Berk v. The City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 31, 2020
Docket1:20-cv-01548
StatusUnknown

This text of Berk v. The City of New York (Berk v. The City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Berk v. The City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JESSICA BERK Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-1548(LLS) SENIOR CITIZEN RENT INCREASE ORDERTO AMEND EXEMPTION (SCRIE) and DISABLED RENT INCREASE EXEMPTION (DRIE), Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990(ADA), alleging that Defendants violated her rights. By order dated March 24, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is,in forma pauperis (IFP).For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits — to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible — not merely possible — that the pleader is entitled to relief. Jd. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, using the Court’s general complaint form, brings this action against two New York City programs — the Senior Citizen Rent Increase Exemption (SCRIE) and the Disabled Rent Increase Exemption (DRIE).' She asserts that Defendants violated her rights under the ADA by denying her application for benefits.

' The SCRIE program exempts qualified senior citizens living in rent-controlled, rent- stabilized, and certain other rent-regulated apartments from paying rent increases. Similarly, the DRIE program protects eligible disabled tenants from rent increases. See N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 467-b; N.Y. City Admin. Code $$ 26—405(m) et seq., 26-406, and 26-509. If a tenant qualifies under either program, her rent amount is frozen, and the City of New York gives the landlord a property tax credit that is equal to the tenant’s future rent increases. See

Plaintiff alleges the following as the facts of her case, verbatim: Me & my mother qualifies for SCRIE and DRIE (Ex A & B). My mother and I are disabled according to ADA laws. My mother died. I do not have identification. I was denied SCRIE and DRIE because I do not have ID. Advocates for Justice took care of my mother as guardian. They helped me and my mother stay in our apartment. I would like this court to give me an injunction as identification, and have SCRIE & DRIE accept my case and refund the money that was taken from us because they did not give me reasonable accomodations for my disability. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff asserts that as a result of Defendants’ actions, she became homeless. Plaintiff attaches as exhibits to the complaint, instructions for submitting application forms for the SCRIE and DRIE programsto the New York City Department of Finance. DISCUSSION I. Claims against SCRIE and DRIE Plaintiff names as defendants SCRIE and DRIE, programs administered by the New York City Department of Finance and the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development. But she cannot sue the programs nor the agencies that administer them because they are not entities that can be sued. See N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against the City of New York, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against the City of New York, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/property/property_tax_reduc_drie.shtml. and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this action to replace SCRIE and DRIE with the City of New York. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. II. ADA Claims Plaintiff invokes the ADA, alleging that she suffers from a disability and that Defendants failed to reasonably accommodate that disabilitywhen they denied her SCRIE and DRIE

benefits.The ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled in major areas of life. The statute consists of three parts: Title I, 42 U.S.C. §12111et seq., which prohibits discrimination in employment; Title II, 42 U.S.C. §12131 et seq., which prohibits discrimination by public entities; and Title III, 42 U.S.C. §12181et seq., which prohibits discrimination in access to public accommodations. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,532 U.S. 661

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Related

PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin
532 U.S. 661 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
McElwee v. County of Orange
700 F.3d 635 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Emerson v. City of New York
740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg
331 F.3d 261 (Second Circuit, 2003)
Jenkins v. City of New York
478 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Wright v. New York State Department of Corrections
831 F.3d 64 (Second Circuit, 2016)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Berk v. The City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/berk-v-the-city-of-new-york-nysd-2020.