev. 835, 841, 34 P.3d 546, 550 (2001)).
As Berkson and Malacky correctly point out, the plain language of NRS 11.340 explicitly authorized their filing of a new action after this court reversed the judgment in their favor on appeal. And if NRS 11.340 is to have any real effect, it necessarily follows that the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion could not be applied to bar a new action filed based on that statute. Claim and issue preclusion essentially bar recovery on or prevent relitigation of previously resolved issues. See Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1054-55, 194 P.3d 709, 713 (2008) (explaining that claim preclusion acts to bar claims brought in a subsequent action between the same parties that either were brought or could have been brought in a prior action, and issue preclusion applies, under certain circumstances, when issues addressed in an earlier suit arise again in a later suit). To that end, these principles would apply to bar an action brought under NRS 11.340 and would render the statute meaningless, as any new action filed under the statute would automatically be subject to summary dismissal on preclusion grounds, which is exactly what happened in the underlying case. Thus, under this court’s established rules of statutory construction, NRS 11.340 must be read as not only authorizing the filing of a new action after the reversal of a judgment in plaintiffs’ favor on appeal, but as barring the application of claim and issue preclusion to any new action filed under the statute.
This conclusion does not end our analysis, however. In responding to Berkson and Malacky’s appellate contentions, respondents argue that NRS 11.340 violates the separation of powers doctrine and should be struck down as unconstitutional. Specifically, [498]*498they contend that the statute unduly hampers the judiciary’s ability to manage litigation through the application of the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion, and as a result, runs afoul of separation of powers principles. Berkson and Malacky dispute that respondents’ separation of powers arguments provide a basis for affirming the district court’s decision. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with respondents’ contention that NRS 11.340 violates the separation of powers doctrine.
NRS 11.340 violates separation of powers
Separation of powers
The separation of powers doctrine is the most important foundation for preserving and protecting liberty by preventing the accumulation of power in any one branch of government. Secretary of State v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 466, 93 P.3d 746, 753 (2004). Nevada’s separation of powers provision, contained in Article 3, Section 1(1) of the Nevada Constitution, provides that
[t]he powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments, — the Legislative, — the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution.
The Constitution further embodies this concept of limited government by specifically delineating the powers granted to the three distinct and coequal branches of government, as set forth in Article 4 (legislative), Article 5 (executive), and Article 6 (judicial). Commission on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 292, 212 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2009). As coequal branches, each of the three governmental departments has “inherent power to administer its own affairs and perform its duties, so as not to become a subordinate branch of government.” Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 261, 163 P.3d 428, 439 (2007) (internal quotations omitted); accord Blackjack Bonding v. Las Vegas Mun. Ct., 116 Nev. 1213, 1218, 14 P.3d 1275, 1279 (2000).
We have.been especially prudent to keep the powers of the judiciary separate from those of either the legislative or the executive branches. See, e.g., Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 19, 422 P.2d 237, 242 (1967). This separation is fundamentally necessary because “ ‘[wjere the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would be the legislator: Were it joined to the [499]*499executive power the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.’ ” Id. at 19, 422 P.2d at 242 (quoting the French Enlightenment thinker Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, whose views had a significant following within the Revolutionary generation); The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison) (stating that “[t]he oracle who is always consulted and cited on [separation of powers] is the celebrated Montesquieu”).
Here, the conflict is between an act of the Legislature — NRS 11.340 — and the inherent ability of the judiciary to manage litigation and finally resolve cases. Regarding such discord between the legislative and judicial branches of government, it is well settled that the judiciary retains the authority to “ ‘hear and determine justiciable controversies’ ” as a coequal power to the Legislature’s broad authority to enact, amend, and repeal legislation. Halverson, 123 Nev. at 260, 163 P.3d at 439 (quoting Galloway, 83 Nev. at 20, 422 P.2d at 242). And as one commentator aptly explained this distinction, “[t]o declare what the law is or has been is judicial power; to declare what the law shall be is legislative.’’ 1 Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 191 (8th ed. 1927).
In keeping with this theory, “ ‘[t]he judiciary ... has the inherent power to govern its own procedures.’’’ State v. Dist. Ct. [Marshall], 116 Nev. 953, 959, 11 P.3d 1209, 1212 (2000) (quoting Whitlock v. Salmon, 104 Nev. 24, 26, 752 P.2d 210, 211 (1988)); see also NRS 2.120(2) (legislative recognition that this court regulates civil practice in order to promote “the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits”). The judiciary is entrusted with “ ‘rule-making and other incidental powers reasonable and necessary to carry out the duties required for the administration of justice’ ” and “to economically and fairly manage litigation.” Borger v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 1021, 1029, 102 P.3d 600, 606 (2004) (quoting Goldberg v. District Court, 93 Nev. 614, 616, 572 P.2d 521, 522 (1977)); see also Marshall, 116 Nev. at 959, 11 P.3d at 1213 (stating that “‘[t]here are regulating . . . powers of the Judicial Department that are within the province of the judicial function, i.e., . . . promulgating and prescribing any and all rules necessary or desirable to handle the business of the courts or their judicial functions’ ’’(second and third alterations in original) (quoting Galloway, 83 Nev. at 23, 422 P.2d at 244)). Thus, “‘the legislature may not enact a procedural statute that conflicts with a pre-existing procedural rule, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers, and . . . such a statute is of no effect.’” Marshall, 116 Nev. at 959, 11 P.3d at 1213 (quoting State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345, 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983)); see also Secretary of State, 120 Nev. at 465, 93 P.3d at 752 (ex[500]*500plaining that the Legislature cannot restrict, substantially impair, or defeat the exercise of this court’s constitutional powers); Whitlock, 104 Nev. at 26, 752 P.2d at 211 (concluding that a particular statute did not encroach on judicial authority because it did not disrupt or abrogate a court rule); but see Connery, 99 Nev. at 345, 661 P.2d at 1300 (noting that any court-created procedural rules “may not conflict with the state constitution or abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right” (internal quotations omitted)). In addition to the constitutionally mandated bases for keeping separate those inherent powers of the judiciary, leaving control of court rules and the administration of justice to the judiciary, and thereby placing the responsibility for the system’s continued effectiveness with those most familiar with the latest issues and the experience and flexibility to more quickly bring into effect workable solutions and amendments, makes good sense. Goldberg, 93 Nev. at 617-18, 572 P.2d at 523.
Claim and issue preclusion
This court’s use of the concepts of claim and issue preclusion is well established. See Whitman Mining Co. v. Baker, 3 Nev. 386, 393 (1867) (discussing preclusive effects); Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 194 P.3d 709 (2008) (clarifying Nevada law on claim and issue preclusion). While claim and issue preclusion are legal doctrines rather than procedural rules per se, we conclude that these legal doctrines are nonetheless subject to the same constitutional separation of powers analysis as this court’s procedural rules. Other courts discussing this issue are in apparent agreement with our conclusion that certain legislative encroachments on the judiciary’s ability to apply claim and issue preclusion to cases decided on their merits raise separation of powers concerns. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Lit., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 71-84 (D. D.C. 2009) (examining in extensive detail the issue of judicial power and finality of judgments under federal precedent and stating an inclination to conclude that because of the centrality of preclusion principles to the judiciary’s purpose of rendering final judgments in civil cases, under certain circumstances, legislation negating these doctrines violates separation of powers); McFadden v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 112 P.3d 1191, 1195, 1198 (Or. 2005) (suggesting that a statute preventing application of preclusion principles to a final judgment on the merits would violate the Oregon state constitution on separation of powers grounds).
The important public policy behind the application of preclusion principles further supports our conclusion that a statute, such as [501]*501NRS 11.340, which prohibits the application of these doctrines, violates separation of powers. Claim preclusion is necessary because “‘fairness to the defendant[ ] and sound judicial administration[ ] require that at some point litigation over the particular controversy come to an end.’” Five Star Capital, 124 Nev. at 1058, 194 P.3d at 715 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19 cmt. a (1982)). As for issue preclusion, the important policy reasons for its application include “conserving judicial resources, . . . maintaining consistency, and . . . avoiding oppression or harassment of the adverse party.” In re Sandoval, 126 Nev. 136, 141, 232 P.3d 422, 425 (2010) (internal quotations omitted). These significant public policies advanced by the application of preclusion principles are directly thwarted by NRS 11.340 because it acts to prolong previously resolved cases, resulting in unnecessary expenses for adverse parties and the diversion of time and scarce judicial resources away from undecided cases.
We therefore hold that NRS 11.340 unconstitutionally interferes with the judiciary’s authority to manage the litigation process and this court’s ability to provide finality through the resolution of a matter on appeal. Consequently, we strike NRS 11.340 as unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds.5
Because we strike the statute, Berkson and Malacky’s refiled complaint is subject to preclusion principles. Berkson and Malacky, however, have provided no analysis or discussion in their briefs to explain how their claims would survive the application of preclusion principles with regard to any of the respondents, including those named as defendants for the first time below. It is well established that this court need not consider issues not supported by cogent argument and citation to relevant authority. See [502]*502Edwards v. Emperor’s Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). As a result, we necessarily affirm the district court’s dismissal on preclusion grounds.6
Although concurring in the result, our dissenting colleague would leave NRS 11.340 at peace by offering an alternative interpretation to the statute that renders it only applying to circumstances in which a plaintiff’s case has been reversed on appeal, unlike the situation here, on “technical” grounds. We disagree that such an approach should guide our analysis.
First, the interpretation of NRS 11.340 advocated by the dissent violates the plain reading of that statute by reading in language that is not there and fundamentally altering the text when neither appellants nor respondents ever argue that NRS 11.340 is ambiguous. Second, our esteemed colleague effectively argues for the approach taken by California courts that read the “on the merits” element into that state’s version of NRS 11.340, section 355 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, even though, at the time of these California decisions, section 355 contained no such language. See, e.g., Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 154 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1944); 3 Kerr’s Cyclopedic Codes of California, Code of Civil Procedure, at 332 (1907) (quoting section 355 as providing that “ ‘[i]f an action is commenced within the time period prescribed therefor, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be reversed on appeal, the plaintiff, or if he die and the cause of action survive, his representatives, may commence a new action within one year after the reversal’ ”). While it is true that the text for NRS 11.340 appears to be largely drawn from California’s section 355 and that the California courts have interpreted their provision in a manner consistent with the approach advocated by the dissent, we conclude that such an approach is unduly problematic. For instance, the analysis in Bollinger simply declares the outcome and relies heavily on a New York statute that is significantly different from section 355. In its enactment, section 355 was reproduced from a section of the New York Code of Civil Procedure that similarly lacked an “on the merits” element. See Bollinger, 154 P.2d at 404 (noting that section 355 was copied after section 84 of the New York Code of Procedure); Gaines v. [503]*503City of New York, 109 N.E. 594, 595 (N.Y. 1915) (quoting section 84 as providing that “[i]f an action be commenced within the time prescribed therefor, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be reversed, on appeal, the plaintiff, or if he die and the cause of action survive, his heirs or representatives, may commence a new action within one year after the reversal”). Subsequently, however, by the time the Gaines decision was published, New York had replaced section 84. Bollinger, 154 P.2d at 405 (noting that the Gaines decision addressed a successor to section 84). The replacement New York statute discussed in Gaines set forth that
[i]f an action is commenced within the time limited therefor, and a judgment therein is reversed on appeal, without awarding a new trial, or the action is terminated in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits; the plaintiff, or, if he dies, and the cause of action survives, his representative, may commence a new action for the same cause, after the expiration of the time so limited, and within one year after such a reversal or termination.
109 N.E. at 595. In relying on Gaines, in our view, the Bollinger court did not sufficiently account for the fact that the amended New York statute in Gaines expressly provided the specific “upon the merits” exception missing from the California statute. Further, we also note that the amended New York statute does not enumerate all possible “technicalities” that could lead to a reversal, and thus, the California reading allowing new causes of action only for reversals not “on the merits” arguably goes even further than the amended New York statute.
Finally, while the California Legislature has subsequently amended the section 355 language to adopt the “on the merits” element historically read in by the California courts, see 1992 Cal. Stat. 887; see also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 355 (West 2006) (noting that the amended section 355 provides “[i]f an action is commenced within the time prescribed therefor, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be reversed on appeal other than on the merits, a new action may be commenced within one year after the reversal”), our Legislature has, to date, not similarly adopted this amendment. We should not supply judicial meaning to a statute that is plain and unambiguous. Rather, this court should leave this decision to the Legislature if it wants to extend statute-of-limitations periods for judgments that have been reversed on appeal for “technical” reasons. Further, if this court were instead to proceed to recognize the “on the merits” element discussed in the dissent, we, and not the Legislature, would also hereafter be called [504]*504to supply, on a case-by-case basis, which “technical” reversals fit within the “on the merits” exception, and which do not.
Accordingly, for the above listed reasons, we are not persuaded by the dissent’s suggestion that NRS 11.340 should be saved through interpretation rather than struck down on separation of powers grounds.
Attorney fees and costs award
Finally, Berkson and Malacky challenge the district court’s post-judgment order awarding attorney fees and costs to respondents as a sanction, arguing, among other things, that NRS 11.340 clearly authorized the filing of their dismissed complaint and that it therefore cannot be considered frivolous. Respondents, however, argue that the lawsuit was frivolous and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions.
This court reviews a district court’s award of attorney fees and-costs, as a sanction, for an abuse of discretion. See Nevada Power v. Fluor Illinois, 108 Nev. 638, 646-47, 837 P.2d 1354, 1360 (1992). Here, the district court summarily awarded attorney fees and costs without citation to authority. As noted, NRS 11.340’s plain language permitted Berkson and Malacky to refile their claims. Moreover, before this opinion, there was no precedent addressing NRS 11.340, and thus, no reason to anticipate that the statute would be found to be unconstitutional. Accordingly, because appellants’ position was supported by NRS 11.340, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to sanction appellants for filing a frivolous claim. Nevada Power, 108 Nev. at 646-47, 837 P.2d at 1360. As a result, we reverse the attorney fees and costs awarded to respondents.7
Parraguirre, C.J., and Cherry and Saitta, JJ., concur.