Bentzinger v. McMurtrey

Idaho Supreme Court

Bentzinger v. McMurtrey

596 P.2d 785, 100 Idaho 273, 1979 Ida. LEXIS 435

CourtIdaho Supreme Court

DecidedJune 5, 1979

Docket12573

StatusPublished

Cited by16 cases

This text of 596 P.2d 785 (Bentzinger v. McMurtrey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bentzinger v. McMurtrey, 596 P.2d 785, 100 Idaho 273, 1979 Ida. LEXIS 435 (Idaho 1979).

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Opinions

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment based on a jury verdict and a denial of motion for additur or new trial in an action for personal injuries arising from an automobile accident. We affirm.

The sole question presented on this appeal is the inadequacy of the jury verdict as a matter of law. Appellants assign no error involving evidentiary matters or claiming that jury instructions were erroneous. Our inquiry is, therefore, confined to whether the jury verdict is supported by sufficient facts or whether the verdict is inadequate as a matter of law.

Joann Bentzinger, who was five months pregnant, was a passenger in a car which was struck by a vehicle driven by defendant-respondent McMurtrey. The Bentzinger car was stopped at the time of the collision. The evidence could be viewed as indicating that the collision was very slight: the damage to the Bentzinger vehicle consisted of a dent in the left front door; there was no damage to the McMurtrey vehicle; [274]*274there was no injury to any occupant of the McMurtrey vehicle; the Bentzinger vehicle was not moved from its stopped position; and the McMurtrey vehicle stopped side-by-side with the Bentzinger vehicle. Mrs. Bentzinger was not thrown from her seat nor did she strike any other part of the car.

This action was filed on the basis of injury to the lower back of Mrs. Bentzinger and sought to recover her medical expenses for pain and suffering occasioned by the injury and by anxiety about the condition of the unborn child, for reduced earning capacity and for loss of conjugal relations. Defendant McMurtrey admitted liability and a trial was had only on the issue of damages. The jury returned a verdict of $1,000.00, $574.60 of which apparently was for direct medical expenses. The Bentzingers made a motion for additur or new trial, which motion was denied by the trial judge on the basis that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict.

It is axiomatic that a factual determination made by a jury will not be overturned if it is sustained by the evidence. This is particularly true in tort actions where the damages cannot be ascertained with mathematical precision. Hence, where such injuries are subjective and measurable with only an approximation of certainty, their award is primarily a question for the jury and an appellate court should interfere with such a verdict only in the most exceptional circumstances. Gonzales v. Hodsdon, 91 Idaho 330, 420 P.2d 813 (1966). See also Wisdom v. Henderson, 98 Idaho 45, 557 P.2d 1118 (1976); Lombard v. Cory, 95 Idaho 868, 522 P.2d 581 (1974). We have examined the record and find the evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. While it is modest and the evidence might have sustained a larger award, nevertheless we cannot say as a matter of law that there was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in denying the motion for additur or new trial. Wisdom v. Henderson, supra; Lombard v. Cory, supra.

The judgment is affirmed.

DONALDSON and BAKES, JJ., and SCOGGIN, J. Pro Tem., concur.

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SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment based on a jury verdict and a denial of motion for additur or new trial in an action for personal injuries arising from an automobile accident. We affirm.

The sole question presented on this appeal is the inadequacy of the jury verdict as a matter of law. Appellants assign no error involving evidentiary matters or claiming that jury instructions were erroneous. Our inquiry is, therefore, confined to whether the jury verdict is supported by sufficient facts or whether the verdict is inadequate as a matter of law.

Joann Bentzinger, who was five months pregnant, was a passenger in a car which was struck by a vehicle driven by defendant-respondent McMurtrey. The Bentzinger car was stopped at the time of the collision. The evidence could be viewed as indicating that the collision was very slight: the damage to the Bentzinger vehicle consisted of a dent in the left front door; there was no damage to the McMurtrey vehicle; [274]*274there was no injury to any occupant of the McMurtrey vehicle; the Bentzinger vehicle was not moved from its stopped position; and the McMurtrey vehicle stopped side-by-side with the Bentzinger vehicle. Mrs. Bentzinger was not thrown from her seat nor did she strike any other part of the car.

This action was filed on the basis of injury to the lower back of Mrs. Bentzinger and sought to recover her medical expenses for pain and suffering occasioned by the injury and by anxiety about the condition of the unborn child, for reduced earning capacity and for loss of conjugal relations. Defendant McMurtrey admitted liability and a trial was had only on the issue of damages. The jury returned a verdict of $1,000.00, $574.60 of which apparently was for direct medical expenses. The Bentzingers made a motion for additur or new trial, which motion was denied by the trial judge on the basis that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict.

It is axiomatic that a factual determination made by a jury will not be overturned if it is sustained by the evidence. This is particularly true in tort actions where the damages cannot be ascertained with mathematical precision. Hence, where such injuries are subjective and measurable with only an approximation of certainty, their award is primarily a question for the jury and an appellate court should interfere with such a verdict only in the most exceptional circumstances. Gonzales v. Hodsdon, 91 Idaho 330, 420 P.2d 813 (1966). See also Wisdom v. Henderson, 98 Idaho 45, 557 P.2d 1118 (1976); Lombard v. Cory, 95 Idaho 868, 522 P.2d 581 (1974). We have examined the record and find the evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. While it is modest and the evidence might have sustained a larger award, nevertheless we cannot say as a matter of law that there was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in denying the motion for additur or new trial. Wisdom v. Henderson, supra; Lombard v. Cory, supra.

The judgment is affirmed.

DONALDSON and BAKES, JJ., and SCOGGIN, J. Pro Tem., concur.

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596 P.2d 785, 100 Idaho 273, 1979 Ida. LEXIS 435, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bentzinger-v-mcmurtrey-idaho-1979.

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