Bergeron Davila v. Marquez

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided March 4, 2024·No. 2:23-cv-01260·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ RAYMOND J. BERGERON-DAVILA,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 23-cv-1260-pp

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MARQUEZ,

Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2), SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A AND DIRECTING DEFENDANT TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (DKT. NO. 22) AND DENYING AS MOOT PLAITNIFF’S MOTION FOR SCREENING ORDER (DKT. NO. 23) ______________________________________________________________________________

Raymond J. Bergeron-Davila, who is incarcerated at Green Bay Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendant violated his constitutional rights. This order resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1, and denies as moot his motion for a screening order, dkt. no. 23. This order also directs the defendant to respond to the plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief, dkt. no. 22. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On October 19, 2023, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial

partial filing fee of $79. Dkt. No. 12. The court received that fee on December 18, 2023. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or

employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d

824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff has sued defendant Correctional Office Marquez. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. On July 4, 2023, the plaintiff allegedly stopped the defendant and told

him that he (the plaintiff) was suicidal and was going to cut himself with a weapon. Id. at ¶1. The plaintiff states that the defendant stopped at the plaintiff’s door and listened to his “suicidal statements.” Id. After listening to the plaintiff’s suicidal statement, the defendant allegedly walked away. Id. at ¶2. The plaintiff alleges that the exchange was recorded on the defendant’s body camera. Id. After the defendant walked off, the plaintiff allegedly “took his very sharp glass we[a]pon and then cut himself on his arm very deep and caused a lot of bleeding as well.” Id. at ¶3.

The plaintiff alleges that Officer Cummings (not a defendant) walked past his cell and saw him bleeding. Id. at ¶5. Cummings and other staff allegedly took the plaintiff from the cell and placed him on suicide watch. Id. The plaintiff states that this “suicidal incident landed him in bed restraints as there was believed to be a ser[]ious suicide risk posed to the plaintiff’s health & safety[.]” Id. at ¶6. The plaintiff claims that the defendant violated his constitutional rights by walking away from the plaintiff when he was cutting himself. Id. at ¶¶8-9.

For relief, the plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at ¶¶10- 11. C. Analysis Failure to provide protection from suicide or self-harm constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation if deliberate indifference by prison officials to an incarcerated individual’s welfare effectively condones the harm by allowing it to happen. Eagen v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 693-94 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations

omitted).

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