Bennetti 85442 v. Rand

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedDecember 23, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-02425
StatusUnknown

This text of Bennetti 85442 v. Rand (Bennetti 85442 v. Rand) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bennetti 85442 v. Rand, (D. Ariz. 2020).

Opinion

1 WO MDR 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Dino Bennetti, No. CV 20-02425-PHX-MTL (JFM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 12 Assistant Attorney General Lucy Rand, 13 et al.,

14 Defendants. 15 16 17 On December 16, 2020, Plaintiff Dino Bennetti, who is confined in the Arizona 18 State Prison Complex-Lewis in Buckeye, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint 19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, a Motion for 20 Temporary Restraining Order, and a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Because it appears 21 Plaintiff has at least “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the Court will permit 22 Plaintiff an opportunity to show cause why the dismissals of his prior lawsuits should not 23 prevent him from proceeding in forma pauperis in this action.1 24 25 1 The Court will rule on Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction Counsel only if Plaintiff either pays the filing and 26 administrative fees or persuades the Court that § 1915(g) does not preclude Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status. However, in the interest of justice, the Court has reviewed the 27 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction only to determine whether a temporary restraining order is appropriate at this point 28 notwithstanding the apparent preclusion of Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status. The Court, in its discretion, concludes that a temporary restraining order is not appropriate because there is no valid reason for proceeding ex parte at this point. See American Can Co. v. 1 I. “Three Strikes Provision” of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 2 A prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis 3 (“IFP”) if: 4 the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 5 appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 6 upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under 7 imminent danger of serious physical injury. 8 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 9 “[Section] 1915(g) should be used to deny a prisoner’s IFP status only when, after 10 careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and other relevant information, the 11 district court determines that the action was dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious 12 or failed to state a claim.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). “In 13 some instances, the district court docket records may be sufficient to show that a prior 14 dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a 15 strike.” Id. at 1120. 16 It appears at least three of Plaintiff’s prior actions or appeals qualify as “strikes” 17 under § 1915(g): 18 (1) Bennetti v. Coleman, CV 19-05021-PHX-DGC (JFM) (D. Ariz.) (October 4, 2019 Order dismissing First Amended 19 Complaint for failure to state a claim, and November 19, 2019 20 Judgment of dismissal with prejudice after Plaintiff failed to file a second amended complaint); 21 22 (2) Bennetti v. Ryan, CV 18-00108-PHX-DGC (JFM) (D. Ariz.) (February 6, 2018 Order dismissing Complaint for failure to 23 state a claim and Judgment of dismissal with prejudice); and 24 (3) Bennetti v. Ryan, CV 12-01754-PHX-FJM (SPL) (D. Ariz.) 25 (April 2, 2013 Order dismissing First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, and May 20, 2013 Judgment of 26

Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 321 (7th Cir. 1984) (district court abused its discretion in 27 granting ex parte temporary restraining order “when there was no valid reason for proceeding ex parte and by disregarding the strict procedural requirements of Fed. R. Civ. 28 P. 65(b) for the issuance of such ex parte orders”); Adobe Systems, Inc. v. South Sun Products, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 636 (S.D. Cal. 1999). dismissal with prejudice after Plaintiff failed to file a second 1 amended complaint). 2 3 II. Imminent Danger 4 A plaintiff who has three or more strikes may not bring a civil action without 5 complete prepayment of the $350.00 filing fee and $52.00 administrative fee unless he is 6 in imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). To meet the 7 “imminent danger” requirement, the “threat or prison condition [must be] real and 8 proximate,” Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lewis v. 9 Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002)), and the allegations must be “specific or 10 credible.” Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001). “[T]he exception 11 applies if the complaint makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent 12 danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 13 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting § 1915(g)). Moreover, although a court considering a 14 motion to proceed in forma pauperis, “should not attempt to evaluate the seriousness of a 15 plaintiff’s claims[, . . . ] it has never been the rule that courts must blindly accept a 16 prisoner’s allegations of imminent danger.” Taylor v. Watkins, 623 F.3d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 17 2010). 18 “[T]he availability of the [imminent danger] exception turns on the conditions a 19 prisoner faced at the time the complaint was filed, not some earlier or later time.” Andrews, 20 493 F.3d at 1053. Claims concerning an “imminent danger of serious physical injury” 21 cannot be triggered solely by complaints of past abuse. See Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 22 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998); Luedtke v. Bertrand, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1077 (E.D. Wis. 1999). 23 In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he has been retaliated against because he was 24 transferred to a prison different than the one to which he was supposed to be transferred, 25 his placement in that prison imposes an atypical and significant hardship,2 and he is being

26 2 Plaintiff claims that if he had been transferred to the proper prison, he would have 27 been able to use the phone three times a week, spend $100 a week at the commissary, recreate for two hours three times a week, clean his cell three times per week, and go to the 28 law library. In contrast, at the facility where he is currently confined, he can only use the phone once a week; spend $40 per week at the commissary, where the items are 1 denied access to the courts. These allegations do not show that Plaintiff is in imminent 2 danger of serious physical injury. 3 III. Order to Show Cause 4 “[O]nce a prisoner has been placed on notice of the potential disqualification under 5 § 1915(g) . . . , the prisoner bears the ultimate burden of persuading the court that § 1915(g) 6 does not preclude IFP status.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1120. This Order serves as notice of 7 Plaintiff’s potential disqualification under § 1915(g).

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Related

Kinnell v. Graves
265 F.3d 1125 (Tenth Circuit, 2001)
Taylor v. Watkins
623 F.3d 483 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
United States v. Massachusetts
493 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2007)
Lewis v. Sullivan
279 F.3d 526 (Seventh Circuit, 2002)
Luedtke v. Bertrand
32 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (E.D. Wisconsin, 1999)
Andrews v. King
398 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Puckett v. Benjamin
28 P. 65 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1891)
Adobe Systems, Inc. v. South Sun Products, Inc.
187 F.R.D. 636 (S.D. California, 1999)

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Bluebook (online)
Bennetti 85442 v. Rand, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bennetti-85442-v-rand-azd-2020.